


JPRS-UMA-90-020  
10 SEPTEMBER 1990



FOREIGN  
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# ***JPRS Report***

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# **Soviet Union**

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***Military Affairs***

# Soviet Union

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-90-020

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10 September 1990

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**Gen Army Popov on Caucasus, Military Reform,  
Draft**

*90UM0692A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY  
in Russian 6 Jun 90 p 2*

[Interview with General of the Army and USSR People's Deputy Nikolay Ivanovich Popov by Azerinform Correspondent A. Guseynov: "Strictly Abide By the Law"]

[Text]

[Guseynov] Nikolay Ivanovich, how do you assess the Armenian-Azeri conflict? What do you perceive as the primary cause of its exacerbation?

[Popov] This question is certainly not only complex but also very timely. Actually, events in the Transcaucasus have been developing along the tragic scenario for over two years now and perhaps today it is already difficult to enumerate all of the facts and reciprocal insults, nevertheless, we need to see the primary cause of the outbreak of violence, pogroms, murders, and other violations of the law that have been committed both in Armenia and in Azerbaijan in this diversity of phenomena. In my opinion, the Armenian nationalists territorial claims against the neighboring republic are the cause. Let us recall how many absolutely illegal decisions the Armenian side made on Nagornyy Karabakh. Does the Armenian Supreme Soviet really not see the groundlessness of the demands set forth in a number of documents they adopted on NKAO [Nagornyy Karabakh Autonomous Oblast]? And the tragic events provoked by Armenian extremists in the border areas with Azerbaijan? Why do Armenian law enforcement agencies not put a stop to the activities of criminal elements? Today armed detachments in Armenia are attacking military facilities to seize weapons, ammunition, and combat equipment. Moreover, the terrorists do not exclude a measure such as seizure of hostages from among the officers to exchange them for weapons. You agree such ideas do not come into the head of a civilized person. And what occurred on May 27 is only one link of the long chain of crimes committed by Armenian nationalists. Although it is also impossible not to see that there were and also still are forces in Azerbaijan that are interested in inciting a conflict. It is strange that the union mass media are attempting not to take note of many things. I personally report to my higher authorities and I inform USSR people's deputies. I have issued precise instructions to the troops to put a stop to the attacks. At the same time, I do not understand why the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies honored the memory of those who died in Armenia thereby placing criminals committing armed provocation and servicemen fulfilling their constitutional duty on the same plane. In short, the situation is very serious. We need to once and for all remove the issue of Armenian nationalists' territorial claims against Azerbaijan. Then other problems will also be resolved. And the first of them is the total confiscation of weapons first of all from the population of Armenia and from the population of Azerbaijan.

[Guseynov] What must we do today to put a stop to Armenian terrorists' criminal activities?

[Popov] I am not an advocate of punitive measures. But, as the ancient Romans said, the law is strict but it is the law. In this regard I am convinced that only strict fulfillment of its requirements will restrain all who intend to achieve their extremist goals through bloodshed. Let us say the USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution dated March 5 1990 precisely defines all measures in this regard. However, they are not being carried out. I personally advocate the introduction of a state of siege in a number of areas of Armenia, including in Yerevan and in the border areas with Azerbaijan. Maybe we should create a buffer zone on the Armenian-Azeri border. We need to develop some sort of measures and make decisions.

[Guseynov] You have been elected a USSR People's Deputy. How are you handling this event?

[Popov] First of all, I want to point out that communists-servicemen have assumed an active position today. They have sent thousands of proposals to the CPSU Central Committee concerning improvement of the draft Party Platform and the CPSU Charter. Consolidation of Party forces is occurring in the Army. I am convinced that the Congress must become a critical stage in CPSU activities. I am disturbed by numerous conversations on very important problems that have been hanging in the air for so long because decisions have not been made on them. In other words, I think that the time for talk is passing. We need decisive action to deepen perestroika.

I also have a number of proposals to improve Party work at the current stage. All of them have been compiled taking into account the thoughts expressed by our communists and this is the main thing. I have already sent several of them to the Central Committee and I will arrive at the Congress with the remaining proposals.

[Guseynov] Evidently some of them concern military reform?

[Popov] Absolutely, I am a professional military [officer]. But I am alarmed that some of the mass media are boldly and maliciously coming out against the Armed Forces. Of course, criticism is needed and all the more so since the perestroika process in the Armed Forces is occurring, as it is in society, with a great deal of exertion. But as they say, there is criticism and there is fault-finding.

I do not understand people who are far removed from Army service and who preach to us about how to organize the personnel training and education process. Who stands to gain from this? I am sure that these same destructive forces do. We need each person to primarily be involved in his own profession.

I am using the service experience and the education I have to develop precise views on modern defense structural development. For example, I am an opponent of

the establishment of national armies because in a country like ours the army can only be interethnic. It is entirely possible that we will nevertheless shift to the path of a gradual transition to a professional army. Experiments have already been planned in this context. I concur with the opinion on the need to reduce [the strength of] the Army. We need to significantly strengthen social protection of servicemen. Someone is creating illusions about fantastic officers salaries. Meanwhile, the press recently published that a team leader at a kolkhoz earns more than a regimental commander. Without diminishing the role of a kolkhoz team leader, I will nevertheless say that there is a significantly greater responsibility resting on [the shoulders of] regimental commanders. Many officers do not have housing and up to 70 percent of officers have chronic diseases before they reach 50 years of age. As a rule, a significant number of servicemen's wives do not have job placement opportunities and officers and warrant officers move up to 10 times or more during their service years.

I advocate legitimate criticism and total glasnost but I am against lies and juggling facts. All of the country's citizens must participate in the discussion of many military service issues. But professional politicians and military personnel must resolve those problems that directly impact Armed Force's combat readiness. The military political situation in the world still remains quite complicated and questions on the improvement of combat readiness must be competently decided.

[Guseynov] How do you assess the situation with the draft in Azerbaijani SSR?

[Popov] There are no grounds to dramatize it. On the whole, the Azeri people send fine replacement troops to the Armed Forces. It is true that we would like those conscripts from rural areas to know the Russian language a bit better. And we also must be more concerned about the physical toughness of future defenders of the Homeland. We know that rumors were disseminated at one time about the negative attitude toward Azeri soldiers in units. And Republic Government, Party, and Komsomol organs acted properly by sending numerous workers collective delegations to practically all military districts. On site, they saw how the sons of the Azeri people are serving. And they are serving well.

[Guseynov] And the last question, Nikolay Ivanovich. How do you, as a USSR People's Deputy, organize your interrelations with the voters?

[Popov] I think that we can call ours working interrelations. During meetings, I inform the voters about the work of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and about my own activities. I respond appropriately to practically every voter appeal. It is true that I cannot resolve every issue quickly. Thus, to this day, about 80 percent of voters' request have been realized. The remaining requests are being resolved.

I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to wish my voters and the Azeri people all the very best, great

work success during preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 32nd Azerbaijan CP Congresses, and to transform its decisions into practical matters.

#### **Col Gen Rodionov Open Letter to Shevardnadze**

*90UM0736C Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 20 Jul 90 pp 8-9*

[Open letter from Col Gen I. N. Rodionov: "Only the Entire Truth Can Convince: Open Letter to Minister of Foreign Affairs E. A. Shevardnadze"]

[Text] **USSR Ministry of Defense, Red Banner Order of Lenin and Order of Suvorov General Staff Academy of the USSR Armed Forces imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov, 30 March 1990**

**To Comrade E. I. Safonov, editor in chief of the newspaper LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA**

Dear Ernst Ivanovich! The magazine OGONEK has published an interview with Comrade E. A. Shevardnadze, in which the Tbilisi events of 9 April are treated in a one-sided manner. I have presented my objections to these unwarranted accusations leveled at military subunits and military leaders in a letter to Comrade E. A. Shevardnadze. Bearing in mind the earnestness on the part of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA toward defending the honor and dignity of the military, I am sending you a copy of this letter. If you deem it appropriate, please publish it in your newspaper.

I have also sent copies of the letter to the magazine OGONEK and to the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

**Col Gen I. Rodionov**

\* \* \*

Dear Eduard Amvrosiyevich!

The tragedy in Tbilisi on 9 April occupies a special place among the many dramatic events which have occurred in this country during the years of perestroika. I bow my head in sorrow in honoring the memory of all 19 persons who died there, and I have sincere compassion for the people who were struck by this tragedy. This cannot be permitted ever to happen again. And in order fundamentally to eliminate the very possibility of occurrence of such a situation, it is important thoroughly to analyze it.

In reading your interview in OGONEK a number of questions arise, answers to which cannot be found in the interview. And since you have publicly set forth the way you see the problem and have publicly stated that even today you can understand neither the conduct of the general officers who directed the operation nor the meaning of the statement made by the Chief Military Prosecutor at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, I must express my disagreement with you in an open letter. May the statement to the effect that "in our time it is not enough for military men of such high rank

to be merely soldiers; they must also be politicians" remain on your conscience. I value too highly the prestige and authority of the general-officer rank and my own honor not to note the irony contained in the word "soldier" [voyaka; this word can be meant ironically or disparagingly]. But I would not make an issue of this if I alone were affected. In this case, however, a particular insult discredits the military as a whole, and I feel that something must be said.

#### On the Nature and Specific Features of the Tbilisi Tragedy

You call those events a "punitive operation," and in your deliberations you even allow for the possibility of using tanks after the decision has been made to employ troops. But why do you do this? Does what has happened not cause pain enough, without such assumptions? I can absolutely assure you that the troops did not have the mission of imposing punishment, taking reprisals against the participants in the mass meeting, and particularly against "Georgian democratic forces." Military personnel were only to clear the square in front of Government House and to place government buildings under protective guard. Plans did not call for surrounding, breaking up and chasing off the assembled throng, but only for pushing them back [e.g. with massed riot shields]. There was a reason for the time selected for the operation—four in the morning—a time when usually a minimal number of persons would be remaining on the square.

The military subunits were brought in to conduct the operation without weapons.

Entrenching tools were used only by a few military personnel and solely as a means of defense, when the soldiers encountered harsh, aggressive countermeasures on the part of a portion of the crowd. In a statement by the chairman of the commission to investigate the Tbilisi events, A. A. Sobchak, he acknowledges that employment of the entrenching tools "was objectively unavoidable in view of the situation which developed." It is true that he explains this situation with the actions of only one side: that the company of paratroopers (only one company!), which lacked appropriate gear (riot shields, rubber riot-control sticks, etc), was sent right into the very thick of things. A. A. Sobchak fails to address the question of why the company was brought into action. And yet they had no other choice, since organized resistance, consisting of specially formed detachments of strong, husky adult males and athletes possessing sambo [Soviet unarmed combat martial art] and karate skills, had taken up a threatening position on the flank and to the rear of the Internal Security Forces subunits by Government House. The company was in physical contact with the mass meeting participants for a period of 10-15 minutes, until the situation was brought under control. A. A. Sobchak also is using a little cunning when he claims that the commission's task is to "establish the fact of employment of these entrenching tools and to condemn it. The specific number of victims of these

shovels," he adds, "is not important." As for the total number of victims, of the 19 persons who were killed on that night, not one of them had any cut or puncture-type wounds. And I insist that the results of the official determination of the cause of death of each of the victims, name by name, be made public.

It is true that seven adult males received bodily injuries from entrenching tools. For purposes of comparison, 189 military personnel were hurt during these events, more than 40 of whom sustained injuries requiring casualty-status medical attention. As you can see, one-sided conclusions are inevitable when actions are analyzed only by one side. The same thing can be said in regard to chemical agents. Incidentally, A. A. Sobchak juggles the facts here as well. The report states that suffocation was the direct cause of death for all persons killed on the square. When he continues, however, reporting the fact of differing conclusions on the character and nature of the suffocation, A. A. Sobchak cites only one of them—the simultaneous action of crushing of bodies in a solid mass and inhalation of chemical substances. He must have known, however, but failed to mention the conclusion of UN experts from the Soviet Union from investigation of instances of employment of chemical weapons. I shall mention the principal conclusion: there is no possibility of serious and lethal affections when agents Cheremukha [Soviet version of riot control/tear agents CNB and CNC] and CS are used in an unenclosed outdoor area; the victims were located in front of Government House, where irritant agents were not employed; the results of chemical analysis indicate that such agents were not present on the clothing of the victims.

I once again restate what I said at the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies: "The Georgian people are continuing to live and work in an honorable and upright manner and are not taking part in these rampages. But everything possible is being done to draw the working people into these mob assemblages." Incidentally, in April 1989 you held the same opinion, since you stated on 14 April 1989 at a Georgian Communist Party Central Committee plenum that you were unable to shake the feeling that certain leaders of unofficial organizations "were quite deliberately leading their trusting followers to their deaths, like lambs to the slaughter." So you have finally shaken free of this feeling?

On both sides of the conflict there were many who, although acting in full awareness, did not always see the actual driving forces propelling the unfolding events. Many knew neither the authors nor the directors of the unfolding drama. This is why, when making an assessment of the Tbilisi events, one should proceed not from an emotional description of the physical plot but from a rigorously rational analysis of their political substance.

**On the Motives for and Mechanism of Reaching a Decision to Terminate the Mass Political Rally by Force**

One cannot help but see the contradictions contained in the magazine article. You state that "Rodionov was the only one who resisted its (the army's) employment to the end," but then you place this in doubt with the statement: "Let us assume that the general was ordered to move troops onto the square."

You testify that late in the evening on 7 April, just after returning home from abroad, you already knew about the morning meeting at the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, at which "all necessary decisions were made," and with the reporter's assistance you portray the "foolish decision to employ force in Tbilisi" as a result of the commanding general's alienation from the people. During the interview it is acknowledged in passing that "there were hard-line slogans on the square, there was shouting and yelling, and what have you" on the square, but then it is stated that the people on the square were for the most part members of the Georgian intelligentsia, who are incapable of antigovernment appeals.

Let's think about it. Today practically everybody knows that the unauthorized mass political rally, which went on for several days, began on 4 April. Such slogans as the following, which predominated at the mass meeting, indicate its character and directional thrust: "Long Live a Free Georgia!", "Down With the Russian Empire!", "The USSR—Prison of Nations!", "Russian Occupation Forces Go Home!", "Down With the Turkish Agents!" and the like. And at a mass meeting on 6 April, attended by a crowd of 6,000 people, an appeal to the United States and the NATO countries was approved (incidentally, Turkey is a member of that bloc), an appeal which, in particular, requested help for Georgia in leaving the USSR, including by bringing in NATO or UN troops. If to this one adds the steadily increasing aggressiveness on the part of those in attendance, their militant intolerance, fueled by appeals "to die in the name of the people" and to "shed blood," the weakness of the position taken by those who now would portray this mass meeting as peaceful becomes clear.

Incidentally, on 14 April you noted that party organizations had lost control of the situation, that the situation had become totally uncontrollable and even unpredictable. At that time you acknowledged that there had been "far from peaceful calls for reprisals ringing out on the previous day," 9 April. Why do you say nothing about that now? Several thousand persons took part in the mass meeting. Personally acquainted with many of them, you did not believe that they were bringing forth antigovernment appeals. But many is what percentage of the total in attendance? Is it not high time at least to acknowledge the possibility of unpredictable development of an unauthorized mass meeting? The subsequent bloody events in Abkhazia (on 14 April, noting the difficulties which had developed there, you considered

the situation to be less acute than in Tbilisi) attest to the existence in Georgia of nationalist and extremist forces which were ready and able to exercise savage violence.

Why is it that further on in your interview, as, incidentally, is the case overall in discussing those events, you relegate to oblivion the fact that this was an **unauthorized** mass meeting, and that consequently all those who took part in it, regardless of the motives by which they may have been guided, were taking part in an **unlawful action**? Once again I quote from your statements on 14 April: "Democracy outside the bounds of self-discipline is the essence of anarchy, while freedom without responsibility is suicidal." Proceeding from this absolutely correct position is the right and obligation of the authorities to stop a mass meeting which is destabilizing the situation in the city.

How the mass meeting is to be terminated is another question. You ask: "Could one really use force here?" A bit earlier you say: "If there is no threat to the lives, health and dignity of citizens, if mass meetings and processions do not step beyond the bounds of the law, then one must act within the framework of the law and solely with political means." I shall note that one must always act "within the framework of the law"—without any "ifs." In this instance, however, since the mass meeting had not been authorized, what kind of "boundaries of the law" can one be talking about?

But was there in fact a possibility of defusing the situation without the use of force? Yes—up to 8 April. Republic party and Soviet leaders, however, took a waiting stance. They wanted to establish order, but they could not bring themselves to impose it. Vague decisions were adopted at endless meetings and conferences, decisions which failed to result in effective practical measures. And so long as development of the situation could be kept under control, I resolutely opposed using troops for this purpose. The situation was rapidly deteriorating, however. There was developing a genuine threat of seizure of vitally important installations, which could, using your words, "destabilize the life of the nation and the fate of the republic and all peoples living in it." The temperature of heated-up passions was taking on a particularly alarming, explosive character because a holiday lay ahead, Sunday, 9 April, when the size of the crowd could swell drastically. Under these conditions the republic's leaders made the decision to employ force.

The decision by the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau was voted unanimous approval and support by a meeting of city party activists held at 12 noon on 8 April. And let us not be deluded by the present abundance of critics of that decision: they include many of those who themselves were insisting that military units be employed.

**On Correctness of the Actions Taken By the Military to Break Up the Mass Meeting**

The conduct of the generals who directed the operation is, I shall say it again, incomprehensible to you. A. A.

Sobchak goes even further, asserting that "our military people have not yet grasped the elementary difference between combat operations against the enemy and our own civilian population." At this point one recalls the words of your great fellow countryman: "Everybody imagines himself a hero as he views a battle from an outside vantage point." You find mitigating circumstances for the local leaders: "They did not expect such a huge crowd to gather, and they never imagined that everything would end in tragedy." But it would be better to speak to the substance. No matter how difficult it might be to admit this, one should state right out that, when planning the use of force, that is, when counting on measures involving force, it is impossible to say in advance and unequivocally whether there will be casualties and to what extent. I state, however, that in our operational plan we endeavored to provide for everything possible in order to avoid tragic consequences, but we were not expecting such strong, stiff resistance, the organizers of which have today been withdrawn into the shadows.

During the afternoon of 8 April, by decision of republic leaders, troop-carrying fighting vehicles drove along the streets, past the crowd. This action can be interpreted in various ways. In the interview it is called a "rehearsal" by the military, causing fear and apprehension that action might be taken against the small group which remained on the square. A. A. Sobchak's report speaks of a show of military force, by means of which the public was being warned that troops had been brought into the city and were prepared to act. The military procuracy testifies that the organizers of the mass meeting used this pretext to whip up tensions. Bands of rowdies proceeded to hurl rocks at the vehicles and soldiers.

One is hard put to take seriously your feeling of certitude that if, prior to beginning the operation, I had addressed the crowd with an impassioned appeal to vacate the square, the people would have listened to me. (I should note parenthetically that you appraise more realistically the power of your own words, not venturing "to make any assertion about the development of events" if you and G. P. Razumovskiy had gone to the square to address the people.) I shall quote the statement by the A. A. Sobchak commission: "The entire city knew about the imminent use of force and that the troops were to use force against the crowd to disperse it." Nevertheless Lt Col R. Gventsadze, chief of the MVD Directorate of the city of Tbilisi, addressed the crowd at 3 a.m. on 9 April, immediately before commencement of the operation. He warned them that if the mass meeting continued it would be dispersed by military troops. This statement was ignored, just as was the appeal by Iliya II, Patriarch-Catholico of All Georgia.

It has long been known that history does not know the subjunctive mood. Who knows what would have been if a given individual had proceeded differently? "If changes had been made in the operation in a prompt and timely manner, if the sequence of the operation and its

timetable had been made different," stated A. A. Sobchak, "one can confidently state that such tragic consequences simply would not have been."

At the same time one can inject other "ifs" with equal boldness but with greater justification. If the republic leaders had been capable of defusing the situation by political means.... If the organizers of the unauthorized mass meeting had not called for refusal to carry out the legitimate demands of the authorities.... If the "peaceful" crowd had not offered aggressive, harsh resistance to the military units.... If all the Ministry of Internal Affairs and police subunits had performed their assigned missions and the operation had developed strictly according to plan.... The list of "ifs" goes on and on. But what has been stated is sufficient in order to acknowledge that it is not right to call for preserving the good name of the military while at the same time making it a scapegoat for the sins of others.

Perestroyka is certainly not a one-time action, and all of us have plenty to work on in this direction. I am no exception. But is it valid to level criticism precisely at me and to accuse me of devotion to pre-perestroyka times and policies, when all this is grounded on just this one specific fact? As you yourself said, I opposed right up to the very end settling the conflict by force, a course of action on which republic party and soviet leaders were insisting. The official transcripts of the proceedings of those meetings attest to my repeated, numerous suggestions that the situation be handled by political means (removal of hunger-strikers from Government House; providing a full schedule of classroom activities at the colleges and high schools, eliminating or at least limiting participation by college and high-school students in the mass meeting; transfer of the unauthorized rally; organization of counter-rallies, etc). Not one of these suggestions was carried out.

In this connection I would like to address one more item. You stated, although in reference to another matter, from the speaker's stand at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies: "As a minister, I shall carry out any lawful decision, while retaining the right, however, to submit my resignation whenever I am unable to agree with a decision on the basis of political or moral considerations." But on the evening of 7 April you supported a decision which had been made earlier, and without your (or my) participation, to take preparatory measures for the possible—under exceptional circumstances—employment of troops. You did not insist that the decision to dispatch military units to Georgia to guard facilities and to prevent possible civil disturbances be rescinded, but you continued monitoring the development of events from Moscow by telephone. In Tbilisi on 9 April, you were the representative of this country's highest-level political leadership, and a curfew could neither be introduced nor lifted without your knowledge. But in the interview you emphasize your role only in lifting it. Why is that?

But that is not the point. Does a military man of any rank—from general officer to buck private—have the legal right to “resign” upon receiving an operation order? It is my profound conviction that a government to which the army does not subordinate itself is of little worth, and I cannot imagine an army operating behind the government’s back. In addition: what ethics or morality justifies a commander who abandons his men at the most difficult moment? An opinion on this score directly expressed by a member of government is particularly important since in the interview you speak of the inadmissibility of a situation whereby the military would engage in other than its own job, but without specifying who should bear responsibility if things are otherwise.

Incidentally, I, just as you, was not in Tbilisi on 7 April. I was in Leninakan, working in connection with earthquake recovery efforts. However, upon receiving orders from Moscow—I emphasize this point because in Moscow they knew the direction that was being taken by events in Georgia, and how these events were developing, and they knew that the situation there had sharply deteriorated—I immediately headed for Tbilisi, without making any calls to clarify the situation, etc. I personally assessed the situation on the spot, and I agreed with the opinion of the republic Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and the meeting of city party activists. Now you are castigating that decision, which was made without your participation. But why were you not there? You offer a very interesting explanation: “I think that the Georgian comrades were apprehensive that the arrival of a member of the Politburo would attract the townspeople’s attention and would aggravate the situation to an even greater extent, making it uncontrollable.”

Pardon my soldier’s straightforward ways, but I would like to ask you a number of questions in turn.

Why is it that you, a Georgian by nationality, who was in power in Georgia for a long period of time, call the present republic leadership “the Georgian comrades,” as if distancing yourself from them? Why would the arrival of a member of the Politburo in his native republic (you speak of the people of Georgia as “my people”) possibly give rise to such apprehensions? Why did you dispel these apprehensions neither by word nor by deed, and why did you not head for Georgia in all haste, where your political wisdom was so needed? Why did it not serve as a warning of tragedy?

#### **On Assessment and Elucidation of the Tbilisi Events**

The impression is created that hidden forces are at work in our society, leading public opinion in a strictly determined direction. Let us start with the careful hushing up not only of the conclusions or at the very least the proceedings, but even the very fact of **operation by an official commission** of the Supreme Soviet, headed by G. S. Tarazevich. And yet it arrived in Tbilisi right after the tragedy and without any prejudice or bias. Why the marked perplexity regarding the co-report by the Chief

Military Prosecutor at the congress? After all, he “proceeded to act,” as you put it, not on his own, but at the decision of that same USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, which formed the A. A. Sobchak commission. Incidentally, the fact that most of the public was unaware of A. F. Katusev’s report is at variance with the notion of glasnost. In addition, there was no debate at the Congress on this matter, and neither Katusev nor anybody else was able to speak, “like everybody.” Katusev’s opinion on the validity of the criticism leveled at him as a citizen and as an official—Chief Military Prosecutor—has been made public (see SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 25 March 1990).

Now they would like to convince us that everything from the report by the Congress commission “would seem to be clear to everybody,” and yet its content reflects the viewpoint of the Congress. I shall remind you, however, that by its resolution the Congress did not approve and did not ratify the commission’s findings, but merely took note of these findings. It did not condemn specific agencies nor specific individuals, but the very fact of employment of violent force in Tbilisi. The commission’s proposals are subject to review and decision by the appropriate bodies during monitoring of their execution on the part of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

Consequently, attempts by anybody to interpret the decisions of the Congress in a one-sided manner, to the benefit of ministerial or group interests or ambitions, should be rejected. They are particularly reprehensible when responsibility for the events is placed on the executor, while he who made the decision remains in the shadows. However, as A. A. Sobchak stated, “we must determine who it is that gives soldiers an order to act in one situation and not to act in another.” “Without this it is impossible,” and I am quoting you, “to strengthen the military and to respect those who guard the homeland.”

The magazine OGONEK titled your interview “Convincing With the Truth.” But only the entire truth can convince.

Colonel General I. N. Rodionov

#### **Adverse Effects of Lithuanian Activism on Soviet Army Reported**

**90UM0613A Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA**  
*in Russian No 8, Apr 90 (Signed to press 12 Apr 90)*  
*pp 18-19*

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Gavrilov, under the rubric “Commemorating Events in Lithuania”: “Where Is Sayudis Leading Us”]

[Text] Literally on the second day after the leaders of Sayudis, who had become firmly established in the republic’s Supreme Soviet, actually carried out an unconstitutional coup, I had occasion to visit the capital of Lithuania. On the surface, the recent political events had in no way disturbed the daily rhythm of Vilnius life. And only by walking around the city, did I become

convinced that this impression was misleading. Everywhere—on the streets and on public transports—people were discussing the changes that had taken place, arguing, and were either outraged or happy. I accidentally overheard the conversation of several youths—Russians and Lithuanians. One of them stated with pleasure—"No longer will everyone have to serve in the military". Another shrugged his shoulders in response: "All the same one cannot do without an army. And somehow it turns out to be frivolous. The secession from the Soviet Union has not yet been legalized and they have already declared that the military commissariats are unnecessary and that there will not be conscriptions"...

Such statements are not uncommon. Sayudis and certain other Lithuanian public organizations of a nationalistic persuasion have conducted a broad campaign aimed at discrediting the Armed Forces. With that end in view, political rallies have been organized, pickets have been set up near the regimental command posts of units stationed in the republic's territory, and inflammatory leaflets have been disseminated. Figuratively speaking, the mass media has participated and continues to actively participate in this. One only has to leaf through a number of newspaper files for recent months in order to be convinced of what a crock of filth local journalists and supernumerary authors have poured out on the army. And in so doing, they do not particularly care about conclusiveness and are guided primarily by emotions. By way of illustration, two articles of an antimilitary nature were carried in one of the issues of the so-called independent newspaper, POLITIKA, which is published in Vilnius. In one of them, signed by R. Grigas, a Roman Catholic priest in Poland, the conscription of the young Kaunas resident D. Kazalupskas into the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces is presented as a tragedy. The article emphasizes that the youth was enticed, almost fraudulently, to the military registration and enlistment office and subsequently "he was taken a thousand kilometers away from Lithuania". In the other article, a certain T. Nikolskaya from Leningrad joins her accomplices from Sayudis in unsubstantiated attacks against the army. The goal of such publications is obvious: to create an illusion of "nationwide" condemnation of "inhumane military service".

The lion's share of such negative information is intended for young people. A particularly single-minded cultivation of conscripts was carried on. It was instilled in them that service in the Soviet Army is "immoral" and "is not in keeping with the vital interests of the Lithuanian nation". The repudiation of basic military training has taken place at secondary schools everywhere and classes conducted by military subfaculties at the universities have been boycotted. And it is no wonder that such "brainwashing" has had an appreciable influence upon a significant portion of young Lithuanians. Cases of conscripts failing to appear at military registration and enlistment offices and of burning military service cards or turning them into the military commissariats in protest have become more frequent.

During a discussion on this topic, Colonel K. Golubev, the chief of the political section in the republic's military commissariat, stated: "After scarcely coming into power, Landsbergis and his accomplices hastened to announce they would defend the borders of Lithuania themselves and announced the abolition of military commissariats in the republic. One can hardly consider this a serious and well-thought-out step. Rather, this is evidence of the fact that the Sayudis activists Vayshvila, Yasukaytite, and others responsible for military issues in Landsbergis's government are simply ill-informed about them".

"Immediately after it was reported over local television that the military commissariats were being dissolved, we held a general meeting of the staff at the republic's military commissariat. The resolution adopted by us required the holding of a referendum, which would determine the legality of the resolutions passed by the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet. Afterwards, we personally handed Landsbergis our protest..."

Let us speak frankly, it is difficult to predict the consequences of the adventuristic actions of Lithuania's new leaders. But here is what the facts indicate. Within just three days of the enactment of the corresponding laws, more than fifty Lithuanian servicemen in units in the Baltic Military District deserted. Kolesnikovas, one of the local Sayudis leaders in Alitus, demanded that the leaders at the city military registration and enlistment office begin negotiations on dissolving the military commissariat and turning its building over to the gospolkom. Attempts were also made to disorganize the work of military registration and enlistment offices in a number of other cities and rayons in Lithuania. The registration of draftable men was immediately hindered. Incidentally, the committee on questions of military service for Lithuanian youths, which was created in May 1989 and is subordinate to the LiSSR Supreme Soviet's Presidium, took the Lithuanian soldiers, who deserted from the USSR Armed Forces, under its wing. It is planned to create some "frontier" units, which supposedly should stand guard over the republic's borders, from none other than these deserters. On 15 March 1990, reports on the creation of 76 "border checkpoints" slipped into the local organs of the press.

Despite their frequent assertions of peaceableness and declarations that "Lithuania does not need an army", the new leaders understand perfectly well that they cannot do without armed forces. The so-called army without weapons, commanded by the self-styled General Raudonisa, was created with the leaders' blessings. The "soldiers" in this army took the oath as long ago as 14 May 1989 in Vilnius's Nagorniy Park. The Lithuanian Reserve Officers League, which is considered the basis for forming the officer corps of the future "national army", is actively functioning. Young people are being urged to join various paramilitary organizations with very obscure missions.

According to estimates of officials at the republic's military commissariat, from 50 to 80 percent of the youths might not report to induction centers this spring, thereby evading service in the USSR Armed Forces. In this case, will they not become that dangerous force, which is capable of provoking various conflicts? If this occurs, the consequences of such conflicts will be unpredictable. It would be advisable for those who are assuming responsibility for Lithuania's future destiny to ponder this. Especially, if one takes into account that many people do not share the view of Landsbergis and his supporters regarding the republic's future. And I would like to believe that common sense will prevail.

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**'Due to Unfamiliarity with the Requirements of War'**  
*90UM0787A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK*  
*in Russian No 6, Jun 1990 pp 3-8*

[Article by Captain 1st Rank A. Bobrakov: "'From Lack of Familiarity with the Requirements of War': Defeat is occurring on land and at sea. What should the tasks of military reform be directed at in this regard?"]

[Text] We are gradually becoming accustomed to the fact that the stream of newspaper and magazine criticism directed at the Army and Navy is not only not decreasing but, on the contrary, is increasing. We cannot agree with some things, some things demand refutation, but any of these articles, even those that are outwardly extremely absurd, suggest a certain reflection. I would also include V. Marinichev's literary humor "Why Nipples for the Admirals?" among them. It was published in ZVEZDA [Star] Magazine (No. 10, 1989). In it, the author asserts that there has not been anything triumphant or heroic in the history of the Russian Navy. And he refers to the destruction of the fleet in the Battle of Tsushima as confirmation of this argument. I do not think that there is a need either to convince the author otherwise or to teach our history to him. But we need to particularly talk about the Navy's defeats, also including at Tsushima. Although from the point of view of those obvious causes that preceded the outcome of the Battle of Tsushima which to this day serves all of us not only as a somber reminder but also prompts us to action because history, as we know, has a tendency to repeat itself.

Thus, Tsushima.... How have contemporaries characterized the causes of the Russian Navy's defeat? For example, Grand Prince Vice Admiral A. Liven, in the work "Dukh i distsiplina nashego flota" [Our Navy's Spirit and Discipline] pointed out that "battles are not being lost deliberately, therefore I also consider myself justified in saying that our Navy's poor state and unsuccessful performance occurred due to our personnel's unfamiliarity with the requirements of war."<sup>1</sup> But if 90 years ago "unfamiliarity with the requirements of war" occurred because "perhaps there will not be a war," today some educated people think that we can already

get along quite well without "perhaps," while counting on troop reductions and conversion as a panacea for all of the economic misfortunes that have appeared in our society.

Naturally, both conversion on a rational scale and reduction of Army strength to allowable limits are a necessary thing. However, can we maintain the high level of troop combat readiness while reducing their quantity without raising their quality? Of course not, any sensible man will say. In this case, is it possible to sharply raise troop quality after having curtailed 120,000 officers and warrant officers, that is, professionals of which we have an extreme shortage during the course of a 500,000 man Armed Forces reduction? Really to do this, besides general appeals, it is necessary to practically change if even only one factor that in my opinion determines troop combat readiness: the quality of officer personnel, conscripts, logistical conditions (from arms to troop maintenance), and legal interrelations in the Army and the State.... Alas, no perceptible changes have occurred for the time being.

Recently we have increasingly turned to experience from across the ocean while resolving various union-wide problems, even those like election of the first president. Just what experience has the U.S. accumulated during ground and naval forces reductions? This is a difficult question. Because since the time of the Vietnam War, the U.S. has not once reduced its armed forces. I cannot even mention how many attempts to begin talks on reduction of the United States Navy have been, as they say, swept aside. As for the Army, the Americans have conducted a reorganization. And the strength of their armed forces has actually decreased as a result of well thought-out and smooth transformations. As I have already stated, the Navy has remained inviolable. And today the U.S. is significantly superior to our Navy. For the first time, it is precisely the threat from the sea that threatens us to a greater degree than the threat from land. Thanks to our disadvantageous geographical position, NATO is capable of creating stunning superiority in men and equipment in any maritime theater in a short period of time.

**How can our Navy oppose this force?**

Let us begin with an assessment of the state of our ships. Incidentally, is it worth pointing out what conclusions were made in Russia precisely in this regard after Tsushima? "Many people blame our equipment of the last war," noted our famous Vice Admiral A.A. Liven. "Our artillery shells were bad, ships were slow and poorly protected, and battleships capsized etc., etc. ...If we more closely examine the primary deficiencies of our technical matters during that war, we become convinced that they occurred not so much from unsatisfactory execution as from an unsound concept of operations. Why were our artillery shells poor? Not because we did not know how to manufacture them better but because the view established itself among artillery men that they had to fire precisely these shells.... And a destroyer's speed, armor,

weapons, and personnel, their assignment, supply, and training, had this all not really been approved and confirmed by the most prominent representatives of the line?"<sup>2</sup>

When you report the same assessments to officers currently assigned to sea duty, their reaction is almost identical: "So, the situation was entirely different at that time. At the present time, industry manufactures not what the Navy needs but what they are capable of manufacturing and what it is advantageous for them to manufacture." And, alas, this is so. I can list examples of both unsuccessful ship designs, ineffective weapons, and violations of technology due to which, for example, the Americans have christened some of our submarines whose primary characteristic must be concealment as "raging bulls." I can name specific cases when the latest nuclear powered submarines were "laid up" due to defective mechanisms. Finally, everyone remembers the loss of the nuclear submarine Komsomolets. The majority of problems not only of the Navy and the Armed Forces but of the country as a whole have been focused on this tragedy.

Let us take just rescue equipment. Not only has it not been perfected, you get the impression that in our country each department that manufactures it invents their product from "scratch" and this system can ruin even the richest country. If versions of the American Harpoon cruise missile have been installed on many classes of surface combatants, aircraft, submarines, and small naval combatants of all NATO countries, in our country, for example, not only does each branch of the Armed Forces have its own specific missiles, but even the Navy has many types of missiles and each such type needs its own specialists, ZIP [spare parts], and equipment. Until recently, each missile had its own platform created under it, that is, a ship or small naval combatant. It seems like we, deserving of better application, are persistently moving toward the pre-Petrine period when each cannon in the Russian Artillery had its own caliber and its own unique combat supplies. We all know what the result of this was in battle.

A production monopoly, both for the country as a whole and for the Armed Forces, allows not only pressing through unreliable equipment that is very difficult to service but also dictating operating requirements that are almost impossible to actually accomplish. This allows representatives of industry to not even attempt to search for technological or design flaws in their products when accidents or malfunctions occur and, as a result, this has become the rule: The Navy is always at fault in any accident.

Today the advisability of constructing our own aircraft carriers is being discussed. What can we say here? A whole squadron of ships located in the open sea can be destroyed in the very first hours that combat operations have been initiated if it does not have modern air cover. Only carrier aircraft are capable of providing cover far from shore. However, after the Armed Forces reductions

in 1959-1961, our aviation "came to its senses" 30 years later and only in recent years have some types of aircraft emerged that meet world standards. Everyone understands that any reduction is dangerous not only for losses of individual weapons and equipment, but also of technologies, rigging, experience, experts, and prospects, that is, everything for which dozens of years are required in the best case. The same is true with conversion. It seems to me that for the time being no one has seriously assessed what conversion will cost the current state of the Army and Navy and especially their future. There are types of arms which are not developed during wartime. Let us recall that our industry did not deliver one major ship to the Navy during wartime. We fought with those that were built prior to the war. In modern war, there will not be a safe rear area and therefore we will fight with what was developed during peacetime. Therefore, we need to build ships today and on a competitive basis. As in Czarist Russia and while considering the experience of Tsushima, Novik Class battleships, the best in the world at that time, were built on a competitive basis. Today, a Soviet plant director talks with the Navy using the language of the ultimatum: Either agree to raise the price of military equipment by a factor of 1.5 or the plant's workers collectives will not produce it. And at the same time another workers collective decides that it is not at all profitable to sew seamen's work clothes and refuses to provide them for the Navy....

Do we correctly understand the "requirements of war"? How is this understanding manifested in training and education, in personnel policy, in the organizational staff structure, in maintenance policy, in ideology, and in preparing the country (and not only the Armed Forces) for war or for other emergency situations? Why am I carrying on about this? Because in the U.S. they do not resort to the extremes that are peculiar to us and they continue along with the establishment of "light" divisions to qualitatively strengthen "heavy" divisions that are capable of breaching any defense. That is, a multi-year armed forces development program exists in their country that unites strategy and tactics and arms and organization. Pay attention to how purposefully and precisely the Trident Program is being executed and how no events either in the world or in the country were capable of interfering with its execution. And the capabilities of the Trident system are such that Ohio Class nuclear submarines, armed with 24 ballistic missiles (each missile has 10 nuclear warheads) can destroy 240 targets in any region of the world from any point of the ocean. As for this very important component as troop morale, American psychologists and military men define the conditions for victory as follows: The individual must believe in himself, the Army must believe in its men, the Army must believe in its commander, the Army must believe in its country, and the Army must believe in its country's cause.

If you recall how, at the 1st USSR Congress of People's Deputies, a Georgian representative called Colonel General Rodionov "a murderer" because Rodionov carried

out the order (although in any country of the world, a soldier, while carrying out an order, is inviolable and immune from jurisdiction and the guilty party is the one who issued the unlawful order), then whom must the Army believe in? Especially under conditions of its general criticism: Tears for lost embezzlers and drug addicts, for homeless people [bomzhii] and drunkards, for prostitutes and thieves who have served time, that is for the degrading part of society and total indifference, and also even hostility, toward people whose hands and minds have at all times been strengthening the might of the Homeland. This position was condemned at the 3rd USSR Congress of People's Deputies however it is now time to move from words to deeds.

In all civilized states, insulting a man in military uniform is assessed the same as disrespect for the state flag because the uniform is the symbol of the state. The state is seriously ill if it is otherwise in our country.

I can say quite a bit about patriotism, conscience, and honor, but according to practically all indicators, the presence of one or the other is service to the Homeland. And it is impossible to understand why not one "thick" or "thin" magazine in the country that is avidly talking about democracy and glasnost cannot recall the civilian valor of the ancient democracies which thousands of years ago developed the principles toward which we are now forcing our way through our own dense ignorance. It is shameful to recall that in a country half of whose history is the history of wars that we need to even revive the concept of the military spirit as the combination of the best masculine qualities: Nobility, courage, selflessness, bravery, and discipline. To revive it in the Army, in society, and in the family. Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy wrote about the main defects of Russian troops during the Crimean War in his "Proekt pereformirovaniya armii" [Plan to Reorganize the Army]: Meager maintenance, lack of education, barriers to improving people's capabilities, a spirit of oppression, seniority, and extortion.

Is it different now? We are already not embarrassed to talk about meager maintenance. Lack of education is characteristic of the entire society because the foundation of education—the school—overwhelmingly graduates uneducated people who are lacking in culture. The understanding of the term "general secondary education," not as the right of each person to obtain it but as a mandatory general scope of each for this education, has actually resulted in a "secondary" education. Our country with all of our numerous academicians and the high percentage of people with a higher education is in the top fifth according to the world intellectual rating. Can we require the officer corps to occupy first place? In the middle 1950's, when our country was in the top third according to this indicator, competition for the Leningrad Higher Naval Engineering School imeni V.I. Lenin was 13 men [for each position] with secondary graduation grades over four. Last year, it totaled nearly two men per position and of them every other one had a three. The mediocrity that is flocking to VUZ's will

"send one's" to the Navy in 15-20 years. Thus, this is a problem not only for the Armed Forces but for the country as a whole. While analyzing the causes of France's defeat in 1871, F. Engels wrote that the German teacher won the war. Ponder these words. Maybe then we will understand that not only our generals were guilty of the great losses during the last war. Having destroyed the flower of the officer corps, to wait for victory "with little blood on foreign territory" is just as naive as the one that the best people will enter the Army when the foundations of morality and patriotism are being steadily eroded.

So, what do we need to do to avoid a repetition of Tsushima? While analyzing the causes of the Russian Navy's defeat, A. Liven wrote in his book "Our Navy's Spirit and Discipline": "We imagined that the center of the Naval Department and the Navy was in the Ministry, meanwhile, it is actually on the combat ship. We have begun to examine the situation and to make arrangements from the Main Admiralty: We saw subjects from the wrong end and everything turned out to be inside out. How can we correct the matter now? Very simply: We need to first of all occupy a valid point of view and stand on the deck of a ship. From there we will immediately see what the matter is."<sup>3</sup>

It is also time for us to stand on the deck of the ship and develop a military reform program whose components, in my view, are as follow: Armed Forces manning, their logistical support, and legal relations.

### 1. The Armed Forces Manning System

It seems to me that we need to develop a series of laws that insure the equality of everyone without exception before the law, including the law on universal military service. In the ancient democratic states, only that person who could bear arms and defend those rights and his state could enjoy the rights of a citizen.

Choose the "happy medium" between the extremes: A volunteer or conscript army. That is, man all positions that require high professionalism and which are difficult to master, including sergeant and senior noncommissioned officer positions, with professionals and the remainder with conscripts.

I propose the following manning system:

- a) Undergo initial military training in the scope of a young soldier's course at school. Graduates who meet the appropriate requirements can enter the service for an 18 month period (from September 1st until May, so that those desiring to can participate in competitive entry examinations for educational institutions). The remaining personnel will have a 2 year period of service;
- b) Eliminate military departments at institutes and tekhnicum. Conduct training using the periodic assembly method at training centers at the place of residence according to the following programs: People

who have not served take the sergeants training course and those who have served take the officer training course. Upon graduation from the institute, those students who served until training will receive the military rank of junior lieutenant and those who did not serve until training will enter the Army for 18 months in the position of junior commanders after which they will be promoted to the rank of junior lieutenant based upon service and examination results in large Army units and Navy task forces;

—c) Those who do not wish to bear arms and also those not capable of serving in line units or who avoided service until 21 years of age must serve three years in auxiliary units or in services that support line units. This will also be so-called alternative service. The complex Army organism and the State as a whole need not only people with weapons but also with shovels;

—d) Men can only be elected as republic people's deputies after service in the Army (an exception consists of people who did not have the opportunity to accomplish their sacred duty due to health conditions);

—e) Specialists, whose training costs are the highest and whose training system is the most difficult, must not have limitations on term of service and limitations will be determined only according to physical and psychological conditions. They are first of all ship captains, pilots, etc.

—f) Review the staff structure of the Army and Navy according to the principles of constant autonomous readiness of the formation to conduct combat operations and activities under emergency conditions;

—g) Restore the extended service system according to a contract of not less than three years. Warrant officers have no less than three ranks: Junior warrant officer, warrant officer, and senior warrant officer;

—h) There must be material and morale service incentives for [service] on warships, submarines, and in the air;

—i) Consider the proposals expressed at the All-Army Officers Assembly in the law on service of officers. But stipulate tougher requirements for training and physical conditioning of regular reserve officers in connection with the proposal for a 10 year minimum service time after school graduation. Sixty eight senior officers died during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Twenty four hours later, 68 senior reserve officers arrived in Pearl Harbor from the U.S. and began carrying out duties with which they were familiar because four times per year they spent one week engaged in their own retraining for which they received a 90 percent pension and when they retired 80 percent of what they received on active duty. It makes sense to also pay combat capable reserve officers; and,

—j) Single out officers who have combat experience, in particular. If an officer who fought in Afghanistan ends up unfit somewhere in the middle of Russia, our peacetime system of training and evaluation will be placed upside down.

## 2. The Logistical Support System Must Have:

1. A single weapons system standardization program for the Army, Air Force, and Navy. A minimum of variety. The fewer types of weapons, the more reliable.

2. A competitive system for testing and accepting new types of weapons. Commission members will be officers of those large units for whom this equipment or ship is being designed.

3. A program of development, manufacturing, modernization and removal of weapons from the inventory at the 10 and 20 year points and personnel staff changes and specialist training, including officers, that is linked to the rearment program.

Prescribe strict but executable standards for equipment service periods and modernization. For example, for the Navy: Destroyer service period—20 years, repair with modernization for a one year period—every five years. After 22 years—to the scrap heap with no service period extensions whatsoever.

4. A balanced combat and support equipment program in the Armed Forces. There must not be a situation when a ship in distress will not leave the pier and is lost because there are no tugs at the base.

5. A program to develop those trainers and targets so that combat training, while not resorting to excess expenditures, is capable of training for what is needed in war.

## 3. The System of Legal Relations

1. A procedure for employment of the Armed Forces in peacetime and in wartime and command and control of the Armed Forces.

2. A procedure for weapons employment by the Armed Forces; during an attack against a unit, the State, or servicemen, employment of weapons against servicemen or during an incursion on the unit's territory without the use of weapons, etc.

3. The inadmissibility of insulting the dignity of the Army, the flag, or the uniform. The obligations of all citizens for fulfillment of military authorities' and servicemen's demands while they are accomplishing their service duties.

4. Laws on martial law, curfew, etc.

5. Laws on military crimes and citizens liability for complicity with servicemen while committing military crimes. A new Disciplinary Regulation. Neither the existing one nor the commanders' draft satisfy [the requirement].

6. Fundamentally change the officer housing allocation system. At service locations, housing must be only service [housing]. Build apartment buildings with the calculation that we can organize their reliable defense and minimum warning and servicemen's arrival time at the unit. Assign permanent housing to officers and warrant officers after five years of service or subsidize individual construction at any location in the USSR selected by them while taking limitations into account. This procedure will permit officers to change service locations without problems while moving with suitcases and not with crates. This system will guarantee an officer's family a roof over their heads, will in fact provide social protection of officers, and will rid garrisons of outsiders.

And the last proposal. A citizen of the USSR must be subordinate to the laws and regulations prescribed by the USSR Supreme Soviet. Therefore, a citizen must be conscripted into service not by a USSR Council of Ministers resolution but by a USSR Supreme Soviet Decree and all organs of Soviet rule and departments must answer for execution of this Decree, besides the conscript himself and his parents.

#### Footnotes

1. Liven, A. "Dukh i distiplina nashego flota [Our Navy's Spirit and Discipline]. Naval General Staff Publication—St. Petersburg, 1915, p 11.

2. Ibid, p. 10. 3. Ibid, p. 90.

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#### Public Appeal On Ochakovskiy Rayon Radar

90UM0740A Moscow SEMYA in Russian No 25, 18-24 Jun 90 p 11

[“Appeal From The Residents of Ochakovskiy Rayon, Nikolayev Oblast”]

**[Text] The editors have received a great deal of letters on the subject of ecology. One of them is an appeal for urgent assistance.**

We are appealing through the newspaper SEMYA to the USSR Supreme Soviet that it halt the operation of radar stations in our area.

We have previously appealed to USSR Minister of Defense D. Yazov, to the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, and to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, but none of our letters have been answered. After we sent a telegram to the Global Forum on Ecology in Moscow, we were visited by a commission from the Kiev Military District. On January 17, 1990, measurements were taken of the intensity of the flux of high-frequency electromagnetic radiation. We learned from the readings that the intensity of the flux [potok] in our area exceeds the allowable norm by 200 percent to 300 percent.

The radar units are located 800 meters away from residential buildings and a few hundred meters away

from two sanatoriums. One of them treats 6,000 people each year, the other 1,200 children. Many come for treatment from the Chernobyl area and are exposed to radiation again!

How could it happen that residential buildings, a kindergarten, and a school were built next to the radars? Why weren't the radars removed before construction started? Why did former first secretary of the rayon party committee Fomin, chairman of the rayon soviet executive committee Izuita, sanitary and epidemiological station chief physician Sergiyenko, rayon hospital chief physician Aleshkov, and other top officials do nothing when the construction had only just begun?

At present, most of us show heightened sensitivity to catarrhal illnesses. We have constant headaches and other ills. Kindergarten No. 1 has the highest incidence of child sickness in the rayon. (The kindergarten is in immediate proximity to the radars).

We have been told that the radars will be removed in two years. That prospect doesn't satisfy us. If they cannot be removed soon, they must be shut down, as was done in Dzhezkazgan. If shutting down the radars harms the country's defenses, we demand that screen grids be placed in front of our homes. This must be done as soon as possible. By the time all the pros and cons are weighed, the loss of health for many of us will be irreversible."

[Signed] Initiative group members A. I. Ryzhakov, V. A. Kramtsov, L. G. Markov, and 2,000 other signatures.

#### Estonian Statement on Unauthorized Military Border Crossing

90UM0748A Tallinn PÄEVALEHT in Estonian  
6 Jul 90 p 1

[“Statement from the Government of the Republic of Estonia”]

**[Text] On Thursday, July 5, an extraordinary session of the Government of the Republic of Estonia was held. The session was presided over by Deputy Prime Minister Jaak Leimann. The following statement was issued by the government.**

Statement from the Government of the Republic of Estonia

The Government of the Republic of Estonia has received information, according to which, on July 4, 1990, at 1400 hours, a column of military airborne equipment (28 tracked vehicles and 15 wheeled vehicles) crossed the border of the Republic along the Pskov-Riga highway. The column proceeded to Parnumaa, along the roads of southern Estonia. Military patrols were active in the township of Tori and its surrounding area. Stepped-up military activity had also been noted in this region earlier.

The government announces that no request for coordination has been received from representatives of the military. The movements of the column had also not been coordinated with the highway authorities or the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Estonia. For the most part, the movement took place along hard-top roads, and at high speeds, resulting in both hazardous traffic conditions and material damages, severely damaged road surfaces among them.

Any signalling by local law enforcement personnel was ignored.

The Government of the Republic of Estonia strongly protests against any military activity geared to induce an irresponsible escalation of tensions, especially in a situation where such activity is linked to political goals.

The government deplores any demonstration of power and hopes that the promise to avoid the use of military for political ends, made repeatedly and emphatically by both the political and military leaders of the USSR, will finally prevail. Tbilisi and Baku should not be repeated.

The Government of the Republic of Estonia

Tallinn, July 5, 1990

**'National Association of Georgian Officers' Created**

90UM0801A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian  
7 Jul 90 p 3

[Article by Georgiy Nadirashvili: "An Officers' Association is Created"]

[Text] As is generally known, work is in progress on draft legislation concerning the creation of national military units—a commission of the republic's Supreme Soviet is involved in this.

The boycott against service in the Soviet Army is assuming mass proportions—for the last two years, not a single campaign for conscripts has passed without losses. And here a new piece of news—on 22 June 1990, a republic-wide national association of Georgian officers was created.

The organization's charter states that it will operate within the limits of the republic's Constitution. Furthermore, taking into account that it will be necessary for Georgia to have a full-fledged army in the future, the association, conjointly with the rayispolkom and the military commissariats, is assuming control over legally drafting young people into the army. In addition, the officers' association will oversee the observance of servicemen's rights at the duty locations and will form youth cadres in the component services. Work will be conducted on establishing courses and publishing literature on military affairs in the Georgian language, and all possible assistance will be rendered to those who have been discharged from the army. Particular attention is being given to the creation of national military units,

with due regard for alternative service, and to equipping these units with modern military equipment.

The headquarters staff will be the governing body of the association between conventions.

**Maj Gen Ivashov Responds to  
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Reformers' Letter**

90UM0736A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
14 Jul 90 p 2

[Article, published under the rubric "Military Reform: A Point of View," by Maj Gen L. Ivashov, candidate of historical sciences, member of the USSR Ministry of Defense Military Legislative Commission: "The Army Will Be With the People!"]

[Text] An article appearing in the 4 July issue of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, entitled "The Army Is Needed for Defense. From whom?" evoked sad reflections on my part. I do not want to discuss its far from parliamentary style, although those who signed the article included many legislators and scholars. What motivated them to place their signatures under such an eclectic document, or who was able to persuade them to do this? In any case the labels, only just short of abusive, the devious devices, the questionable unfocused statistics, and the innuendos, with which the article abounded, make me feel embarrassed for the devotees of such a "style."

Of course there are problems in efforts to reform defense organizational development. Judging by the article, its authors are totally unaware of many of these. I would therefore like to say to them: in such a complicated matter as reform, one must obviously adhere to a principle which has stood the practical test of time: do not break established structures and mechanisms without having created a reliable replacement. I feel that this is particularly important in regard to military organization of the state.

In parallel with large-scale practical reforms (the politicians, military, and scientists who signed the article must know about these), future prospects for development of the Armed Forces are being comprehensively examined, and many theoretical and practical problems pertaining to the reform are being resolved. In particular, formulation of a draft USSR Law on Defense is in the completion stages. The bill will be introduced in the USSR Supreme Soviet in the fall of this year. Draft laws on universal military training and military service, on the status of military personnel, and new general military regulations will be introduced in the latter half of 1991. The working group charged with drafting these documents has been instructed to incorporate provisions which will ensure genuine democracy in relations between military personnel and reliable social and legal protection for members of the military.

I do not think there is need to expand further on this subject: it has been repeatedly discussed in the media, and a draft Law on Defense has long been under general discussion. Nevertheless I must make some observations. I personally, just as many of those who are in one way or another involved in resolving the problems of military reform, have no doubt as to the true authorship of the "letter to our country's leaders," which was presented to the mass reader in the form of a list of signatures. It sets forth the basic points of a draft plan of military reform presented by several military personnel who are USSR people's deputies, heavily larded with unseemly phrases pertaining to "the military-bureaucratic elite," "conservative forces," and "anti-perestroika elements." Many of these points are totally removed from the actual state of affairs in this country, its capabilities, and from specific defense tasks. In particular, the groundlessness and unreasonableness of adopting the principle of voluntary enlistment for Armed Forces manpower acquisition have been repeatedly demonstrated in a sufficient amount of detail, as has the unacceptability and even danger of proposals calling for the establishment of ethnic national military units, depoliticizing of the Armed Forces, etc.

These and other ideas of the draft reform are presented as the final and ultimate truth, however, with a persistence which it seems to me is worthy of better application. These ideas are being thrust not only upon the public but upon government bodies as well. And if one expresses a difference of opinion with such ideas, there follows the categorical conclusion that it is necessary "to replace top officials at the USSR Ministry of Defense and on the Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security Affairs." There is pluralism for you.

I should note that one of the authors of this draft document, Maj V. Lopatin, who is most active in the mass media, at mass political rallies and in various mass-participation activities such as the debate at the Krasnaya Zvezda Day festivities at the Central Cultural and Recreation Park imeni M. Gorkiy [Gorkiy Park], was invited to take direct part in drafting specific military reform bills. This would seem to be an excellent opportunity to implement his ideas! He outright refused, however. It is apparent that effect-producing statements made in lofty public forums, before the TV cameras, before the "masses," are more attractive. Other military personnel who are USSR people's deputies are displaying a fundamentally different and, it seems to me, genuinely responsible approach to the matter. Maj E. Gams, for example. His suggestions—well thought out, intelligent, and well substantiated—are genuinely helpful in working on a program of reforms for the Armed Forces. USSR people's deputies Cols V. Ochirov, N. Petrushenko, and many others are doing likewise. It would seem that the main significance of the activities of a people's deputy and the essence of his civic position lies precisely in such painstaking, constructive work, including the preparation of legislative bills, work permeated with genuine concern for our country's fate, concern free of personal ambitions.

In spite of the fact that the question "With whom will the army be?" contained in the appeal published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA seems to me to be totally contrived, I nevertheless would like to reply. The army always has been, is now, and will continue to be with the people. It is sharing with the people all the difficulties of perestroika, all its successes and achievements.

#### Maj Gen Safonov on Semipalatinsk Controversy

90UM0752B Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda  
in Russian 17 Jul 90 p 4

[Interview with Maj Gen F. Safonov, deputy chief of the Semipalatinsk range, under the rubric "A Topical Interview": "The Semipalatinsk Range: Forecast for Tomorrow"]

[Text] The debate surrounding the Semipalatinsk range continues unabated. Only recently this problem has been discussed at two press conferences in Moscow, in articles in the press and on Central Television programs. The matter was also brought up at the 28th CPSU Congress. What are the latest assessments of the situation and the proposals for resolving it? This was the subject of an interview conducted with Maj Gen F. Safonov, deputy chief of the range, by our correspondent.

[Correspondent] Fedor Fedorovich, we know that a representative, interdepartmental commission headed by A. Tsyb, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, worked at the range last year. Doubt was cast upon their conclusions, however, by activists in the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement and by some of the residents of oblasts adjacent to the range. Where does the truth lie?

[Safonov] Let us recall that in addition to this commission, the Americans also took measurements at the range. And the Union deputy group was there quite recently. All of them concluded that the technology for underground testing has now been refined to the point that it poses no threat to man or the environment. Their conclusions were not accepted, however. The range is not a dance floor, of course. The finishing touches are made on awesome weapons there. It was dangerous only during the period of surface testing, however. That is, until 1963.

[Correspondent] But there was still an escape of inert radioactive gases to the surface in February of last year.

[Safonov] One can hardly talk of any sort of serious danger in connection with this. The temporary rise in the level was only five milliroentgens. What does this mean? We receive about the same exposure on a flight from Semipalatinsk to Moscow. We have still taken a number of steps to prevent even this, however. They include placing the charge at a greater depth, carefully studying the geology of the soil and thoroughly concreting the head of the hole. There is still the seismic effect to consider. It can be lowered, however, by reducing the

size of the charge. I would also stress the fact that our range has an advantage over the Nevada range, where the radioactive level is four times higher. No one there is calling for its closure, however, except for periodic statements by the Greens.

[Correspondent] This is perhaps because information on the explosions is more accessible there? It was reported at the latest press conference in Moscow, for example, that only 80% of our information for the Semipalatinsk Special Health Center has been declassified. A map of the radiation situation has still not been published...

[Safonov] I am against this kind of supersecrecy. Particularly since, as far as I can see, the material contains nothing out of the ordinary. This is more a matter of inertia of thinking. And so, we should open up the other 20% of the information. This would deprive opponents of the range of many trump cards. I understand, however, that this decision is the prerogative of the USSR Ministry of Health. With respect to a map of the radiation situation, the decision has already been adopted in the Ministry of Defense to publish one. It will be published with the necessary explanations in the near future.

[Correspondent] I have the impression that, as usual, we are late in doing so. The Karaganda miners have included in their package of demands one that the range be closed.

[Safonov] To some degree that apparently has to be admitted. A fact which, incidentally, certain informal organizations are skilfully exploiting to their own ends. As a result, the situation surrounding the range has gone from an environmental to a political one. It was assessed from this standpoint also by certain delegates at the congress. This is despite the fact that the oblast's chief sanitary doctor stated in the 13 May 1990 issue of the newspaper IRTYSH that the radiation level around the range is normal. With respect to the congress, I addressed it with specific proposals for getting out of the impasse, which were coordinated with activists in the antinuclear movement and at the final stage, with the nation's government. What did they consist of? A proposal was introduced and approved for a government commission be set up with the participation of foreign experts. It would once again thoroughly evaluate the radiation situation at and around the range and determine whether the tests being conducted are dangerous. A second proposal was that a subcommittee be set up under the Committee on Ecology and the Prudent Use of Natural Resources, which would perform legislative work. What kind? The preparation of normative enactments for assessing the safety of all military facilities with a heightened danger in general and the drafting of laws for their startup and operation and for ensuring safety and providing benefits and preferential status for individuals working at them and those residing in the zone of recognized risk. General civic interests and not departmental ones would be taken into account.

[Correspondent] The last question, Fedor Fedorovich: An international congress on the banning of nuclear testing was held in Alma-Ata in May at the initiative of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement. Did it produce any kind of specific results?

[Safonov] We heard once again the official position of the USA on the matter. Eugene Carroll, head of the American delegation, expounded it: "We do not regard nuclear testing as an evil which must be stopped. On the contrary, we consider it to be a means of national security." There you have it. I would add to this the fact that the Bush Administration informed the congress that the USA must continue its nuclear testing for at least 10 years. That is, until the 21st century. We could pretend that we are unaware of this, of course. But would we not be hiding our heads in the sand?

If we have no confidence in the findings of the Tsyb commission or the conclusions of the Union deputy group, let us believe what an independent—government, if you like—international commission would have to say. Let us be intelligent. We have learned well how to destroy and break up things in 70 years. It does not take a lot of intelligence or ability to destroy a range which cost billions of rubles. Let us consider very carefully before taking such a step again. And let a deliberated approach, thorough assessment and thrifty consideration for the people's money predominate in the decision, and not pride and political ambitions.

#### Military Members of CPSU Central Committee

90UM07524 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
20 Jul 90 p 4

[Reader's question and reply under the rubric "Briefing for the Readers": "Servicemen in the CPSU CC"]

[Text] I would like to know what servicemen were elected to our party's Central Committee at the 28th CPSU Congress.—N. Ivanitskiy

The following were elected members of the CPSU Central Committee:

—Colonel General Vladislav Alekseyevich Achalov, commander of Airborne Troops and people's deputy of the USSR;

—Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Nikolayevich Dmukha, secretary of the party committee of a motorized rifle regiment (Turkestan Military District);

—Lieutenant Colonel Gennadiy Lavrentyevich Karunin, deputy regimental commander for political affairs (Strategic Rocket Forces);

—Colonel Aleksey Konstantinovich Marenkov, commander of an air defense formation of the Air Defense Forces;

- Army General Mikhail Alekseyevich Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, first deputy minister of defense of the USSR, people's deputy of the USSR;
- Colonel General Nikolay Andreyevich Moiseyev, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Ground Forces, people's deputy of the USSR;
- Admiral Vasiliy Ivanovich Panin, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Navy;
- Colonel General of Aviation Viktor Alekseyevich Prudnikov, commander of the Moscow Air Defense District;
- Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Maksimovich, deputy commander for flight training of a helicopter regiment;
- Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Maksimovich Raylyan, deputy commander for flight training of a helicopter regiment;
- Colonel General Vladimir Magomedovich Semenov, commander of the Transbaykal Military District, people's deputy of the USSR;
- Colonel Nikolay Sergeyevich Stolyarov, senior instructor at the Military Air Academy imeni Yu.A. Gagarin;
- Major General Mikhail Semenovich Surkov, member of the military council and chief of the political section of a formation of the Transcaucasus Military District, people's deputy of the USSR;
- Admiral Gennadiy Aleksandrovich Khvatov, commander of the Pacific Fleet;
- Colonel General of Aviation Yevgeniy Ivanovich Shaposhnikov, first deputy commander in chief of the Air Forces;
- Colonel General Nikolay Ivanovich Shlyaga, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy;
- Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov, USSR Minister of Defense.

The following were also elected to the CPSU Central Committee:

- Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolay Vasilyevich Ogarkov, chairman of the All Union Council of Veterans of War, Labor and the Armed Forces of the USSR;
- Army General Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov, chairman of the USSR KGB;

—Colonel General Yuriy Vasilyevich Shatalin, commander of Internal Security Forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Army and Navy Communists are also represented in the Central Control Commission of the CPSU.

This information was obtained in the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

#### **Uzbek Supreme Soviet Examines Military Issues**

*90UM0736B Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA in Russian 23 Jul 90 p 1*

[Article, published under the rubric "Problem," by KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA reporter Vera Saykina: "The 'Military Issue' in the Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] On the eve of the 2nd Session of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, 12th Convocation, a meeting of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Youth Affairs was held. The schedule of activities for the current year was examined. The membership of the subcommittees was approved. There are four subcommittees: on liaison with youth organizations and problems of college youth; on problems of internationalist military personnel and military youth; on monitoring of compliance with laws on protection of youth rights; on youth socioeconomic problems. The membership of a working group to draft a "Governmental Youth Policy in the Uzbek SSR" was also approved. Mukhamed-Zakir Magdiyev, a young scholar and head of the laboratory of legal problems of government administration at the Advanced Studies Institute under the republic Council of Ministers, was elected group chairman. It was noted that the working group consists of 30 young scientists and scholars, specialists in various fields of knowledge. They already have a picture of the overall problem and its various component parts.

The committee meeting devoted particular attention to examining information on progress in implementing the resolution of the First Session of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, 12th Convocation, entitled "On Proposals by the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet on Amending the USSR Law on Universal Military Training."

A Republic Military Commissariat spokesman discussed the problems of conscripts. In Andizhan Oblast, for example, one out of every six inductees is unemployed, that is, a young man lacking workforce conditioning, who has great difficulty adapting to military life. This category of conscript requires a special approach. One strong suggestion was that urban and rural factors be taken into consideration when making up conscript unit assignment groups: as a rule urban youths are more physically fit, have a better command of Russian, and are more communicative. When placed together with such youths, it is easier for rural lads to become accustomed to their new conscript collective, and this means that there will be less probability of instances of mutual relations at variance with or contrary to regulations.

The public is particularly alarmed at instances where young men are killed during military service, both in construction and combat units, at cases of failure to return home, and the loss or disappearance of discharged soldiers. This issue was discussed in particular detail at the committee meeting.

Medical aspects were also considered. Adverse criticism is leveled at the medical examination of inductees to determine fitness for military service, where young men who are unfit for military service are sometimes passed as fit for service. The republic health minister stated in response that a special order has been issued, increasing the responsibility of military fitness medical examining board personnel in the localities. A doctor's conclusion as to fitness for service shall not be influenced by draft allocation requirements.

At the same time we should note that 85 percent of cases of persons being returned from the military are not only by reason of state of health. Other reasons include accidents, violation of safety regulations, and acts committed while AWOL.

There are also problems with adequately supplying and equipping the military fitness medical examining board in the oblasts; there is a shortage of requisite medical instruments. Particular attention at the present time is being directed toward so-called dynamic medical care for secondary-school seniors and recent graduates. There are 280 teenager medical care offices in the republic. But the doctors who work with teenagers should be enabled to upgrade their skills.

As for draft deferments, there is an order to the effect that all persons who have had viral hepatitis shall be given a 12 to 18 month draft deferment. A list of diseases for which young men are to be freed from induction for a certain period of time has been drawn up and submitted to the Presidium of the Republic Supreme Soviet.

The status of basic military training in this republic's schools was also discussed. A department chief from the republic Ministry of Public Education reported on an experiment which will be conducted in September of this year. According to the basic military training schedule, students in the upper grades will attend training camp sessions at Pioneer camps which are vacant following summer vacation.

On the whole it was noted that military-patriotic indoctrination of students requires considerable upgrading. A Suvorov school is to be established in this republic in the near future. Four special boarding schools presently operating in Tashkent, Samarkand, Fergana, and in Khorezm Oblast are not proving successful.

A subcommittee member who has recently returned from Ulan-Ude spoke about the need for a more serious attitude toward patron relations with units in which youths from Uzbekistan are serving. Our boys would really like to see some local papers. It is both possible

and necessary to arrange for shipping fruits and vegetables to areas distant from this republic.

Deputy contacts with military units are becoming a meaningful tradition. Traveling field teams include not only deputies, but also parents of soldiers, doctors, and people from the prosecutor's office.

A large number of problems were examined in connection with the "army" resolution of the First Session of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet. Proposals were drafted, submitted at the current session, as well as petitions which the youth committee will take to the appropriate authorities.

#### Surface-To-Air Training Missile Brings Down Tractor

90UM0801B Moscow *TRUD* in Russian 28 Jul 90 p 1

[Article by Ye. Grigoryev: "Someone Pushed the Button"]

[Text] The territory of the Tasma industrial enterprise in Kazan came under fire by surface-to-air missiles. The missile salvo was fired from the proving grounds of an adjacent factory.

Fortunately, the missiles turned out to be training models and not combat missiles. After deviating from the assigned trajectory during ground testing of a new launcher vehicle at the Kazan helicopter manufacturing plant, the missiles fell on a peaceful facility for the production of photographic film. As the saying goes in such cases, there were no casualties or property damage at the Tasma plant, which is more than can be said about the unintentional "aggressors" themselves.

Several missiles damaged helicopters, a tractor, and a car, which were parked in a field there. One missile hit the wall of the assembly shop. A fuel truck was destroyed by a direct hit—many Kazan residents could see the column of black smoke yesterday.

An official investigation is being conducted to determine the causes and circumstances of the missiles' "running amok". Can our beloved city sleep peacefully?

#### Military Reform Debated, Goals Outlined

90UM0853A Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian 15 Aug 90 First Edition p 2

[Article, published under the heading "Military Reform: Problems, Proposals," by Col O. Belkov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor: "How Broad Is the Spectrum of Opinions?"]

[Text] There has been a great deal of discussion of what kind of military reform there should be. The goals, directions, content, and timetable of reform are becoming increasingly more clearly delineated in the course of numerous debates and discussions. A plan of military reform is being worked on both at the Ministry

of Defense and the USSR Supreme Soviet. Nevertheless it seems to me that the enormous creative potential of society and the military is far from being fully utilized in this matter, which is so important for our state. Apparently we should work more vigorously to stimulate activity on the part of independent groups of plan authors who have their own view on reform, as well as work in this area by military scientific centers, including such major centers as the General Staff Academy. We should not be frightened off by an abundance of such plans. It is important only that nobody claim the role of sole possessor of the truth. But unfortunately there is such a danger.

For example, frequently opinions are expressed which reduce military reform merely to restructuring of the Armed Forces. And yet the military organization, as we know, in addition to the army and navy proper, comprises a highly complex aggregate of economic, political, social, technical, scientific, and ideological structures. The country's mobilization capabilities in peacetime and in time of war, the level of training of the body of persons subject to military conscription, etc are determined by their interaction. Obviously a military reform should also bring all the elements of this aggregate into conformity with perestroika processes in this country and in the world as a whole.

On the other hand, a reform of the Armed Forces cannot boil down solely to quantitative (even substantial ones) changes or to qualitative improvement of individual characteristics. Any large system, including a military system, does not constitute a hardened, rigid structure but is in a process of continuous development. It is continuously adapting to the changing conditions in which it performs its functions, also undergoing appropriate change. But the present situation in this country and in the world has demanded transformations which affect the very foundations of organizational development and the principles of Armed Forces activity. Thus we are talking about an entire aggregate of interlinked and interdependent measures which encompass all aspects of army and navy affairs. It is obvious that their implementation is little probable within the framework of the old laws. A reform should be preceded by constitutional-law determination of its program and end objectives.

April 1985 gave an impetus for transformations in the most diversified political and societal domains, including the military. As the process of revolutionary restructuring advanced, however, these reforms proved insufficient for accomplishing resolution of existing conflicts. And today we are also becoming faced with important, extensive new tasks.

Just what are these tasks?

I would say that the most important one is achieving a guarantee of strategic stability at the lowest possible level. Our defense might should correspond to the realities of the politico-military situation in the world and

should organically fit within a new system of international security. Both an unwarranted buildup of our own power and unilateral disarmament, which would make our country defenseless, are equally intolerable. Defense sufficiency has been defined as the "golden mean" between these extremes. But this very concept is dynamic in nature. That which was sufficient yesterday may become excessive if security is strengthened by political means. Or, on the contrary, it may cease to be sufficient if the other side develops new weapons or tactics of warfare. And since the factor of strength continues to be utilized in world politics, we need a strong military organization which is capable of responding swiftly and flexibly to all changes. Professional armed forces correspond to this demand to the greatest degree. A phase-by-phase transition to professional armed forces should in my opinion comprise the core thrust of military reform.

The other task is a sociopolitical one. The military activities of our state are gradually ceasing to be a top-secret domain. And a military reform should once and for all place the Ministry of Defense firmly under the control and oversight of the highest agencies of authority and should ensure maximum openness of activities, taking into account the attained level of trust and confidence between states.

At the sociopolitical level the vital activities of the Armed Forces of a state governed by rule of law, toward which we are proceeding, will be organized on the basis of and in full conformity with adopted laws. There should be no gaps in our laws which permit the possibility of willful, subjectivistic decisions. Clear-cut formal articulation in law of the functional designation of the Armed Forces, the manner and procedure of and rules governing their employment, including in emergency situations, is of fundamental importance. The general processes of national rebirth and the national (and nationalist) movements engendered by them require thoughtfully considered decisions and responsible actions. While essentially opposing splitting up of the Armed Forces on the basis of ethnic region and affiliation, at the same time one cannot ignore the aspiration of the republics to take direct part in decision-making on defense matters. One must assume that forms of delineation of the authorities of the Union and its constituent elements in the military domain, corresponding to present-day conditions, will be defined in a new treaty of union.

A great deal is being said about depoliticizing of the Armed Forces. But a depoliticized military is as absurd as hot cold or dry water. As long as the army and navy continue to exist, they cannot be outside of politics for a single instant. The point in question is different: what policy do they serve, to whom does political leadership belong, and who forms and shapes the political responsibility of personnel before the state and the people, and how is it done? There is plenty to be changed here. While making a decisive break with past political monopoly and with usurping the functions of the state's agencies of

government, the CPSU has itself approached the matter of abolishing direct party leadership and direction of the Armed Forces. But this does not mean a cessation of political work in the military. The party retains the capability to exert its influence on the life and activities of military units through army and navy Communists.

The third task of a reform of the Armed Forces is a humanitarian one. Military service never has been and never will be easy. But difficulties and privations connected with military service should be reduced to a minimum. There are no trivial matters here. Everything is important: social and legal protection of military personnel, democratization of the relationships of military service, enhancement of the role of the military community, development of a system of material and moral incentive for the labor of military personnel, etc.

It is understandable that each of these directions of military reform may acquire priority significance at a given moment. They should not be absolutized, however. Otherwise, while resolving one conflict in military organizational development we shall be creating another. For example, reduction of defense appropriations has led to the termination or suspension of many research and development projects. But this by no means fosters transition to qualitative parameters of national defense.

Such conflicts and contradictions are not always apparent. This is why when formulating an integral plan of military reform it is important to consider as broad as possible a spectrum of assessments of the present state of national defense and views on future prospects for reform.

#### Col Gen Morozov on Military Reform

90UM0853B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 15 Aug 90 p 2

[Article, published under the rubric "Quick Questionnaire," with Col Gen I. Morozov, commander of the Odessa Military District, responding to questions submitted by the editors of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "Three Questions for the Commanding General"]

[Text]

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What in connection with the military reform has already changed in the life and activities of the troops under your command?

[Morozov] The results of the winter training period indicated that the district's troops successfully mastered a large portion of defensive topics in operational and combat training. Table of organization changes are continuing, which are affecting the fate of many military personnel and their families. The process of democratization in the military is also advancing. Permanent certification boards are operating in all units, and the Assemblies of Officers are picking up steam.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What in your view should be the end result of the Armed Forces reform?

[Morozov] It should not lead to diminished national defense capability. Troop levels, level of equipment, and bringing units up to strength with military cadres should also be planned and scheduled in conformity with this.

As for the end objective of the reform pertaining to the troops of our district, one must mention social problems. They have been accumulating for too long a time. In particular, we are currently placing priority importance on solving the housing problem. The troops are patiently waiting for a specific national-level program for social services for military personnel and their families, as well as for persons discharged from active military service.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What in your opinion are the main obstacles in the path of profound reforms in the army and navy which are demanded by the times?

[Morozov] I would like to stress at the outset that the army and navy are unified, that they have a common destiny. And that which today concerns society also affects the interests of the military. Are the people in the military to blame for the fact that with the most recent draft call there was a larger number of conscripts with a police record, with a problem with alcohol, etc? All this affects acceleration of the processes of reforms in the military.

It is essential to create an effective system of social guarantees for military personnel and radically to revise the legal system of Armed Forces life and activities. In this connection I should like to see early passage of a "Law on Defense," "Status of Military Personnel," and other legislative enactments governing our lives.

#### Military Reform Aspects, Advantages Outlined

90UM0854A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Aug 90  
Second Edition p 4

[Article, published under the rubric "Polemical Notes," by Professor V. Kovalevskiy, doctor of philosophical sciences: "Military Reform: Pro and Con"]

[Text] People favoring radical reforms in the Armed Forces have long since let their views be known. Such voices were first heard among the general public. And that is natural, for this is not a purely professional-domain issue. It is of significance to the nation as a whole.

\* \* \*

A plan of military reform can be formulated only by means of open, broad discussion, with the participation both of the civilian and military community, taking into consideration the opinion of military leaders and specialists.

It would seem that the understanding currently prevails that a new model of national defense should be constructed not on the basis of ideological postulates but

should, on the one hand, correspond to the level of actual military threat, while on the other hand it should be based on a long-range scientific forecast of international relations and world societal development as a whole.

Such a forecast exists. It has enabled us to conclude that the "cold war" has come to an end and that conditions are gradually being created for mankind to enter a prolonged period of peace. This forecast can be considered to be the methodological foundation for the plan of military reform presently being drawn up. It enables one to state the issue as follows: what are needed are peacetime Armed Forces sufficient to guarantee national security, while not presenting a threat to other countries.

A substantial reduction in defense expenditures in conditions of a crisis state of the economy does not constitute merely a good intention but is perhaps the most peremptory imperative of perestroika. The question does not permit alternatives: it is a question of either or. A strategy of defense sufficiency should take into account not only considerations of a military technical nature but also the country's economic capabilities. We must grasp this sobering and somewhat unexpected lesson, no matter how much it jars our "world power" consciousness. The branch on which our entire defense rests is cracking. In order to prevent it from breaking off entirely, it will be necessary to subordinate the entire defense complex to the task of raising up our country by its economic bootstraps.

The Ministry of Defense, which will be receiving and will have at its disposal the entire defense budget and which will become, finally, a full-fledged party to financial activity, will need to learn to count its money, to enter into contracts for the procurement of arms and equipment, to seek out financially advantageous contractors, and to eliminate cost-ineffective expenditures. The free-spending life is coming to an end.

All this will require the establishment of new economic, organizational, and legal structures for maintaining the Armed Forces as an operating entity. Formulation of such structures can brook no delay.

The sociopolitical aspects of the forthcoming military reform are no less complex. Let us take, for example, the nationalities question—the most complex and sensitive issue both for society and for the military. The dramatic development of interethnic relations and separatist movements has brought the situation as regards induction of young men into the military to the brink of crisis. In some regions the crisis has already erupted. There are thousands of "refuseniks" in this country, that is, persons who are evading military service. And the situation is becoming increasingly more alarming within the military itself. Soldiers are banding into groups on the basis of ethnic affiliation. I do not think there is any need to explain that in the Armed Forces this constitutes a particularly dangerous phenomenon.

New issues have arisen. For example, what does ethnic diversity or multiethnic composition signify for the

Armed Forces in present-day conditions? Does the new interethnic situation which is taking shape in this country and the genuine Soviet federation which is forming not prompt one to reexamine the principle of internationalism as it applies to the military? Is the equal-distribution mode of stationing assignment of members of different nationalities and ethnic groups within the Armed Forces still a valid operative principle? There is plenty to think about here.

Society is proceeding along the road of creating a renewed and refurbished organization and structure of nation and state. And this process of course will also affect military organization. And already today, in the course of preparation to adopt a new treaty obligation, it makes sense to discuss in detail the military and defense aspects of organizational development of the new federation, without shutting our eyes to the facts and the harsh lessons of life, basing considerations solely on a sober and sensible forecast. We must define the defense functions of the Union and the republics on a treaty basis. This can no longer be avoided.

Society is observing with increasing alarm the enormous effort on the part of the military leadership to maintain the military in a state of order and combat effectiveness without resorting to profound, comprehensive reforms. That segment of the military administrative apparatus which is inclined toward a stagnation [Brezhnev era] mindset is applying massive pressure to democratic elements in the military and is taking reprisals, according to all the rules of "class struggle," against socially active military personnel who believe in perestroika. At the present time it is an extremely simple matter to expel undesirables from the military—via the mechanism of "reduction of forces."

It is said that the intelligent learn from the lessons of others. The United States implemented a military reform, transitioning to a professional military not out of a charitable impulse or due to an abundance of funding. More substantial reasons were involved. At the end of the 1960's and beginning of the 1970's the U.S. Armed Forces presented a sad and frightening spectacle: mass burning of draft cards, military desertion, refusal to fight in Vietnam, drunkenness, and smuggling of contraband. Mutinies were breaking out one after the other on naval ships.... Only after all this did Congress pass a law calling for changeover to an all-volunteer, professional military.

In this country, however, debates are continuing over the possibility of transitioning to a professional military, as one generally designates armies in which manpower acquisition is based on a contract of service. Arguments pro and con are presented. And yet this issue has long since been resolved by world military organizational development practices. Today's military is a professional military. Nor could things be different in an era of scientific and technological advance, which has made military activity one of the most complex types of

human activity, which in addition entails special responsibility for the fate of peace and preservation of life on earth.

From a legal standpoint the constitutional right of Soviet citizens to free choice of profession and to pay based on work performed will be extended to military activities, to military service by noncommissioned officers and primary-rank personnel. From a moral and ethical standpoint the possibility of serving not by obligation but by calling, and on a volunteer basis, will change attitudes toward the Armed Forces for the better and will humanize the moral atmosphere in military units. From the standpoint of international law the adoption of alternative service for those who cannot take up arms for religious or moral-pacifist reasons would also be an acceptable measure.

Of course changing over to military manpower acquisition based on a contract of service will require time as well as some additional funding to pay the cost of maintaining noncommissioned officer and primary-rank enlisted personnel. It will become possible only as Armed Forces manpower is reduced. But in my opinion transitional, experimental forms of professionalization are possible right now, beginning with NCO and technical personnel, with this process gradually extending to primary-rank enlisted personnel.

Finally, changes in the administrative and indoctrination structures of the military are inevitable under the effect of renewal of the political system which is taking place in this country as well as a multiparty system, which is gradually taking hold. These processes are evoking a complex, at times very negative response in the military. Resistance to such innovations is particularly persistent in the Armed Forces.

An atmosphere of political pluralism—which is natural and beneficial in society—can have an adverse effect on the level of discipline and order in the military and can cause an ideological-political split within the officer corps. Can this be permitted? This question is such a major, important issue that it requires separate examination and discussion. One thing is clear: exuberance over the growing politicization of consciousness on the part of military personnel should be tempered by concern to ensure that military bases and barracks as well as the Armed Forces as a whole do not become an arena of political passions and upheavals, so that our army and navy will continue to be a symbol and guarantor of social stability and firmness of our nationhood.

Any reform, and a military reform in particular, is a complex, laborious affair. Just as everything pertaining to the Armed Forces and defense of the homeland, it echoes in society and within the military proper in the form of a certain moral confusion and disorder, a turbulence of feelings and interests—from lofty civic and patriotic to narrow parochial and even purely personal, careerist sentiments and interests. The entire spectrum of sociopolitical orientation—from anarchist-pacifist (there is no need for a military!) to right-wing conservative (the military needs no reform)—is also represented in views on the aims and methods of reform and the depth of the forthcoming transformations.

In my opinion a profound military reform will not only give a second wind to perestroika but will also beneficially reflect on the entire system of international relations and will result in positive changes in the politico-military and the military structures of the West, and will become a global phenomenon.

#### Desertions Increase in Zaporozhye Oblast

90P50071A Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 Aug 90 p 1

[Article by A. Pavlushin: "Where They Send Deserters"]

[Text] As reported by the oblast youth newspaper KOMSOMOLETS ZAPORIZHZHYA, instances of oblast citizens deserting their places of compulsory military service have increased.

In order to clarify this report our correspondent met with Colonel A. Volskiy, military commissar of Zaporozhye Oblast.

"In general the fugitives are from Transcaucasus military construction units. In my view, this was abetted by a decree adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR which defines the fulfillment of compulsory military service by citizens of the Ukraine. This decree, by the way, does not have the force of law. The Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet later appealed to conscripts to honorably and conscientiously fulfill their soldierly duties within those units to which they have been sent to perform their service. But that was already after the fact. A second reason of no small importance is the existence of unauthorized relations within military units, the so-called "hazing" [dedovshchina].

"What will be the fate of these young men?"

"Those who report directly to oblast and rayon military commissariats we send to the garrison's military procuracy, where their guilt is ascertained. Since most of them are not refusing to perform military service in general, we send them to other units until the question of their military service is resolved."

**On Maneuver of Artillery in Defense**

*90UM0799A Moscow VOYENNYY VESTNIK  
in Russian No 7, Jul 1990 pp 33-36*

[Article by Major General V. Sapozhinskiy, candidate of military science and senior lecturer, and Colonel A. Khodakov, candidate of military science: "On Artillery Maneuver in Defense"]

[Text] As we all know, a motorized rifle battalion can defend itself both in a security area, in a forward defense position, and also in the regimental first or second echelon. Depending on the assigned mission, artillery subunits are attached or allocated to it for support. What is the best way to organize artillery fire control and maneuver? It seems to us that the battalion commander and assigned personnel must decide what the appropriate way is to accomplish these tasks. The content and procedures of their work during fire control is adequately and fully covered in regulations and training literature. But in our view, command and control of the battalion artillery subunit's maneuvering, especially while operating in a security area, really requires detailed treatment and precision. Let us begin with the fact that this concept consists of command and control of the advance of artillery subunits from staging areas (deployment locations) and deployment at the specified positions or lines and also control of their own maneuvers within the limits of one static area and movement (during withdrawal) from one area to another.

Execution of an artillery defensive maneuver has its complications. On one hand, it should conduct uninterrupted fire and on the other it should attempt to relocate as often as possible to get out from under enemy fire.

During the threatened period, an artillery battalion advance and deployment in a security area is, as a rule, executed in succession and camouflage measures are observed. Artillery reconnaissance systems subunits attached to (supporting) battalion combat security (an optical reconnaissance section in a PRP-3 [mobile reconnaissance post] or in the commander's vehicles and also consisting of SNAR-10 [artillery reconnaissance station] radar equipment) will most probably be the first ones to simultaneously advance to positions. At the same time, the positions of one of the battery's artillery reconnaissance systems are selected along with those of the combat security subunits and the remainder (including divisional) deploy at an interval of 500-1500 meters from the forward edge of the battalion. Once they have ascertained an enemy firing battery's position, artillery reconnaissance systems apparently deploy simultaneously with the division in which they are operating. Obviously, sound ranging subunits will be brought forward at the same time if they are deployed at the security area.

Since command and control during an advance and occupation of positions by firing subunits (mortar and artillery) will probably be carried out within the overall system of command and control of covering units, it is

important to note this factor. Since the battalion prepares a total of two (more rarely, three) positions, it is advisable for those assigned and supporting it in this zone to assign an area for a total of one (more rarely, two) firebase area at a distance of 8-10 kilometers from the line of contact (border). It is best to assign a second area for temporary firebases on the boundary of the forward edge of the main defensive zone and also behind its first trench.

As for battalion organic artillery, it should plan several (3-5) such areas in the security area, the first of them to be selected roughly 3-5 kilometers from the security area's forward edge. In each of these areas, it is necessary to prepare no fewer than two or three firebases per battery (with a distance of 400-600 meters between them) to maintain the artillery's survivability.

For ease of command and control and in support of preserving its capability to resist, artillery battalion and battery commanders must combine their command-observation posts with battalion and company commander observation posts and redeploy in the same columns during the course of the maneuver. Yet another important detail. Battalion (mortar battery) commanders may implement, so to speak, their decisions (in accordance with the previously developed plan as soon as the fire mission is accomplished at the former position) to maneuver firing subunits from one firebase to another within the area. But the maneuver of an artillery battalion from one area of firebases to another is carried out in compliance with the plan only after reporting to the senior commander and with his permission. This in turn is dictated by the need to maintain no less than half of the artillery complement in constant readiness to conduct firing. Consequently, during the artillery battalion's travel stage, effective engagement of the enemy in his sector will be carried out by the decision of the higher commander.

When developing the artillery movement plan in a defensive engagement, we obviously must proceed from the premise that previous artillery subunit firebases must be abandoned before the enemy attains certain lines from where his advancing tanks and IFV's [infantry fighting vehicles] will have the opportunity to use direct laying fire at the retreating firing platoons and batteries.

As a result, it is practically impossible to establish the astronomical time that movement is begun or ended during a defensive engagement so that, during planning, it is necessary to proceed from an arbitrary time when an "S" signal is given that is associated with a shift of the line of contact on the sides (withdrawal of our troops) to specific lines. When only one reinforced artillery battalion is operating in support of the battalion, it redeploys by battery as a rule. If one artillery battalion is attached to it and another is assigned to support, it is advisable to plan the movement of the attached battalion as a single unit.

The battalion's mortar battery will best move to new firebases by platoons, in leapfrog maneuvers of 2-3 kilometers each. Calculations show (see the diagram) that, during an engagement in the security area, the battalion commander must already have sounded the command (signal) for the first movement of a mortar battery platoon while the enemy is breaching the platoon's first echelon defensive positions (that is, during penetration to a depth of 300-500 meters) and the second platoon initiates movement no later than when company defensive positions are breached at the covering units' positions (that is, when it is penetration to a depth of about 1000 meters). Naturally, command and control of the mortar battery should be carried out with the calculation that first platoon is ready to conduct fire from its new position by the time second platoon begins to redeploy.

As experience has shown, it is very difficult to do this. Indeed, during an enemy advance at a rate of 2-3 kilometers an hour, the time allotted for the platoon's withdrawal using 2-3 kilometer leapfrog maneuvers is quite limited (15-20 minutes in all). The limit (just 30-40 minutes) is no less rigid for a battalion using a 4-6 kilometer leapfrog maneuver by battery or about 50-60 minutes for a battalion movement using 8-10 kilometer leapfrog maneuvers. Under these conditions and while directing the engagement, the battalion commander should not only give the command to open fire in a timely manner but he should also not be late issuing the signal for the artillery to leave the security area for the forward edge of the main defensive zone.

During a battalion defensive engagement, the entire mortar battery will most often be deployed to the main defensive zone's first position. Furthermore, this maneuver should be coordinated with the maneuver of the reinforced battalion batteries. In this case, the first sequence battery (artillery battalion) movement rationally begins no later than when the command is issued for the first echelon company to move out. While calculating a 6-8 kilometer leapfrog movement and deployment time at new positions, the maneuver requires up to 40-50 minutes. During this period, the enemy, while advancing at his previous speed, has in all probability penetrated to a depth of about two kilometers into our defense's first position. Consequently, if the battalion manages to stop the enemy at that depth, practically all of its artillery located in two position areas can be brought to bear on them simultaneously. If the enemy continues to press first echelon battalion subunits and at the same time the threat arises of a first position breach, then in this case second sequence batteries (artillery battalions) will have time to be withdrawn from previous positions and move to an alternate area.


It follows from what has been said that each echelon must divide its movement into at least two sequences while organizing command and control of an artillery maneuver in a defensive engagement. Furthermore, only

half of the battalion can participate in enemy fire suppression and the other half will constantly be on the move during a regimental defensive maneuver.

And now, it is worth discussing one more specific feature. If the battalion that is operating in the security area is allocated just one artillery battalion for support, then its movement should be carried out in the same order as the attached battalion. In this case, the battalion commander must coordinate the artillery battalion's maneuver (according to time and place) with the senior combined-arms commander and the artillery battalion commander will coordinate with the commander of the artillery group to which he is assigned. However, in our opinion the battalion commander should be allowed more independence than under ordinary circumstances in questions concerning assignment of fire missions to the supporting artillery battalion because he needs to set specific ammunition limits. This need is confirmed by the experience of the Great Patriotic War when the rational and characteristic trait of artillery maneuvers was that centralized command and control was rarely utilized even at the artillery regimental or group level during a withdrawal. As a rule, artillery regiments were used by battalions in support of units and the rifle battalion commander still had the right to call on any designated artillery assets to conduct a standing barrage.

In a specific situation, a battalion from the senior headquarter's artillery group may be moved to the security area to temporary firing positions to strike the enemy's artillery batteries or other important targets in depth. In the direct support plan of a battalion that is defending in the security area, that artillery battalion may also not have a specific mission. However, destroying the enemy's artillery and command posts has a positive impact on battalion operations as a whole and artillery battalion maneuvering in particular. Therefore, movement of the artillery battalion should conform to the single maneuver plan for all artillery that has been moved to temporary firebases in the main defensive zone. In our view, these bases may be located at various distances from the forward edge of the security area (3-4 kilometers and more) depending on the nature of the targets to be destroyed and mission execution times.

While controlling the first sequence of artillery subunit movement, it is advisable from the very beginning for the battalion commander to accelerate the operations of the battalion anti-tank platoon in APC's [armored personnel carriers] particularly by covering intervals between subunits to decrease enemy tank and IFV rates of advance. PTRK [Anti-tank missile system] crews are best deployed in pairs while covering axes accessible to tanks, intervals, and access paths to artillery firebase areas. In the intervals between the battalion artillery positions and firebase areas, employment of fire ambushes is also recommended while directing their resources in the integrated covering subunit command and control system.



During a defensive engagement, the artillery battalion's primary efforts must be concentrated toward execution of the primary mission which is continuous destruction of the attacking enemy. It is advisable to move artillery reconnaissance subunits as part of the NP [observation post] and KNP [command and observation post] with the combined-arms commander for this purpose (for example, as part of their command and control facilities). A reconnaissance commander from an artillery battalion in a PRP-3 or platoon commanders from batteries with one or two scouts and communications gear in a vehicle are left as part of the rear guard subunits to reconnoiter the enemy and adjust artillery fire during the artillery battalion's withdrawal to the next line.

While considering that sound ranging and radio-electronic reconnaissance subunit combat formation breakdown takes no less than an hour, their withdrawal to the security area should be viewed as an exception and should not be farther than 4-6 kilometers behind the forward edge of the main defensive zone.

During an engagement for the first and subsequent positions in the main defensive zone, the battalion artillery maneuver has a number of specific features. If the battalion is withdrawn from the security area to the second position, the attached artillery battalion is most

frequently immediately assigned to the PAG [regimental artillery group]. Sometimes it is resubordinated to the battalion that is defending at the first position (although, in the subsequent variation, well known additional difficulties arise in the organization of command and control, especially during the phase of resubordinating the artillery battalion from one battalion to another battalion). In this case, firebases for the organic mortar battery and the artillery attached to the battalion need to be selected at a distance of 2-3 kilometers from the forward edge of the main defensive zone and supporting [artillery firebases] 3-6 kilometers depending on the subordination of the artillery. Subsequently, the axis of artillery movement within the main defensive zone, in our opinion, needs to be more centrally conducted. But, nevertheless, it should begin with maneuver of battalion and regimental artillery, and to the extent of their readiness to fire at the new positions, senior echelon artillery should already be tasked with a mission to maneuver.

In this article, we have attempted to examine rational command and control methods for maneuvering artillery that is carrying out fire missions in support of the battalion based on predictions of the probable dynamics of a defensive engagement.

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**Response to Rumors on Redeployment of Troops  
From Czechoslovakia**

90UM0632A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA  
in Russian 26 May 90 p 1

[Article by Colonel General Eh. Vorobyev, USSR People's Deputy and Commander of the Central Group of Forces, under the rubric "Letter to the Newspaper": "A Slightly Tainted Dish..."]

[Text] In April 1990, NASHA GAZETA, a publication of the workers' union at Kuzbass No 9 (18), published an article, entitled "'The Czecho-Slovak Corps' in Kuzbass", with the following content (I am quoting word for word):

"Food for thought... I am suggesting two dishes. For the first course—July strikes. For the second—the redeployment of the troops that are being withdrawn."

"Don't you think that the newly fledged president will suggest using these two dishes on the same menu?"

"Yakov Kraus."

And further from the editorial staff: "According to unofficial information, the first transport aircraft with troops from Czechoslovakia will arrive in Kuzbass literally in a day or two. Up till now we have not received official information about this. We consider Ya. Kraus's question quite appropriate. Using the Soviet Army for police purposes has become a fine tradition of the Ministry of Defense. Rebellious Kuzbass is quite a suitable training ground for this."

After reading Ya. Kraus's article and the editorial commentary upon it, I was simply shocked. What in the world have we come to? Is it possible that elementary ethics are only required in the USSR Supreme Soviet, and everybody else can conduct themselves in such an unruly manner?

I fondly remember the newspaper articles about the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakian territory, when, despite a multitude of local social welfare problems, the Gorkiy city Soviet and Party leaders conjointly with the command element of the

Moscow Military District greeted servicemen from the Central Group of Forces with sincere warmth.

These receptions contained a dose of great moral strength—the homeland greeting its soldiers, they possessed enormous motivational importance for those who still faced redeployment, they inspired confidence in the future, and they dealt an appreciable blow to the popular opinion that no one needs us and that the troops are leaving for "nowhere". Those of us who are being redeployed assess the situation this way.

I do not identify Yakov Kraus with our country. I do not know what kind of position he holds nor what kind of stock he comes from. But I do know full well that a civilized country does not treat its soldiers the way that NASHA GAZETA did. Not even literary license gives the author the right to use a blatantly insulting tone with respect to the Soviet Forces that are being brought back to the homeland, much less to speak so disrespectfully about the country's President, while making a "farseeing" political prediction.

As to the newspaper's editorial staff, its slanderous position in this episode is being thoroughly examined. And, in this case, I doubt very much that its commentary expresses the opinion of the Kuzbass workers.

The editorial staff should know that the "Ministry of Defense" includes the Soviet Army, which, if it is performing missions that are not inherent to it, it is not doing so independently, but while carrying out the orders of our government.

With respect to the unofficial information (by the way, real workers in the mass media do not wait for information, they actively search out information themselves), I will officially state that the first and only transport aircraft has arrived in Kuzbass and that only two battalions having technical functions have arrived in Kuzbass from the ranks of the so-called "Czecho-Slovak Corps".

In my opinion, the aforementioned article in NASHA GAZETA is insulting and derogatory to the USSR President, the Ministry of Defense, and the Soviet Army, and it does not contain one iota of truth.

Therefore, I think that the editorial staff of NASHA GAZETA should deliver public apologies to the head of State and the Ministry of Defense and refute its insulting prognosis.

**'Unjustifiable Limits' on Financial Authority of Unit Commanders**

90UM0465A Moscow FINANSY SSSR in Russian  
No 3, Mar 90 pp 29-32

[Article by Col I.N. Shupenko and Lt Col L.I. Plaksivyy:  
"Changes Are Essential"]

[Text] The finances of the USSR Armed Forces, as a portion of the nation's financial system, under the conditions of carrying out a radical economic reform cannot be outside the sphere of the transforming processes. A start has already been made in positive changes. In particular, in recent years the rights of the troop units have been broadened in utilizing the monetary fund formed from the nonbudget sources. Basically, these are deductions from the products of the subsidiary farms.

Since 1988, the troop units have been given the right to expend budgetary allocations on a consolidated basis, permitting overexpenditures for individual items on the estimate of the USSR Ministry of Defense at the expense of balances on others within a certain paragraph. Moreover, the unutilized balances of allocations for a number of the estimate subdivisions may be expended in the following budgetary year. In the interests of the troop units, instead of the previously existing practice of a monthly transfer of funds, from the start of the current year, financing is to be made twice a quarter (for the first two months and the last month of the quarter). This provides a freer maneuvering of the money.

The positive importance of such changes is beyond doubt. However, we feel that they must be viewed not in isolation but in the context of the general changes in the nation's economic situation and the new military doctrine. We have in mind the following. Up to the present, current expenditures for the support of the Army and Navy (the issuing of pay, uniform and food supply, medical and routine services for the personnel, the combat and political training of the troops, the maintenance of equipment and so forth) in our nation both in absolute and relative terms have been much lower than in the United States. While in the USSR they are, for instance, some 20.2 billion rubles, in the United States, they are \$160 billion. In 1990-1991, we intend to reduce defense expenditures in comparison with the five-year plan by 30 billion rubles and by 1995, achieve a reduction in their proportional amount in national income by 1.5-2-fold.

Considering this as well as the inevitable absolute and relative rise in the total volume of defense expenditures of outlays for pensions of servicemen related to the cutback in the size and the demands of rigid savings of budget allocations caused by the difficult financial situation of the nation, it can be expected that the proportional expenditure of financial resources on current activities calculated per unit of combat equipment, per serviceman and troop subunit will decline. On the other hand, the most important component in the doctrine of

defensive sufficiency is the achieving of higher quality parameters for the state of the Armed Forces.

Thus, it is essential to carry out a difficult task: with an absolute (and possibly also relative) decline in the financial resources and on the broader level, the economic resources, to bring about a strengthening of the nation's defense capability. From this derives the urgent need to sharply increase the return from each ruble of assigned allocations for defense. If we view the problem from such a viewpoint, then it must be frankly admitted that the previously planned measures to improve the financial support of the troops (positive in and of themselves) are clearly insufficient. It is a question of the estimate-budget financing which holds a prevailing place in the Army and Navy. A critical analysis of the functioning of the financial mechanism in the troop sphere (and precisely this is capable of disclosing the reserves for increasing the effectiveness of such a mechanism) sheds light on the two most important interrelated problems:

The unjustified restricting of the financial rights and economic initiative of the commanders (chiefs) of the troop echelon and not completely corresponding to their role and responsibility;

The absence of an integrated economic mechanism (the economic mechanism here is viewed in the narrow sense as an aggregate of tools, levers, forms and methods for carrying out economic work in the troops) which would provide thriftiness in the troop subunits, units and formations and the military administrative bodies.

No proof is required concerning the validity of raising the first problem as many officers and rear workers speak about this daily and the army press has begun to write often about it. It is more important to determine what are the reasons for such a phenomenon? In our view, here both objective and subjective factors are at work. The former are caused by the well-known imbalance of the consumer market and by an overall deficit in the material resources of the national economy and this tells fully also on the use of the allocations assigned directly to the troops. Certainly these allocations are outside the sphere of contractual relations and outside the state order. This is why the most elementary needs of the troop units are at times not satisfied (even with the presence of money).

The most obvious reason of a subjective nature is the excessive detailing of the expenditure list for the estimate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Let us immediately stipulate that the budget classification, including the classification of the ministries estimate, is undoubtedly useful. The great detailing of the list unjustifiably evokes argument. It would be difficult to find a reasonable explanation for the reasons due to which the financial resources being allocated for defense (in 1989, these were 77.3 billion rubles, or around 15.6 percent of the state budget) are distributed over a much larger number of estimate subdivisions than the remaining, predominant portion of the state budget which is channeled into

the financing of the national economy, sociocultural measures and science and state administration.

We feel that in classifying expenditures under the estimate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, it is essential to rationally combine both the demands of the departmental (central and district supply bodies) assigning of allocations and responsibility for their use as well as the possibility of the freer maneuvering of financial means on the troop level within the total amount of assignments (certainly with the exception of the funds for pay and salaries). If the given question is still waiting for a more thorough study and practical testing, the detailed breakdown found in the expenditure list of what is permitted to buy appears an anachronism. It contradicts the very development logic of the Armed Forces as there is a generally known objective tendency for a constant broadening of the range of materiel consumed in the Army and Navy and which currently numbers over a hundred thousand items. An article list is incapable of covering them and for this reason is unacceptable in principle.

The decision to allow the troop units to use the saved budget funds under individual estimate subdivisions in the following year has somewhat weakened the established practice of spending allocations before the end of the year whatever the cost. But this is only a part of the problem. We should be aware that effective incentives for saving budget funds requires the use of stable financial standards. At present, in the financing of the troops differentiated standards prevail (with the exception of pay rates). For this reason, a troop unit, having saved a certain amount of budget funds during the current year, cannot be certain that the superior granter of credits will not cut off allocations in the new budget year.

From the standpoint of the efficient use of financial resources allocated to the Armed Forces, a more difficult problem is seen in creating in the army an integrated economic mechanism which would provide savings and efficiency. The system of economic ties which has developed here is marked by a high degree of centralizing the financial resources. This is fully explainable, in the first place, by the need for rigid centralization in the command and control of the Armed Forces. Secondly, the purchasing of weapons and military equipment requires well-organized contractual work with suppliers. But regardless of the designated factors it can be said that in the troop echelons economic ties in their majority are not carried out through the means of commodity-monetary relations but are rather made in kind and are characterized, as a rule, by the absence of any cost accounting for the movement of the materiel. At the same time, it is precisely in the formations and troop units that the basic mass of resources is consumer (military equipment, fuel, food and so forth). Here is found a definite contradiction which is manifested not only in the lessening of ruble control but also in the inefficient use of incentives to save resources.

Definite steps in the direction of the more efficient use of the financial and material resources allocated for defense have been undertaken over many years and primarily upon the initiative of the financial service. The result is the current management mechanism. The real and most effective levers for saving are, in the first place, the limiting (in physical units) of the consumption of individual types of material resources and, secondly, the rather rigid system of material responsibility of the servicemen for damage caused to the state (the troop unit). However, here there are no incentives for the saving of resources. Let us give a characteristic example. Exercises involving a modern motorized rifle or tank division cost the state tens and hundreds of thousands of rubles. There is a scientifically sound method for an integrated assessment of expenditures on conducting them. But who directly makes the calculations and compares expenditures and results? Certainly, the expended ammunition, fuel and motor life are accounted for in physical units and in the forefront is always an assessment of combat skills. The consideration of the economic factor becomes more the exception than the rule. It would be possible to give rather many analogous examples from troop practices.

In our opinion, we must actively introduce economic relations in the troops echelons of the Armed Forces. Specifically, this could be expressed in the following. Considering the broadening in coming years of wholesale trade in the means of production and market relations, it seems possible to delegate a portion of the financial resources and the corresponding rights of realizing them to the troop unit. Undoubtedly this should be done within reasonable limits and solely for purchasing general products (spare parts and tools, parts, building and other materials and so forth). Arguing in favor of such a decision is the fact that the current excessive centralization for peacetime of financial resources and logistic support for the troops involves additional outlays for the storage and transporting of materials and commodities and the inevitable formation (with the existing methods of organizing and planning supply and the lack of computers) of unliquid supplies and most importantly does not ensure the satisfying of the normed requirements for many of them.

In considering a certain decentralization of the resources to be valid in principle, we are aware that this requires time and will be possible only with the saturating of the market with commodity supplies. At present, there are also other variations for developing economic relations and management initiative in the troops: through a substantial rise in the importance and share of nonbudgetary sources for financing the troop units and formations. This would mean the introduction of the elements and features of cost accounting relations into a system of estimate-budget financing. On the practical level this would require a broadening of the currently existing list of sources for the forming of the monetary fund of a troop unit by deducting a certain portion from: the above-planned delivery of scrap ferrous and nonferrous

metals; the total of paid services rendered to the public (for transporting passengers and freight, domestic services, the use of apartment telephones from the agency automatic exchanges and so forth); the outside sales of unusable packaging and unliquid materials. Moreover, we must fully transfer the total amount of the repayment of debt for losses and shortages of property recovered from guilty parties.

The designated list clearly cannot be considered exhaustive. The percentage of deductions for the monetary fund of a troop unit should be set on a differentiated basis for each type of receipt (for example, from 25 to 75 percent) depending upon the degree of the collective's involvement in the forming of these total receipts. The remaining portion should be transferred to the income of the Union budget. It would also be just if restrictions in the use of the mentioned fund would tell on the amounts of bonuses and the totals going to retire debts for damage caused to the state. The latter should be sent completely to purchase lost equipment and this would encourage a more active retirement of debts.

Let us point out that a definite drop in receipts as income of the Union budget related to the proposed measures to some degree would be compensated for by a drop in budget allocations. But this is not a simple reshuffling of the components. The activating of economic incentives and management initiative should provide a total increase in the economic effect. The question may arise that the troop units in terms of the nature of combat training activity, place of disposition and tasks being carried out, are under varyingly advantageous conditions from the viewpoint of forming the monetary fund. For this reason it would make sense to grant the command of the superior levels (the formation or field force) the right to reallocate a portion of the monetary fund (up to 20-25 percent).

The proposals made, of course, do not make any claim of infallibility. However, we are convinced that there is an urgent need for a profound analysis and elaboration of new approaches and sound methods of financial support for the Army and Navy in the interests of achieving greater efficiency.

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#### **Import of Commitment to Military-Scientific Research**

90UM0759A Moscow TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE  
in Russian No 5, May 1990 pp 1-3

[Unattributed Article: "Science—For the Protection of the Homeland"]

[Text] Fascist Germany's unconditional surrender document was signed forty five years ago on May 8, 1945 in Karlshorst, a suburb of Berlin. The other day, May 9, in Moscow, the capital of our Homeland, 30 salvos from thousands of guns heralded our Great Victory to the world. May 9th was announced in our country as the

Soviet people's Victory Holiday in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. This day has become a bright and dear holiday of all Soviet people and of all progressive humanity.

History does not know another such example of an entire people's deeds and its unprecedented solidarity to achieve victory over an awesome foe—Hitler's Germany. Victory was achieved by the Soviet people and its Armed Forces under the Communist Party's leadership. The Party acted as the inspiration and organizer of the universal struggle against the German Fascist aggressors. It began enormous work to explain the just nature of the Soviet Union's war to the broadest masses of the Soviet people and insured the restructuring of the country's entire national economy to a war footing. The Party's historical service consisted of the fact that it clearly and skillfully defined the tasks in the war and managed to arouse the entire people for a patriotic war and war of liberation, to mobilize all of its forces to implement the program developed to defeat the enemy, and to realize those capabilities which were harnessed in the socialist social and state order.

During the war, the Party redistributed its forces, restructured intra-Party work, and strengthened its impact and influence on the entire life of the country and the Armed Forces for the sake of the front. The Party's military organizational activities which it based on Leninist teaching about protection of the Socialist Homeland became its core activities during the war. The Party's military organizational activities as the fighting Party under wartime conditions consisted of developing a scientifically-based political and military strategy, defining missions facing the Soviet Armed Forces, uniting the military and political leadership, and creating emergency management organs to consolidate Party influence during the entire course of conducting the war and achieving victory in war.

During the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Armed Forces' superiority over the strongest and most experienced army in the capitalist world—Hitler's Army was clearly manifested. The Soviet Armed Forces exceeded Hitler's Army in the level of technical equipment and personnel moral, political and combat qualities. The high level and creative nature of Soviet military science and military art was revealed in its entirety during the war.

The country's scientific forces played an enormous role in achieving victory over the enemy. They solved very important scientific and technical defense problems. The war demonstrated the creative might of Soviet science and Soviet scientists' loyalty to their patriotic and international duty. Prior to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Union achieved significant successes in the development of science. It had powerful physical facilities for its future flourishing. There were 1,821 scientific institutions in the country by the beginning of the war in which there were over 98,000 scientific workers. By 1941, Soviet scientists had made quite a few

scientific discoveries and studies that had great defense significance. Aviation, shipbuilding, radio-electronics, and other sectors of industry received further development and workers at these plants mastered production of the latest aircraft, tanks, artillery, and other military equipment.

Thus, for example, accelerated series production of new types of aircraft was begun during the second half of 1940—beginning of 1941: the Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3 fighter aircraft, the IL-2 armored ground-attack aircraft, and the PE-2 dive bomber. In 1939-1940, the T-34 and KV tanks, which were distinguished by the best combination of fire power, armor protection, and high maneuverability, were developed and series production was later begun.

The Soviet Union's scientists were faced with the most difficult and responsible task—to assist the Party and the people to insure our entire industry's very rapid transition to a wartime footing, to place our economic potential into action, to rush the latest weapons against our hated foe, and to use the entire might of the country's scientific potential for its development and production.

The war demanded not only the united efforts of scientists of many specialties but also precise coordination of the activities of scientific institutions. Special commissions played an important role in coordinating the activities of our science. These commissions were composed of the most prominent experts in their fields of knowledge and representatives of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The commissions maintained close contact with government institutions and with industrial and defense narkomats [People's Commissariats].

USSR Academy of Sciences President Academician V. Komarov headed the Urals and Western Siberian Commission on Mobilization of Resources and Academician Ye. Chudakova headed the Volga and Kama River Basin Commission on Resources. The Commission under the Department of Geologic and Geographic Sciences, whose chairman was Academician A. Fersman, was engaged in geological and geographical support. USSR Academy of Sciences Vice President Academician L. Orbelin headed the Military Health Commission. Commissions on Scientific and Technical, Navy (Chairman Academician A. Ioffe), and Aviation Issues (Academician N. Bruyevich headed it) were also organized.

Right now we can say with total certainty that this form of organizing scientific research work under wartime conditions totally justified itself. The idea of the closest contact of science with practice was most completely embodied in it. It provided the capability to not only conduct massive research associated with the economic development of entire areas of the country, but to also fulfill specific Party Central Committee and GKO [State Defense Committee] tasks of a purely practical nature which was no less important.

Already by July 1, 1941, four primary directions were noted in the work of the Academy of Sciences by

agreement of planning organs. The first of them was work on modernizing series models of arms and military equipment, improving their combat qualities and tactical-technical characteristics, and also developing fundamentally new models of arms and combat equipment with higher and, in a number of cases, even completely new technical characteristics and combat properties. The second direction provided for rendering specific scientific assistance to industry to improve and master military production by developing and introducing advanced technology; third—mobilization of the country's raw material resources and replacement of shortage materials with local raw materials and, fourth, the search for effective countermeasures against new German military equipment.

Soviet scientists regarded the resolution of the scientific-technical tasks raised by the war with exceptional responsibility. The high rates of scientific research work and introduction of its results into practice were a characteristic trait of scientific development of that time and had important significance for the nation's defense. Thus, comprehensive work on the problem of superhigh pressures was conducted at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Organic Chemistry under the leadership of Academician L.F. Vereshchagin. One of the results of this work was the development of a special assembly to reinforce small, medium, and large caliber artillery and mortar barrels. The guns' maximum range and service period was increased using the new barrel reinforcing method and lower quality steel could be used in their manufacture.

Soviet science made a great contribution to the development of domestic military aviation. During the war, our aviation did not have one case of destruction of aircraft due to errors in determining wing strength.

Widespread introduction of automatic submerged arc welding developed at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Arc Welding under the leadership of Ye.O. Paton. Application of this method in the production of tank hulls, aircraft bombs, and artillery pieces was exceptionally important. The productivity of the automated process was eight times higher than manual welding.

Specific defense tasks were resolved not only by representatives of the technical and applied sciences but also by representatives of the basic sciences. Research conducted under the leadership of Professor I. Kitaygorodskiy permitted the creation of bullet-resistant aircraft glass. Academician A. Kolmogorov, using his work in the area of probability theory, provided the determination for the most advantageous dispersal of artillery shells and USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member N. Chetayev solved a complex task for determining the optimum rifling slope for artillery piece barrels that permitted them to provide grouping and projectile stability.

Everyone worked on defense. Chemists improved the technological processes to obtain high octane gasolines

and lubricants and compiled formulas for manufacturing explosives and gunpowder. Geologists discovered new deposits of iron, copper, and manganese ores. Geographers, geodesists, and topographers carried out General Staff operational missions—they compiled geographic-geographic maps and reference books.

Soviet military science demonstrated high zeal during the years of the Great Patriotic War. It developed in exceptionally difficult conditions and was inseparably linked with combat operational experience. It devoted its primary attention to resolution of the most timely problems of strategy, operational art, and tactics that resulted from the practical need to successfully conduct war with a technically strong and experienced enemy. During the war years, Soviet military science worked out many important theoretical problems, made correct conclusions about the role and location, organization and conduct of strategic defense, on preparations for and execution of a counteroffensive, on formation of men and equipment into echelons on the most important axes and their maneuver during the course of defensive engagements, and on utilization of reserves. Many questions of military structural development and the military economy were also worked out and successfully resolved.

From Autumn 1942, when the strategic initiative began to transfer into the hands of the Soviet high command, Soviet military science's primary attention was directed at problems of organization and conduct of the strategic offensive.

The Great Patriotic War once again convincingly confirmed the immutable fact that one of the decisive conditions for achieving victory in war is superiority over the enemy in the economic organization of society and in the level of development of the economy, science, and technology.

During the postwar period, scientific-technical progress resulted in a radical change in the military profession. The appearance and development of nuclear missile weapons and other new weapons to conduct war caused new qualitative changes in the structure of the Armed Forces and assigned new tasks to Soviet military science. On the whole, Soviet military science was raised to a new level after the appearance of nuclear weapons. Its conclusions and scientifically-based recommendations were successfully utilized for the sake of further strengthening the USSR's defense capability. At the 19th All-Union Party Conference, military science was named among the primary components for ensuring the effectiveness of our defensive structural development primarily through qualitative parameters.

Specific practical measures to improve the functioning and improve the structure and network of scientific research and experimental institutions have been implemented during the course of perestroika in the Armed Forces that is more completely encompassing the various spheres of life of ground and naval forces. Definite

results have been achieved. Significant scientific potential has been created. The task consists of achieving the most complete mobilization and the best utilization of this potential using organizational, economic, and social factors, establishing order, increasing responsibility and discipline, and diligent and truly proprietary utilization of available men and equipment while proceeding from an orientation on qualitative indicators.

We must admit that during the course of a number of recent years instances occurred when scientific developments were directed along the beaten path and essentially reduced to copying what had already been developed, to repetition of the path already taken, and new, non-traditional solutions for development of arms and equipment were not sought. As a result, costs were permitted in the determination of the prospects of weapons development, in the operational-tactical basis of some models, and in insuring that their quality and reliability met modern requirements. The results of scientific-technical progress, basic research, and the latest achievements, discoveries, and inventions were slowly introduced. Serious delays in planning played a negative role. Frequently a situation developed when plans existed in and of themselves and were not linked with ground and naval forces missions.

In our days, Soviet science is faced with a task to accelerate development of its priority directions, first of all development of new concepts of military art in accordance with the defensive nature of our military doctrine, with a search for effective solutions to the problems of improving the military personnel training system, and increasing the effectiveness of political, military, moral, and legal training of personnel. We need to purge everything alien from military science, restructure internal relations in it, create an atmosphere of glasnost, openness [otkrytost], freedom of creativity and discussion, and businesslike criticism and self-criticism.

Life is confirming the urgent need to improve our military scientific potential based on the comprehensive democratization of the situation in military science and overcoming bureaucratism and administration. A simple definition and consistent application in practice of the primary criteria for assessing the work of a scientific research institution and each scientific worker—and the specific scientific results they obtain—has fundamental significance.

The influx of young scientific personnel has important significance for an upsurge of military science. We need to look for and solicitously nurture gifted and inquisitive young scientists. At the same time, it is important to guarantee the succession of generations, to considerately utilize accumulated experience, and rationally combine young and experienced personnel. We also need to more widely utilize the capabilities of VUZ science and the pedagogical experience and knowledge of professorial and teaching personnel.

We need to persistently improve experimental and testing facilities, work to introduce mathematical methods and modeling in the work of scientific institutions and to improve test range technical equipment [and provide] everything necessary to insure a high scientific-technical level of testing and reduction of time periods for finishing and entering advanced models, complexes, and systems into the inventory. We have to keep our primary goal in mind—to insure high quality and reliability of arms and military equipment.

Strengthening vital ties with the troops in many ways promotes the increase of military science's effectiveness and scientific research institutions's productivity of labor. The well-known requirement of the inseparable interrelation of theory and practice is doubly and triply justified for military science. A transition to cost accounting and self-financing can provide much in the solution of the task to increase military science's effectiveness and to improve its qualitative indicators.

While cooperating with the 28th CPSU Congress, Army and Navy personnel wholeheartedly and completely approve the foreign policy course of the Communist Party and Soviet Government and the practical steps toward arms reductions and further reduction of military confrontation while considering provision of the parties' mutual and equal security.

The USSR Armed Forces personnel training and education system is structured in accordance with the primary political task and Soviet military doctrine is subordinate to its solution—the mission to prevent war. We examine all issues of repelling aggression only from the position of retaliatory operations. We proceed from the principles of equality and defensive sufficiency both in the equipment level provided to ground and naval forces and in military structural development as a whole.

Along with all the people, Soviet soldiers participate in carrying out Party policy for the revolutionary renewal of society. They greet the Victory Holiday with an increase of military skill, field, air, and naval skill, consolidation of discipline, and increased combat readiness of units and ships. For Soviet soldiers, the deeds of the heroes who won the Victory in the Great Patriotic War—deeds for the sake of the Homeland and for the sake of life—will always be an eternally vital, inspiring example of selfless fulfillment of patriotic and international duty and selfless service to the people.

The work of military scientists and engineers finds its real embodiment in specific models of weapons. A model covers the long path of design development and varied testing from the scientific-technical idea until the plant assembly line. But repeated improvements and modernization await it during the operating process even after its "birth."

Today, when total production of arms and military equipment is being reduced based on our State's defensive military doctrine, many technically promising developments that are associated with the use of

weapons strike systems are being removed from design bureau plans and new priority directions are being assigned that promise to increase the effectiveness of repelling aggression. The task of preserving troop combat capabilities based on increasing the tactical-technical characteristics of weapons, automation, and computerization of military equipment is becoming one of its most important tasks. The second page of the magazine cover and pages 4-9 discuss some representatives of military science and inventors of new equipment—scientists, designers, and testers.

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#### Mail Round-Up on Civilian Killing of Officers

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[Article by Capt 2nd Rank S. Turchenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent, in the column: "Looking at the Mail": "A Result of General Deterioration?"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The editors have received more than a hundred letters commenting on the 17 February article "By the Hand of Criminals." Strange as it may seem, there was only one official letter. It was signed by State Judiciary Adviser 3rd Class A. Tsyanova, who is deputy chief, Main Administration for Investigation and Inquiry Oversight, USSR Procuracy. There was no response on the part of other officials who are instrumental in the investigation in one way or another into the cases of killing of the officers and adoption of measures directed against the growth of such crimes. For this reason, in preparing our survey of mail from readers, we decided to address the readers' questions to representatives of the respective institutions and departments.

Many readers wrote that they were shocked by what they read in the article. "I never thought I would hear of anything like that!", exclaimed F. Krivonosov of Makeyevka, a handicapped veteran of the Great Patriotic War. "It is beyond imagination that someone is killing our officers in peacetime! Who is doing this? Riff-raff, scoundrels, idlers..." "Where is the man that will do something about this?" asks P. Vyshemirskiy of Moscow. "Who will protect them? The President? The Ministry of Defense? The Main Military Procuracy? The Ministry of Internal Affairs?" The article even caused V. Korzhenyants of Moscow to experience apocalyptic feelings: "With the difficult situation existing in the country, if there is an organized force that maintains internal order, discipline, and stability, that force must be the Army. If we weaken its foundation, demoralizing the officer corps and enlisted ranks, we will PERISH. Not by a blow from without, but from internal strife."

"It is the press, or, more accurately, some malicious journalists (to put it mildly), that did their part to make the Armed Forces into some kind of monster, the kind that is used to frighten children. Defamation of the Army strikes officers the hardest." (N. Vovchenko, pensioner)

"I am a civilian. I did my obligatory service in the 1960s and have warm feelings for the Army. It hurts me to see officers placed into such a humiliating situation. I believe that our government is indifferent to this problem. That is the root of the trouble." (M. Gonaya, Tayshet) "It has long been clear that officers are among the most socially unprotected members of society. There has recently been nothing more than talk about that. This can be the cause of a devil-may-care attitude toward officers." (S. Yaroshenko, V. Dubinskiy; a total of eight signatures) "One of the causes of crimes committed against officers is the absence of special legislation geared toward effective protection of their life, honor, dignity, and civil rights in society." (F. Tkachenko, reserve colonel) This topic is discussed by P. Kozlov of Taganrog; A. Soroka of Khmelnitskiy Oblast; M. Kiselev of Moscow; V. Stoyev of Ryazan; and many others.

Virtually every letter offers specific suggestions to resolve the problem.

"I served in the Army eight years," writes I. Lapayev, a combat veteran residing in Novosibirsk Oblast. "I was stationed in other countries, where I never saw servicemen treated as badly as in our country. It is high time that the USSR Supreme Soviet adopts the 'Law on USSR Armed Forces.' I believe that the law should state that an attempt made on the life of a serviceman constitutes a very grave crime, and that premeditated murder of a protector of the Motherland calls for capital punishment." V. Gusev of Yaroslavl shares this opinion: "The USSR Procuracy is empowered to exercise legislative initiative. It includes the Main Military Procuracy. The organization is dealing the cards, so to speak. Let it take action with legislative initiative." The topic of the present need for developing and adopting laws offering servicemen social protection is taken up by Yu. Sentyukov of Moscow; N. Stekleneva of Minsk; A. Slepushkin, M. Kondabarov, and G. Nedov of Kursk; V. Sukhar of Primorskiy Kray; Guards Colonel V. Gubanov, commander of Garrison X, speaking for his subordinates; and Political Section Chief Guards Lieutenant Colonel N. Trofimov.

The letter writers also make suggestions for the newspaper. "The editors should take an active interest in all 59 cases of officer murders," writes Muscovite M. Kravchenko. "Officers are being killed, and the Army newspaper does nothing but report the facts," indignantly states N. Petrenko of Dnepropetrovsk. "What good does it do to print the article? You must take action so that suitable measures are adopted."

The suggestions are reasonable. It is gratifying that our readers have joined the newspaper in taking such an interest in this problem. Thousands of letters were received by the Main Military Procuracy, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs after the article "By the Hand of Criminals" was published. They demand that everything possible be done to assure social protection for servicemen. What response has this elicited?

### Main Military Procuracy

"We are examining all 59 cases of officer murders committed last year and the 21 of this year," said Colonel of Justice A. Korotkov, deputy chief of the Investigations Directorate of the GVP [Main Military Procuracy]. "The military procuracies are not in a position to conduct independent investigations of the murders committed by civilians, since they do not possess the investigative set-up. In addition, investigatory activity is covered by the law. In this case, criminal law places the burden of conducting investigations on territorial procurators. With regard to legislative initiative, the GVP has submitted via the USSR Procurator General proposals intended to assure social protection for servicemen. One of them states that a crime committed against a serviceman is an aggravating circumstance. We concur with the proposal that officers carry a weapon. However, the rendering of decisions in this regard comes under the purview of the Minister of Defense or the President of the USSR.

### USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs

"After the article 'By the Hand of Criminals' was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, the Minister of Internal Affairs received a letter of request from the Supreme Soviet Committee on Problems of Defense and State Security," writes Colonel of Justice I. Khrapov, deputy chief, Main Administration of Criminal Investigation of the USSR MVD. We thoroughly examined each case of officer murder. Actions that were taken have resulted in solving more than 30 of the crimes; investigation into the remaining crimes is continuing. To be more specific, investigation has been completed in the cases—cited in the article—of murder of Lieutenant Colonel V. Bazhanov and Captain-Lieutenant S. Zadoyan; a search is underway for the person suspected of killing Major S. Komissarov... Unfortunately, it is too early to say anything about the investigation into the murder of Lieutenant I. Kholostyakov. The GUVD [Main Directorate of Internal Affairs] of Mosoblispolkom and the Shchelkovo Division of Internal Affairs have conducted an exhaustive investigation without arriving at positive findings. We are presently questioning a number of persons whom our information implicates in possible participation in the crimes... The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs has sent to the MVD of union republics a directive outlining the development and implementation of a plan whereby action will be taken jointly with other law enforcement organs to effect a set of measures relative to preventing and responding in a timely manner to violations committed against servicemen."

In addition, Minister of Internal Affairs V. Bakatin has written to the Supreme Soviet Committee on Problems of Defense and State Security, stating the following: "To intensify the struggle against violations committed against the honor, life, and health of personnel of internal affairs organs and of servicemen, including their families, it is necessary to adopt the USSR law on 'Legal

Protection of Persons Carrying Out Official Duties or Public Obligations in Safeguarding Order and Rights of Citizens,' a draft of which has been submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet."

#### USSR Ministry of Defense

Here the problem is of particular concern. Each case of criminal offense committed against servicemen is closely followed. However, the situation is becoming more alarming. I repeat: More than 20 officers have been murdered to date this year. In only the first quarter of this year, 200 officers were administered medical treatment as a result of beatings by hooligan elements. There are on file 3,500 incidents of violence and other offenses against servicemen.

Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, found it necessary to write to the President of the USSR. He wrote:

"I request that you take up the problem of enacting into law measures intended for protecting the life and safety of military personnel; putting an end to the commission of offenses against the Army on the part of antisocial forces; and directing the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the USSR Procuracy to activate the search for criminals responsible for the deaths of the officers, for the purpose of bringing them to justice for gross violation of the law."

As we can see, the problem is fully in the focus of attention, proposals have been made, and legislative initiatives prepared.

The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Problems of Glasnost, Rights, and Appeals of Citizens has already taken a step in this direction. Considered in its recent meeting was the topic "Socio-Political Activity of the Periodical 'Ogonek'" (Committee Chairman V. Foteyev suggested that the discussion be widened to include all mass media writing on the Armed Forces.) Of course, there could be a difference of opinion as to suitability of submitting to the Supreme Soviet questions of inaccuracies in press reporting or leaving this entirely to the courts, but one thing is certain. The committee's discussion compelled many persons to realize once again that objectivity, truthfulness, and absence of prejudice should be the norm relative to information published on the Army and Navy, also. An attitude of respect for protectors of the Motherland can change many things for the better.

And so, the matter has been given a "push." However, can the newspaper "close" the matter? It cannot, of course. Not only because of the continuing heightened interest. The ambivalent attitude on the part of representatives of some law enforcement organs causes concern. In this connection, the official reply made by the USSR Procuracy is highly pertinent here. It has this to say: "There is nothing to indicate that the criminal offenses committed against servicemen were associated with manifestations of a negative attitude relative to the

Armed Forces. The increase in occurrences of these offenses is merely the result of general deterioration in law-abidingness in the country..." It is difficult to agree with that conclusion, considering that the total number of recorded crimes committed last year in the country increased by a third, while the number of murders of officers grew by a factor of 30! This statistic certainly is no cause for complacency or satisfaction, even though the USSR Procuracy, judging from the reply to the editors, intends to take action sometime in the future to "study the causes and conditions that gave rise to the abovementioned crimes, and, on this basis, develop specific measures to eliminate them." Even in a discussion with workers of the Department for Investigation of Serious Crimes Against Persons, USSR MVD Main Administration of Criminal Investigation, doubts were expressed about the existence of this kind of problem. The explanation was that there is no point to differentiating between offenses committed against servicemen and all other illegal acts. We maintain that this is not a matter of dividing Soviet people into "blue bloods" and "commoners," but rather one of the special position a member of the military occupies in our social system. This requires that he receive proper treatment.

The editors are making a careful reading of all letters written on the topic of "By the Hand of Criminals." We will not put this matter aside until all crimes against the servicemen are solved and after the passage of legislation offering them protection. We will keep readers informed on the progress made in resolving these problems.

#### Hazardous Duty Pay for Civil Disorders

90UM0800A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT  
in Russian No 29, 16-22 Jul 90 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Follow-up on a Rumor"]

[Text] Benefits have been authorized to servicemen in the Soviet Army for participating in the suppression of civil disorders.

As has become generally known from unofficial sources, on 25 September 1989 and 9 February 1990, the national government adopted the appropriate resolutions and in February 1990, the USSR Minister of Defense issued an order providing benefits for participation by Soviet servicemen in the suppression of mass public disturbances.

In accordance with the minister's order, during states of emergency while performing missions away from their permanent duty stations to maintain public order, pay at one and a half times the rate for military specialty and payment of a per diem subsistence allowance at the rate three rubles 50 kopecks are authorized for servicemen, including primary rank enlisted personnel, sergeants and senior NCOs (officers and warrant officers will also receive monthly pay for military rank). During a serviceman's temporary duty assignment to an area of public

disturbances, he is paid the longevity increments, additional payments, and compensations, which he would receive at his permanent duty location.

Every month, spent in an area of civil unrest for performing missions to maintain public order during states of emergency, is reckoned as one and a half months service at a permanent duty station for the payment of pensions on preferential terms. After every three months of continuous temporary duty in a detached region, servicemen must be granted 10 days of leave with free round trip passage to their place of permanent residence.

In case of serious wounds, mutilation, or shell shock, servicemen will receive a lump sum allowance of up to 400 rubles. If the bodily injury entails only a temporary disability, a lump sum allowance of not more than 200 rubles will be paid.

In the words of some servicemen, many Soviet Army officers are familiar with the text of the USSR Minister of Defense order by hearsay.

#### **Special KGB Detachment of Taman Motorized-Rifle Division**

*90UM0795A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
29 Jul 90 First Edition p 4*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel S. Kalinayev: "They Call the Department Special"]

[Text] We could not previously talk about these KGB subunits in the open press but our lives are inexorably moving from "impossible" to "possible," and now competent organs themselves propose specific candidates: Lieutenant Colonel Igor Aleksandrovich Shakhov, chief of the KGB USSR Special Department for the Taman Guards Motorized Rifle Division imeni M.I. Kalinin. Get acquainted, ask questions, and write....

We got acquainted. We talked a bit. Igor Aleksandrovich turned out to be a sociable man and, one could say, open. It is true that we did constantly run up against that invisible border in the ping-pong "question-answer" formula beyond which it seemed like his desire to satisfy a journalist's professional curiosity was lost without a trace and we understand that.

By the way, I think that the reader will completely sense the reasons for this "reticence" by just becoming acquainted with the very short list of missions that military counterintelligence specialists accomplish. And this is protecting the troops from enemy intelligence and subversive special services activities, detection, prevention, and suppression of especially dangerous state crimes, protection of state and military secrets, protection of the Soviet constitutional order, and combating organized crime....

A number of other important and interesting factors are hidden behind those last four dots. And just this one—safeguarding weapons, ammunition, and explosives.

This occurred during the dead of night in September 1989. Two unknown persons climbed over a fence and penetrated a unit's territory. They went to a subunit where only Company Noncommissioned Officer of the Day Private Vyacheslav Gvozdikov was and where Orderly Private Aleksandr Terekhov was sleeping quite peacefully. The remaining personnel were at the training center at that time.

"Well, how is the duty, Slavik?" asked one of the unknown persons who under closer examination turned out to be very, very well known. And precisely Yevgeniy Trofimov, a former soldier of this company, who had now been released to the reserve.

The subsequent conversation did not nearly follow along the course of recollections about shared soldier workdays and friends and comrades. Trofimov's request followed and was reinforced by a knife to make it convincing:

"Be quick—an assault rifle and cartridges! Yes, do not be afraid, I will return tomorrow. Right now I need to scare someone..."

Gvozdikov's indecisiveness was finally subdued by the last argument:

"If you do not give it to me, your wife and child will not be healthy!"

And well the alarm had already been turned off, the door had been opened, and Trofimov had a Kalashnikov in his hands....

"There was enough work on this case," said Lieutenant Colonel Shakhov. "Of course, not only for our department. We acted jointly with MUR [Moscow Office of Criminal Investigation], with UKGB [Plenipotentiary of the State Security Committee] for Moscow and Moscow Oblast, and with other services."

"How? First of all, during the operational investigation, KGB agents determined that Trofimov had been released [into the reserves] in Talny in Krasnoyarsk Krai. It was ascertained that he does not live there, although he registered and is a member of a cooperative [there]. The thread soon stretched toward Moscow. We ascertained the address of Trofimov's lover and we conducted surveillance of places where he was periodically "appearing."

They arrested Trofimov at the Intourist Hotel and afterward the entire criminal group of which he was a member. It "operated" with foreigners, blackmailed well-to-do fellow citizens, and also had other troubles during which it would seem like they did not have hands if they did not have assault weapons.

And in 1989 a total of four cases of arms thefts were solved in the division with the assistance of the KGB

special department and all of the weapons were found and returned. I will add to this a whole series of attempts to "walk away with" weapons and ammunition from depots, barracks storage rooms, and at training exercises that were prevented last year and it becomes clear that the contribution of the special department agents in combating crime and extremist elements is quite specific.

And nevertheless not only and not so much these cases are characteristic of their service which, it seemed to me, "is attempting" to benefit people little by little, without being excessively pompous and without publicity. Yes and hands often do not touch the material it is concerned with, let us say, such as the moral and political atmosphere in a military collective.

"Really, like for example, what already occurred this year," Division Political Section Chief Colonel A. Gerasimov told me. "We obtained information from military counterintelligence officers that a conflict situation arose in a tank regiment between a group of Azeri servicemen and representatives of other nationalities. As it turned out, it stopped one step short of disaster. We worked with our KGB agents to expose the leaders—seven men—but not in order to punish them. On the contrary, we made every attempt to try to direct their influence and prestige to good deeds, one could say, and we raised them up in the eyes of others. Thus we managed to prevent a possible outburst of emotion. Later one of the "ringleaders", Private Iris Mikailov, had the opportunity to speak on the Vremya [Television] Program. You should have seen how he spoke about the friendship of peoples and about the brotherhood of soldiers. And the main thing was that he spoke from the heart."

"An insignificant service".... Until this time, hardly anyone knows Private Ali Mamedov who facilitated his ardent desire to be transferred to the intelligence company where things are now proceeding excellently for him in contrast to his previous job. And the riddle of just who will help Private Valeriy Chelyshev "change" sub-unit remains for him since he, so to speak, has not gotten acclimatized to the collective.... There are dozens and hundreds of such episodes. Of course, it is uncomfortable to speak about them, but such things happen when they politely say to an officer that he is conducting a service by making entries in a pocket notebook that can only be "committed" to a secret notebook. Or—purely comradely advice that affects, so to speak, moral and ethical standards of conduct.

Well! says the freedom-loving and democratized reader: The KGB is once again poking into personal lives. I dare to assure you that it is not nearly so in this case. Everything is proceeding from specialists' participation in the service and lives of our own comrades in the division and alarm and, one could say, pain for the fate of each person. Because when a tactful word had been spoken, it frequently led to peace and agreement in that

same family life and, for example, in interrelations of two commanders who ended up in a situation of "having found their match."

Yes, "an insignificant" service. But people who are performing it are becoming more open and accessible to each of us with each passing day. I myself saw documentation of an internal detail on a desk in the visitors' rooms and announcements in the Leninist Rooms: "Comrade soldiers! For the sake of defending your own rights and dignity, you can call...." And further on—the telephone number of the division commander, political section chiefs, the USSR KGB special department heads, Party committee secretaries, and deputy commanders for Komsomol affairs. Do they call the special department? Constantly, and on the most varied grounds. From motor vehicles of foreigners that were noted near the unit (the license plate number is reported) to manifestation of "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts], from service squabbling to purely everyday problems—housing, kindergartens, stores, etc.

And just recently, the political department and the KGB special department conducted a joint roundtable for the first time in the Moscow Military District. This meeting lasted nearly three hours, more than 100 questions were asked, and not one of them remained unanswered. In particular, even one that was addressed to Shakhov:

"When did you last catch a spy?"

Igor Aleksandrovich then answered that his six years service in the division was distinguished in the sense that USSR KGB special department agents for the Taman Division had not had that opportunity. I learned in that conversation that: There is no hint of spy-mania in the vulgar sense of the word in our work today. There actually previously were such cases of listening to and disseminating transmissions of "hostile voices" and a preventive conversation would be conducted with a man. There are no such cases now.

And generally the KGB representatives' mission in the troops, if we outline its main contours, is counterintelligence support to the Armed Forces.

Yes, frankly speaking, this is a serious mission.

"Total shadowing is avoided, unacceptable, and even simply unnecessary for us," explained Shakhov. "There is no such thing in the practice of KGB agents. And there will not be! But there are professional secrets without which, and this is clear to the uninitiated, it is impossible [to perform this mission].

#### Military Involvement in Harvest Emergency

##### Help Urgently Needed

904B0278A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
4 Aug 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Lt Col S. Kalinayev under "Harvest 90" rubric: "Help Urgently Needed"]

[Text] A very good harvest is ripening, an exceptional harvest. And it will be a shame if we lose it. Or if we do not bring it all in. It is an exceptional harvest and we need to take exceptional measures....

It was with these words that Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.I. Ryzhkov opened the meeting on 2 August of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers on the question of additional measures to involve labor collectives and the means of transport in the harvest.

According to the estimates of specialists, 300 million tons of grain have ripened. If one takes average data, natural losses in the harvest may amount to 30 to 40 million tons. They cannot be avoided these days. But all of the remaining grain must be brought in. Otherwise it will be necessary to reduce the level of food provided to the population by 20 to 25 percent, which must not be allowed.

The situation is the same with vegetables and potatoes. If the countryside is not helped, 25 percent will be lost. They will simply be plowed under.

What are the ways to solve the problem? Additional manpower resources—from enterprises, institutions and student lecture halls—must be sent from the cities to the harvest and this must be done urgently. The rural areas, which lose a million people every year, cannot cope with the harvest season without help from the city. Here is just one fact: 20 percent of the combines stand idle in the fields today.

Among the "exceptional measures" is the major, up to 10 to 15 percent, involvement of motor vehicles from enterprises, organizations, urban farms, etc., in the harvest. "Only the army can save us here," said one of the speakers. The supplemental need for motor vehicles is currently 20,000 and most of them—along with drivers—will have to be provided by the armed forces.

In his recent trip to Saratov and Uralsk oblasts, Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov also visited one of the military schools that trains personnel for military transport aviation. At the meeting, he shared his impressions from this encounter. In the process of training military pilots, powerful aircraft "carry" air practically all the time. The command and officers of the school expressed their full willingness to convey national economic loads, including the harvest of fruits and vegetables, a distance of up to 2,000 kilometers.

The USSR Council of Ministers will make specific decisions on the entire complex of these and other questions in the coming days.

Thus, an additional 20,000 motor vehicles with drivers will be required for the harvest. The armed forces are sending another 10,000 vehicles to the fields on an urgent basis. 35,000 military vehicles are already hauling grain and vegetables.

### Military Vehicles Provided

*904B0278B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
4 Aug 90 First Edition p 1*

[Article from the Press Center of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "Soldiers on the Grain Routes"]

[Text] As was already reported, the USSR Ministry of Defense has formed 70 motor transport battalions including 35,000 vehicles for the harvest this year. Most of them are already working on the grain routes of Russia and Kazakhstan. Altogether, 1,088 million tons of farm products, including 792,000 tons of grain, have been transported with them since the start of the harvest. In Volgograd Oblast, the soldier-drivers have already transported 566,000 tons of farm products, including 460,000 tons of grain. In Saratov Oblast, the respective figures are 217,000 and 176,000 tons; 33,000 tons of grain have been hauled in Uralsk Oblast.

In connection with the fact that in many rayons an extremely intense situation has arisen with respect to the hauling of the grain from the unprecedented generous harvest this year, which is fraught with serious losses of grain, the decision has been made to allocate an additional 20 motor transport battalions, that is, 10,000 vehicles.

The minister of defense also issued instructions to the commanders of the forces of the military districts, commanders of units and garrison commanding officers to provide comprehensive help to the workers of the countryside by allocating personnel and equipment. The leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense appealed to all personnel of the armed forces to relate to the harvest as a matter of special state importance, thereby showing very great organization, discipline and responsibility for the fate of the harvest.

### Kuybyshev Situation

*904B0278C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
4 Aug 90 First Edition p 1*

[Article: "Echelons Going to the Volga Area"]

[Text] On 2 August, the first echelon with subunits and equipment was dispatched from the Western Group of Forces for the harvest in Kuybyshev Oblast. Altogether the group is allocating more than 2,000 people and more than 1,000 trucks already equipped for hauling grain to help agriculture in the Volga area.

As related by Lt Gen M. Kalinin, first deputy commander of the group of forces, the battalions of the group are 100 percent manned with drivers.

It is planned over the next 10 days to dispatch two echelons a day in the USSR.

### Military Air Transport

904B0278D Moscow *TRUD* in Russian 7 Aug 90 p 1

[Article by V. Volgin: "Battalions Rushing to Help"]

[Text] Yesterday the first of 28 planned aircraft of military transport aviation headed for Astrakhan. Along with the 15 Il-76's already working in the transport of vegetables, they will establish an air bridge from the Caspian area to the northern and eastern regions of the country.

We were informed in the Ministry of Defense that the formation of an additional 20 motor transport battalions is being completed. They will be hauling grain from the fields of Kazakhstan and southern Russia. About 22,000 soldiers and 10,000 trucks are awaiting requests from local authorities.

As usual, there is some overlapping. Some of the drivers of virgin battalions are being called up from the reserves during the time of the harvest. But some leaders of Chimkent, Taldy-Kurgan and Dzhambul oblasts vigorously defended the drivers of their own personal vehicles, apparently thinking that the decrees of the union government do not extend to them personally.

At the same time, the rayon authorities are trying under any pretexts to obtain the help of as many military subunits as possible. As a result of such "planned" distribution, the possibilities of the virgin battalion are being utilized only 15 to 20 percent in Aktyubinsk Oblast. Military drivers are shifted from one place to another, wasting fuel and valuable time.

Altogether they have transported more than one million tons of farm products since the beginning of the harvest, including about 800,000 tons of grain.

### Moscow Okrug Transport

904B0278E Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian 10 Aug 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Maj Gen G. Virgasov, chief of the motor transport support service of Moscow Military District, by Col F. Semyanovskiy under "Harvest 90" rubric: "Not All Lessons Considered"; date and place not specified]

[Text] The military motor transport specialists from Moscow Military District are taking active part in this year's harvest. Our outside correspondent met with Maj Gen G. Virgasov, chief of the motor transport support service of the district.

[Semyanovskiy] Granit Fedorovich, how did the military motor transport specialists relate to the decision to allocate equipment and people to the harvest?

[Virgasov] The officers and soldiers had understanding for this extreme measure. This is precisely how we receive the decrees of the government. Although I will

say frankly that there is much in this situation that disturbs us military people, above all problems in combat readiness.

[Semyanovskiy] Please tell us specifically how the military drivers of the district are participating in the grain harvesting season.

[Virgasov] At the present time, we have allocated 1,000 military vehicles for the harvest in Belgorod Oblast and an equal number for work in Altayskiy Kray. We are also prepared to have to allocate more than 500 vehicles for the harvest in the fields near Moscow. In Belgorod Oblast, more than 25 percent of the drivers are inducted personnel and the rest were called up from the reserves. The situation is similar in Altayskiy Kray. People are working from dawn to dusk. Among them, I would like to name the lieutenant colonels A. Romanov, S. Teterkin, A. Klochkov, V. Yakonyuk, Ye. Duginov and others.

At the same time, they are wasting too much time in meetings at the oblast and rayon levels. But few people are interested, for example, in where people and machinery will be housed. At times they are proposing cattle yards and ditches for this....

[Semyanovskiy] Are the lessons from last year being considered?

[Virgasov] One of the bitter lessons is the following. As long as the machines are hauling produce, our people sense at least some concern for them. But as soon as the work comes to an end, people seem to forget about them immediately. And it took almost superhuman efforts just to dispatch drivers and machinery from the units. Sometimes they quite simply abandoned the machines in the fields and then the officers went out and "collected" them. This could happen again.

In my view, a second major error involves unjustified two-way transport. I will give an example to explain. We sent 1,000 machines to Altayskiy Kray. Meanwhile, in the territory where the troops of Moscow Military District are deployed, there are already 16 motor transport battalions at work from other districts, including some that are very far away. As you can see, the lesson was of no use.

### Transport Assistance Described

904B0278F Moscow *SELSKAYA ZHIZN* in Russian 12 Aug 90 p 1

[Article by V. Simonenkov: "The Soldiers Are Helping"]

[Text] As you know, the soldiers of the USSR Armed Forces are taking part in the unprecedented harvest in accordance with a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers. As Col N. Kiselev, deputy political chief of staff for the leadership of motor transport battalions of the USSR Ministry of Defense, reported to our correspondent, 68 of the 90 virgin battalions formed have begun

this work. This is 34,000 motor vehicles. They are working in 24 oblasts and rayons of Russia and Kazakhstan.

A third of the men in the battalions are cadre-induced military personnel and the rest have been called up from the reserves. A special feature of this year is that most of the soldiers from the reserves are working in those oblasts from where they were called up.

People are working under a maximum load in Volgograd, Voronezh, Uralsk and Aktubinsk oblasts. According to reports as of 10 August, 2.3 million tons of agricultural loads have been hauled, including more than 1.6 million tons of grain.

A good harvest is expected in Kustanay Oblast. Nine battalions are being sent there, five of which are fully manned. Altogether, according to preliminary estimates, the military people will haul 31 million tons of freight, including 7 million tons of grain.

Advanced workers were also determined. They include the battalion of Lt Col A. Voronin, which is working in Volgograd Oblast. It has transported 200,000 tons of agricultural freight. And the subordinates of Lt Col V.

Dobrolyubov in Voronezh Oblast have hauled about 100,000 tons of freight. These subunits have been awarded monetary bonuses of 2,000 and 1,200 rubles, respectively.

But there are also problems. The main problem is the fact that not all leaders of oblasts, enterprises and institutions reacted conscientiously and with understanding to the withdrawal of people for the performance of this most important state task. There have been instances in which the managers of enterprises have simply sabotaged the sending of people to help the peasants. And if they sent them, it was people whom any manager tries to "get out of his sight." Similar facts have been noted in Saratov, Lipetsk, Ulyanovsk and Kursk oblasts. At other places, things reached the point where they had to send some people back, that is, they came to the assembly points in a drunken state.

There are other disturbing signals as well. In Orenburg Oblast, for example, a battalion formed in the Pacific Fleet is awaiting work. In Saratov Oblast, 600 machines from Odessa Military District stand idle. A working group of the staff flew out there to look into things locally and to redeploy the subunits if necessary.

**Airborne Troops' Chief of Staff Explains Exercise  
in Estonia**

*90UM0772A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA  
in Russian 20 Jul 90 p 4*

[Article by Lt Col N. Medvedev, USSR Ministry of Defense Press Center: "Airborne Troops Against the Storm Troopers?"]

[Text] D. Zakhartseva of Kostroma Oblast has heard that within Estonia there are various complaints against military personnel, particularly against the airborne troops. Ostensibly the grounds for these complaints was a "show of strength" by the "blue berets" within Pyarnu Rayon in response to the rally of veterans of the SS 20th Division that was expected there.

The Chief of Staff of the Airborne Troops, General Lieutenant Ye. Podkolein, replied, "talk suggesting that our airborne troops ostensibly were 'flexing their muscles' is cause for bewilderment. But the report released by the press service of the Estonian government suggested that additional subunits of airborne units were introduced into the area of Pyanur Rayon without the agreement of the republic government. What actually took place?

"The summer training period is now underway within the Armed Forces. All units and subunits are performing combat training plans. And this includes the airborne troops. Usually their studies are characterized by a special degree of saturation and tension: they must complete long distance marches of up to 500 kilometers.

"Within the territory of Pyarnu Rayon a subunit commanded by Major Sibiryakov was proceeding. The sub-unit included 28 combat vehicles and nearly 200 personnel. The airborne troops were given a brief rest at a military unit in Pyarnu. After this they continued their march. Within an 18 hour period the subunit covered nearly 350 kilometers, without, of course, having done any damage at all to the roads or to farmlands. You see, they have been accused of this as well.

"At the same time airborne troops' exercises were taking place within other Baltic republics and in Leningrad and Pskov oblasts. Nowhere did any of this cause any stir. Nor did they give rise to any misunderstandings earlier. And, after all, our subunits have been here since 1945.

"As concerns the proposed gathering of the former SS troops, of which we learned later, I am certain that the 'blue berets' were connected with it artificially for quite specific and improper purposes."

**Remote Pilotless Vehicles**

90UM0758A Moscow *VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY* in Russian  
No 5, July 1990 pp 63-65

[Article by Captain V. Kinshin: "Remote Pilotless Vehicles"]


[Text] "Dear Editor!

"An article titled "Remote Pilotless Vehicles in NATO's Plans" was published in *VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY* Magazine's first issue of 1988. It pointed out in particular that successful utilization of remote pilotless vehicles by Israeli troops during combat operations in Lebanon served as the impetus for their further development in many capitalist states. Could you describe the paths along which this type of military equipment is being improved using specific examples."

From Captain G. Bakurov's letter

Actually, according to many foreign military experts assessments, the use of Remotely Piloted Vehicles [RPV's] as reconnaissance aircraft, target designators, and decoys was successful in local wars in the Middle East. At the same time, a series of substantial deficiencies have been noted in these aircraft, including insufficient range and flight duration, maneuvering characteristics and payload, the range of executable missions, and in-service time. Foreign designers are working to eliminate these deficiencies while attempting to provide higher combat and operating characteristics to RPV's based on the latest achievements of science and technology.

**Figure 1.**



Key: a. Stowed position.

For example, the American firm Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical (TRA) came out with TRA 410UAV [Unmanned Air

Vehicle], the latest model of a long-endurance remotely piloted vehicle (Figure 1.) that opens, in its opinion, a much wider range of applications for remotely piloted systems. Model 410 is equipped with a 160 horse power four-cylinder engine and attains speeds of up to 190 kph at an altitude of 4,500 m. It is distinguished from other similar mini-systems by the availability of a 0.68 m<sup>3</sup> payload bay. Its flight duration reaches eight hours with a 1,000 km range while carrying a 135 kg payload. Dimensions: Wingspan—9.5 m, overall length—6.6 m, and fuselage length—4.5 m.

Wing area is 7.6 m<sup>2</sup> with a NACA LS(7)-0417 type profile which, according to foreign experts, insures maximum lift coefficient during takeoff and the optimum combination of speed and flight range. High density foam/glass fiber [wing and fuselage] and graphite epoxy resin [wing struts] are used in its manufacture. The design of the wing flaps allows control of the aircraft's steep descents and ascents and also facilitates the solution of the short takeoff and landing problem. A 230 m long strip is adequate for takeoffs and landings with a normal takeoff weight of 726 kg (of which 135 kg is the payload and 160 kg is fuel).

Gear struts manufactured from graphite epoxy resin and low pressure tires provide a landing with a maximum [sink rate] accumulated vertical speed of 4.5 mps. According to foreign experts, this permits the TRA410 to be used off airfields which, in combination with increased flight range, facilitates selection of a basing site.

The TRA410's navigation accuracy is provided by an inertial measurement unit that operates with the OMEGA system. Use of the Global Positioning System [GPS] is possible in the future. The RPV's navigation system, its airspeed sensor, engine controls, mission sensor controls, and autopilot are all interlinked through the main computer. Flights will normally be preprogrammed but the program can be changed in flight using a ground control device.

Model 410 has the capability to complete automatic landings using an instrument landing system [ILS]. System sensors will be installed in the large payload bay with the stabilized imaging systems, and a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) system or daylight television system mounted in a retractable turret. The nose gear retracts into the fuselage after takeoff to provide a clear field of view for the IR sensors.

Foreign experts state that the slab-sided fuselage is manufactured to permit installation of a side-looking radar. However, in their opinion, power availability may limit widespread use of onboard radars. The possibility of installing an additional generator is intended to eliminate this limitation.

Besides the aircraft, the system consists of a ground control center manned by two operators. Each such center is capable of controlling the operations of up to eight RPV's via a single two-way data transmission

channel. Onboard information (depiction and real-time data) transmission range can reach 180 km when the RPV is within line of sight of the ground control center. Data can be recorded when operating at great distances for subsequent transmission via satellite.

Despite the fact that the system successfully completed flight testing, TRA has begun further improvements of model 410. They plan to increase the turbo-charged engine's horsepower which will allow them to increase maximum flight altitude to 13.5 km and payload [maximum takeoff weight] to 1,100 kg. They also intend to increase the wing area which will provide the capability to lift a nearly 1,300 kg payload. Additional fuel in this variant will be located in tanks attached to the wing/tail boom junction. They expect the new model 410 variant will be capable of performing an 80-hour sortie with a 45 kg payload on board.

Foreign experts note the design improvements and its conformity with acceptable size, adequate payload bay capacity and simplicity of onboard systems as the TRA 410UAV's unquestioned advantages. In their opinion, the capabilities of the developed model are adequate so that two 410 systems, one at Reykjavik and the other in the Bahamas, could continuously monitor convoys crossing the Atlantic.

According to foreign experts preliminary calculations, the TRA410 system's cost which includes 6-8 aircraft with television sensors and an onboard forward looking




Figure 2.

IR system, groundbased communications systems, ground control center, and other support can total from 10 to 18 million dollars.

One more promising RPV model similar to the TRA model is the R4E-50 Skyeye (Figure 2.) that, according to foreign press reports, will replace the Aquila RPV in the near future. Foreign experts stress that, despite its relative newness, the R4E-50 already enjoys great popularity. Skyeye systems have been in service for several years in Thailand and in Central America. In 1988, an Arab country ordered a squadron of R4E-50's in the U.S. and Middle Eastern countries will also purchase several squadrons. Developmental Science which produces Skyeye intends to deliver these models to Middle Eastern countries (this company previously developed the Aquila, R4E-30, and R4E-40 RPV's<sup>1</sup>).

The R4E-50 Skyeye model is distinguished from its predecessors by a number of specific design features, including the presence of an enlarged wing (size 6 m), lengthened fuselage (4.48 m) and Teledyne 50 horse power rotary engine with a four-bladed wooden propeller. These improvements resulted in the aircraft's weight becoming nearly 306 kg (of which 45 kg is fuel) but payload capacity increased to 99 kg. The payload is stored in four fuselage compartments with a total capacity of nearly 0.31 m<sup>3</sup>. Maximum flight speed reaches 120 kts (242 kph) and cruising speed is 70 kts (130 kph). The RPV can be in the air for up to 10 hours.

An underbelly gimballed turret has been installed in the fuselage's nose section that provides 360 degree surveillance for the Honeywell forward looking infrared system located in it. The onboard infrared system can be replaced with an ordinary television system. Furthermore, onboard equipment includes: A meteorological kit, a Texas Instruments linescanner, a 70-mm reconnaissance camera, Vinten panoramic cameras, and COMINT-DF [Direction Finding], ELINT-DF, and communications transceivers. A TEAC video recorder has been installed on board to record data for subsequent transmission to the ground. They envision using a laser designator on future Skyeye models for which a special mechanical interface has been installed onboard the R4E-50.

An autopilot linked to a microprocessor monitors the precision of the RPV's flight along the assigned flight path. The microprocessor's memory is designed to hold 256 waypoints which can be either a prescribed flight path or sensor instructions, for example, on a television camera. The capability has been provided to use information from the GPS while the navigation system is operating. Skyeye flights can be preprogrammed, under autopilot control, or under manual control from a ground flight control center. In the latter case, the flight occurs in the following manner.

The ground control center transmits continuous position updates for the RPV when within line of sight. Transmissions are passed via an ACOM data transmitter with

a changeable low frequency. This permits transmission of control commands to the aircraft and reception of onboard instrument displays, video information, and the RPV's position coordinates. Furthermore, spread-spectrum and frequency-hopping tuning data transmission channel utilization modes have been provided. Reliable exchange of information is possible at distances of up to 128 km from the ground control station when the RPV's flight altitude is about 180 m.

As a rule, two men, a sensor operator and a pilot who controls the RPV's flight, man the ground control station located in a standard shelter on a five-ton truck. The information presentation system consists of videomap displays with encoded map terrain representations on a laser disk and continuous scale changes.

An aircraft landing occurs in the following manner. The pilot sets the television camera or onboard forward looking infrared system 6 degrees down and locks it in this position. A sensor is dropped on the selected area that permits landing guidance during the day or at night. Then, a parafoil (guided parachute) is released on command from the ground which insures a descent rate of 20-25 kts (37-46 kph). During landing, the autopilot monitors flight parameters, including speed, which the pilot controls from the ground. We must point out that the engine is shutdown in model R4E-40 before contact with the ground when landing and it occurs after landing in the R4E-50. All of this, along with everything else, in combination with the durable characteristics of the retractable shock-absorbing skid insures wide possibilities in selection of a landing site, including in the most complex weather conditions.

We must say that modernization has significantly increased the cost of the entire Skye system. According to foreign experts calculations, the approximate cost of a system consisting of six aircraft and a ground control station totals nearly 10-15 million dollars.

At the present time, further development and improvement of remotely piloted vehicles is occurring both in the U.S. and among its allies. RPV combat applications are being worked out during the course of exercises and during various armed conflicts. The foreign press points out that the RPV's primary task remains as before: Battlefield reconnaissance, artillery spotting, target designation, conduct of electronic warfare, and support of covert agent reconnaissance. Therefore, knowledge of RPV capabilities and combat application techniques can help PVO [Air Defense] Forces personnel seek effective methods to combat them.

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#### Footnotes

1. The Aquila and R4E-40 RPV's primary tactical flight characteristics were published in VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY Magazine, 1988, No 1.

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### Ship Repair Reserves

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in Russian No 6, Jun 1990 pp 54-56

[Article by T. Kostkina, candidate of economic sciences and assistant professor, and Captain 1st Rank A. Khonyakin: "Ship Repair Reserves"]

[Text]

#### Economic Work in the Navy

We are continuing publication of articles on ship repair problems. In this article, the authors examine one of the realistic ways to increase output from the Navy's existing industrial capacity which is especially important with the reduction of appropriations to the Navy. The suggestion merits the attention of not only repair enterprise experts but all Navy seamen who plan or prepare ships for repairs or participate in [the repair process].

#### Ship Repair Reserves

The task of improving quality and shortening ship repair time periods under current conditions of its increasing labor intensiveness and also the cost of materials and wages makes increased demands on the state and utilization level of the Navy's ship repair plant production capacity. They have primarily developed extensively in recent years. For the period from 1975-1989, the annual rate of increase of ship repair plants fixed production capital (buildings, ship raising facilities, production equipment, transport vehicles, etc.) has been highly significant and totaled 11.5 percent.

At the same time, fixed capital has been invested in capital construction of new workshops, quays with appropriate energy-intensive and crane equipment, floating docks, etc. As a result, new jobs have been actively created at the Navy's ship repair plants and in our industry as a whole. The average annual growth rate of enterprise industrial-manufacturing personnel strength totaled 2.1 percent until 1988 (it is true that personnel strength has been decreasing since 1988).

At the same time, renovation in primary production capital, namely their active portion—production equipment through whose application ship repair work is directly accomplished, remained extremely low. Removal of obsolete fixed production capital totaled 0.7 percent (it has been 5.5-6 percent and 8-9 percent in the USA and FRG, respectively). Price increases for new equipment also had an impact. Replacement of old [equipment] with new [equipment] with similar characteristics costs 10-15 percent more.

Under the current ratio for introduction and removal of fixed production capital, a trend is being noted toward their obsolescence and an increase in the degree of equipment wear. Thus, according to their state in 1989, in individual cases wear totaled more than 50 percent and the potential operating period was more than 50 years which exceeded data for the country's industry as a

whole (40 percent and 44 years, respectively). The economic situation was made even worse when the cost of capital production capital rose more rapidly than the productivity of new production equipment. Thus, the capital-labor ratio in ship repair plants (the value of basic industrial assets received per worker) has grown 1.8 times in the last 14 years, while the output of production equipment was only 1.1 times. But with the constant organization of production this leads to ship repair work production cost increases.

Thus, intensification of production and therefore the number of ships turned over to the Navy should become the primary direction of the future growth of ship repair volumes under conditions of sharply reduced assets for capital investment. Its most graphic indicator is the return on investment (the ratio of production volume to the initial cost of fixed production capital). According to our assessments, only one percent of its growth corresponds to the increase of production volume, in monetary terms a sum over six million rubles, which permits us to repair an additional 2-4 ships. Consequently, there has been an increase in the return on investment equivalent to expansion of production without additional expenditures on capital construction.

In our opinion, considering the difficulty and long period of time to replace old production equipment with new, more productive [equipment], the real way to increase return on investment is to increase equipment utilization time on its primary task.

There are two possibilities to do this: By increasing the shift coefficient (the ratio of total worker strength to their number on the largest shift), right now, for all practical purposes, it greatly exceeds one; and,

By reducing production equipment's unproductive downtime which in individual cases reaches 50 percent of planned work time.

Under total cost accounting, it is important not to simply increase the shift but to establish its optimum size by guaranteeing a balance between the number of jobs and the cost of capital production capital. Calculate the optimal shift coefficient for plant operation as a whole or for its shops (K) according to the formula:

$$K = \sqrt{\frac{En \cdot C}{0.07 \cdot W}}$$

where  $En = 0.12$ , the standard coefficient of economic effectiveness;

C is the job cost in rubles; and,

W is the average annual wage for one job, in rubles.

Using this formula and actual ship repair plant work indicators, we calculated the optimum shift coefficient which turned out to be within the limits of 2.0-2.6 percent. So great is its size, it defines a sufficiently high

capital-labor ratio of our plants. Consequently, its transfer to a multi-shift system should take place simultaneously with the identification and elimination of unnecessary, unneeded equipment.

An assessment of the economic impact of increasing shifts presupposes a savings comparison obtained from reducing the number of jobs (by increasing operating shifts), with the additional expenses caused by reduced productivity of labor in the evening and at night, with material compensation for personnel for the inconvenient production routine, additional energy expenditures, the need for feeding arrangements, night worker transportation to the plant, etc. Expenditures for this are somehow or other connected with wages and can be calculated. It is also possible to determine the extent of the reduction of productivity of labor on the second and third shifts through experience. Thus, for example, a universal lathe's productivity of labor on the night shift might decrease by 15-20 percent, but the output of a machine-tool section with digital program control will not change at all since workers here are accomplishing auxiliary operations.

Considering what has been stated above and according to our calculations, the number of jobs needed to insure the targeted production volume of a ship repair plant operating a two shift schedule might be decreased by 48 percent. Then savings due to capital investments obtained due to a decline in the stock of available equipment totals:

$$S = En \cdot CPA \cdot 0.48$$

where CPA—is the average annual cost of capital production capital in thousands of rubles.

For example, if CPA = 10 million rubles, saving total 576,000 rubles. The general saving, considering the reduced charge for assets at a rate of two percent taxation (96,000 rubles) is 672,000 rubles.

If we assume that the shift differential increase for work on the second shift is 20 percent or even 50 percent, with the production proportions that have developed at the ship repair plant (with transfer of everyone to a two shift operation), we can expect nearly a 6-7 percent increase in repair costs. In our example, this signifies an increase of up to 450,000 rubles in additional expenditures. Consequently, the total economic impact of introducing a second shift in our example totals 672,000 - 450,000 = 222,000 rubles. The advantage is obvious: Both the customer's potential resource savings and the capability to complete an additional 222,000 rubles worth of work on ships for him. We should also take into account that the enterprise may receive an additional social impact since unneeded obsolete equipment being dismantled will free up production space that might be used as a break area, a psychological and physical relief area, or for medical and consumer services.

Reduction in production equipment unproductive downtime is no less significant. Its causes are well

known: Unsatisfactory technical condition of equipment, poorly organized preventive work for surveillance, repair, and monitoring production utilization, energy-producing, material-handling, dock, and other equipment. The plants' power-mechanical service workers are involved with this. Low pay for their work is resulting in undermanning, high personnel turnover and, as a result, to work interruptions of the plants' most important auxiliary subdivisions. To stimulate the category of personnel in question, it is advisable to employ those allowed to hold more than one job and pay them at a rate up to 50 percent of the combined position and pay for the increasing area served. However, it would be more effective to raise the piece-rate estimate and increase the rate-of-payment share of total salaries for the plants' auxiliary subdivision workers. Unfortunately, the latter are the most difficult since they are regulated by existing directives.

If a reduction in production equipment unproductive downtime is primarily the enterprise's internal task, increasing the shift coefficient to a significant degree depends on external conditions, including on the activities of the crews repairing the ships. Up to 60 percent of all repair work is directly accomplished on the ship and requires appropriate support from its personnel (explosion-fire proofing, survivability, etc.). Therefore, conducting second and third shifts at ship repair plants naturally requires an adjustment to the crew's daily routine and more of them will be working on the ship. However, in our opinion, this will prove to be totally justified by a reduction in the time period for repairs.

Thus, a whole series of measures that require the active participation of ship specialists, headquarters of task forces, fleets, and central directorates, and the Navy's scientific-research and equipment design organizations to make the ship-repairing industry more intensive. In the first place, we have in mind measures for qualitative preparation of ships for repair, thorough and well-grounded definition of the scope of work, and introduction of modern methods of technical diagnosis that permit objective evaluation of the equipment's actual condition and excludes unneeded work. Implementing the measures mentioned above in conjunction with improving repair enterprise's production activities, also including increasing work shifts, will permit greater satisfaction of fleets' ship repair requirements with the same expenditures.

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#### Air-Launched Anti-Ship Missiles

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in Russian No 7, July 1990 pp 40-41

[Article by Reserve Colonel B. Semenov, candidate of military sciences: "Air-Launched Anti-Ship Missiles"]

[Text] According to the classification that is accepted abroad, air-launched anti-ship missiles (ASM) are divided into short range (10-25 km), medium range

(25-50 km), and long range (50-100 km and greater) missiles. The primary specification and performance

characteristics of anti-ship missiles of the leading capitalist countries' armies are listed in the table.

Designation, Country-Developer	Weight, kg.		Maximum Firing Range	Cruising Speed, Meters per Second (Mach)	Aircraft (Helicopter) Platforms
	Launch	Warhead			
<b>Short Range Anti-Ship Missiles</b>					
Maverick, AGM-65E, U.S.	293	136	25	2	A-4, A-6, AV-8B, F/A-18
Maverick, AGM-65F, U.S.	307	136	25	2	A-4, A-6, AV-8B, F/A-18
Sea Skua, Great Britain	145	20	18	0.95	Lynx
AS.15 TT, France	96	30	10	280	Dauphin
Marte Mk 2, Italy	260	70	20	0.85	Agusta, SH-3D
<b>Medium Range Anti-Ship Missiles</b>					
Exocet AM 39, France	652		50	0.93	Super Etandard
Kormoran, AS.34, FRG	600	165	30	0.95	F-4, Tornado
Penguin Mk 3, Norway	380	120	40	270	F-4, F-16
Gabriel Mk III, Israel	560	150	40	0.73	Kfir, F-16, F-4
<b>Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles</b>					
Harpoon AGM-84, U.S.	522	225	120	0.85	P-3, A-6, F-111, F-18, B-52
Sea Eagle, Great Britain	600	230	110	0.9	Buccaneer, Sea King, Sea Harrier
ANS, France, FRG	650	—	180	2-2.5	Tornado

Short range [anti-ship] missiles are intended to combat small ships and small high-speed combatants with up to a 500 ton displacement. The Maverick AGM-65E and F (U.S.), Sea Skua (Great Britain), AS.15 TT (France), and Marte Mk2 (Italy) are missiles of this type that are in the inventory.

The Maverick AGM-65E is equipped with a semi-active laser seeker head, a high-explosive warhead, and a solid fuel rocket motor. It is constructed based on an ordinary aerodynamic design. As noted in the foreign press, the missile has sufficiently high accuracy but has a quite substantial deficiency: The aircraft platform must illuminate the target which significantly increases its vulnerability to enemy PVO [Air Defense] antiaircraft weapons systems.

According to foreign experts, the AGM-65F has been relieved of this deficiency since it is equipped with a passive infrared imaging seeker head. Day-night and all-weather capabilities are considered to be this missile's advantage over the base model.

The Sea Skua missile is manufactured according to a tilt-wing aerodynamic design. Its body consists of two parts of different diameters joined by a junction. The nose section contains a semi-active radar seeker head

and a shaped-charge warhead that is exploded using a contact fuze after the missile is within the ship. A two-stage solid fuel rocket motor is installed in the tail section. The AR1 5979 Sea Spray that operates in the 8-10 GHz range carries out target illumination for the seeker head. As has been reported in the foreign press, the missile's seeker head and radar have good antijam protection.

The AMS's launch is conducted after the seeker head has locked onto the target. The missile descends to an altitude of several meters and completes its flight to the target at a speed of 0.8 Mach.

The AS.15 TT [tous temps—all-weather] missile is manufactured according to an ordinary aerodynamic design. The warhead is located in the forward portion of its body behind which are located elements of the radio command guidance system (a transceiver and decryption device) and a radio altimeter. The solid fuel rocket motor is installed in the tail section and its operating time totals 45 seconds.

The missile's guidance in the horizontal plane is provided by an Agrion-15 panoramic radar which is installed on the aircraft platform. The radar measures the range to target and missile and the angle between the

headings of the aircraft platform—target and missile—and target. A signal is generated in accordance with the data received and arrives at the missile in encrypted form. Here it is decrypted and is transmitted in the form of commands to the rudder thereby carrying out a turn toward the target. The missile's flight trajectory is adjusted in the vertical plane by a radio altimeter. Flight speed is 280 meters per second at an altitude of 2-5 meters.

The Marte Mk2 has a nose section with a larger diameter than its body. An active radar seeker head, inertial [guidance] system and radio altimeter are located in it. A high capacity warhead is located behind them. A solid fuel rocket motor that has launch and propulsion stages is installed in the tail section. Ignition of the launch stage occurs after the ASM has separated from the aircraft platform. It operates for 1.5 seconds and then separates from the missile. The propulsion stage is turned on after this. The missile descends to an altitude of 3-5 meters and the inertial [guidance] system carries out flight control for the nearly 15 km flight. The seeker head is turned on approximately six kilometers from the target.

Medium range ASM's are primarily intended to combat groups of ships. The AM-39 Exocet (France), Kormoran AS.34 (FRG), Penguin (Norway), and Gabriel (Israel) are representatives of medium range ASM's.

The AM-39 Exocet is equipped with an active monopulse seeker head that is capable of detecting surface ships at ranges of up to 24 km. The seeker head weighs 32 kg and its operating range is from 8-10 GHz. The foreign press has reported that its design permits activation of a remote radio-actuated proximity fuze that insures the warhead explodes while the missile is flying over the ship's deck. The compartment with the inertial [guidance] system, computer, and radio altimeter is located behind the seeker head. Altitude measurement accuracy is plus or minus 0.2 meters.

A high-explosive warhead with explosive material based on Hexylite is located in the ASM's middle section. It has been reported that the warhead's greatest effectiveness is attained with an angle of incidence with the target of nearly 70 degrees. The explosion is carried out using a delay percussion fuze.

Launch and propulsion solid fuel rocket motors are installed in the missile's rear section and their operating time totals two and 130-150 seconds, respectively. A launch can occur at altitudes from 50 to 10,000 meters. First of all, the missile glides to an altitude of 10-15 meters after which it continues the flight with a speed of 0.93 Mach. As the missile approaches the target, altitude is gradually reduced to seven meters during the midcourse phase and to 2-3 meters during the terminal phase.

The Kormoran AS.34 missile design consists of three sections that are joined by retaining rings. An active seeker head which is capable of operation in a guidance mode toward an active jamming source is located in the

nose section. A warhead with 16 hollow shaped-charges is located in the second section. The explosives weigh 56 kg. The warhead explodes after the missile has penetrated the interior of the ship. According to foreign experts, the shaped charge jets of molten material formed when the warhead explodes are capable of penetrating steel plates up to 90 mm thick.

The missile is equipped with two launch (operate for one second) and one propulsion (operates for 100 seconds) solid fuel rocket motors. Its flight profile is similar to the Exocet missile's flight profile.

The Penguin Mk3 was accepted into the Norwegian Air Force inventory in 1987. It is manufactured according to a canard-wing aerodynamic design and consists of three sections: Equipment, warhead, and engine. The inertial [guidance] system and radio altimeter carry out control during the midcourse phase of the trajectory. Furthermore, the flight profile is selected from collision avoidance conditions while insuring concealment of the approach to the target and while utilizing mountainous terrain relief. During the missile's terminal flight phase, the infrared seeker head carries out missile guidance from a relatively short range. As reported in the foreign press, the specific feature of this missile consists of the fact that it can be used in narrow straits and among islands where ASM's with radar seeker heads cannot be used.

Launching a missile salvo is possible with the missiles approaching the target from various directions. According to foreign press reports, research is currently being conducted to equip the missile with a laser seeker head and a more powerful warhead.

The Gabriel Mk3 is manufactured according to an ordinary aerodynamic design. A high-explosive warhead is used on the missile. It is equipped with an inertial guidance system that operates during the midcourse phase of the trajectory and with an active radar seeker head during the terminal phase. Two guidance modes have been provided: Autonomous [fire-and-forget] and with adjustments [fire-and-update]. During the fire-and-forget mode, the inertial system and radio altimeter are used during the midcourse phase and an active seeker head during the terminal phase when the enemy is not using electronic warfare systems. During the fire-and-update mode, data about the target's current coordinates are transmitted to the missile while the ASM is closing with the target. In this case, the seeker head antenna is more accurately oriented to the target and the missile operates in the self-guidance mode at short ranges from the target which decreases the possibility of the enemy detecting the missile through the active seeker head's radio wave radiation. The missile covers the midcourse phase at an altitude of 20 meters and at a speed of 250 meters per second, and during the terminal phase of the flight, it descends to an altitude of 1-4 meters.

Long range [anti-ship] missiles are intended to combat ship formations that have an intensive air defense system. The Harpoon AGM-84 (U.S.), Sea Eagle (Great Britain), and ANS (France, FRG) belong to this category of missiles.

The Harpoon anti-ship missile consists of four sections: Nose, warhead, fuel, and engine. An active radar seeker head, radio altimeter, and inertial guidance system are located in the nose section. The seeker head weighs 34 kg and its operating frequency range is 13-17 GHz. As has been reported, the seeker head's maximum detection range of a destroyer type target is 40 km.

The warhead is armed with powerful explosives. Forty five kilograms of fuel are located in a 1.2 meter long soft fuel tank. The ASM is equipped with a turbojet engine weighing 45 kg which has 270 kilograms of thrust.

After launch, the ASM descends to an altitude of 5-10 meters and completes the flight to the target area. The flight trajectory is programmed before launch so that the missile can approach the target up to 90 degrees relative to the direction of launch. During the terminal phase of the trajectory, the missile completes a maneuver to gain altitude and attacks the target from above.

A variant of the Harpoon missile that has received the designation SLAM is undergoing flight testing right now. The Harpoon engine and guidance system, the Maverick infrared imaging seeker head, and NAVSTAR satellite navigation system terminal communications equipment

are being used on it. As has been reported, the infrared imaging seeker head permits the missile to be used not only against ships but also against ground targets. They plan to introduce the missile into the inventory at the beginning of the 1990s.

An active radar seeker head, high capacity warhead, inertial guidance system, and radio altimeter are the Sea Eagle missile's primary elements. A turbojet engine is installed in it. The seeker head operates in the pulse mode in the three centimeter [super-high frequency] wave band and maximum detection range of a ship with an RCS [Radar cross-section] equal to  $100 \text{ m}^2$  totals 30 km. When it explodes, a shock wave is formed by the warhead that, according to foreign experts, is capable of destroying several bulkheads of a ship's hull.

Target identification and ASM launch is carried out by a weapons control system that is located on the aircraft platform. After launch, the missile races up to a speed of 0.85 Mach and descends to the maximum possible low altitude. The seeker head is turned on at a range of approximately 20 km to the target. The missile gains altitude several kilometers prior to reaching the target and attacks it while diving.

The ANS missile was jointly developed by France and the FRG. They are planning to equip it with an active radar seeker head, high capacity warhead, and an air-breathing ramjet engine. As the foreign press points out, this missile will achieve speeds of 2-2.5 Mach and will have increased maneuverability.

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**Call For Creation of All-Union Emergency, Disaster Service**

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7 Apr 90 First Edition p 4*

[Article by Elena Agapova: "Disaster Medicine"]

[Text] A terrible anniversary occurs this month, April 26. The unprecedented technological disaster at Chernobyl was four years ago. The dosimeter is still running, and the sorrowful account of human losses has not been closed. The doctors cannot predict their number: the half-life of strontium and cesium is 30 thousand years, of plutonium, tens of thousands of years. These figures can take you aback, but then, so can others.

Twenty-five thousand dead, 18 thousand injured—the earthquake in Armenia.

Four hundred and thirty dead—the "Admiral Nakhimov."

Four hundred and eight burned up, the explosion on the railroad near Ufa...

The State Statistical Committee reports that last year there were 107 railroad accidents, 74 accidents at sea, 131 on rivers, and 169 in the air...

For the present there is just one minor consolation: these numbers are inciting protest, and in a normal person protest should engender action. Otherwise, disaster.

I recall that in the blackest days of the Spitak earthquake, newspapers were published with headlines like "Help Arrives in Time." But it became clear from the same papers that in the first days grief paralyzed those who had been stricken by the calamity, including the local health care system and ambulance service. The chaos of those days was aggravated by a total shortage: from hoisting cranes to sensing equipment to detect the living under the rubble.

Here is a chronicle of those days. The hospital at Leninakan was destroyed immediately, at 11:41. There were 120 persons under treatment in it. From the first minutes military doctors who remained unhurt set up a treatment area right out in the open. Within three hours, resuscitation and surgical departments were established on the basis of a surviving medical company. Within seven hours specialists arrived at Leninakan from the district military hospital in Tbilisi. By the morning of eight December, a 500-bed hospital was operating in a surviving barracks. In the first days 1,230 victims arrived there. Specialized assistance was provided to most of them with 6-8 hours of their extrication from the ruins.

So today let us give their due to the military doctors who worked then with their last ounce of strength. For the fact is that they, the military doctors, provided help to every third victim in Armenia.

But thought of the victims of the disaster gives us no peace. There could have been fewer of them, and fewer victims of other calamities and natural disasters. If only the country had an operating quick-response service. With professional rescuers, up-to-date equipment, the latest technology. The West has had such a service since 1972. How well it is organized became clear in Armenia. The French, Germans, Austrians, Americans... Their groups began the rescue at once, from a "standing start." I will mention the French in particular. Their military quick-response medical forces enjoy the reputation of being the best in the world. These include parachute surgical teams and an EMIR [epidemiological, microbiological, and infectious disease group]—a modular autonomous detachment numbering 75 men. The rescue doctors work autonomously for seven days, if need be up to 30 days. The government makes the decision for the EMIR to travel abroad. There is such a service in the Armed Forces of the U.S., the FRG, Norway... All this is cause for the most serious comparisons.

This service, at least in a rough approximation, could have appeared long ago in our country too. Here is just one fact of the story. In 1970 a powerful earthquake in Peru took the lives of 66 thousand people, and 143 thousand were injured. A detachment of our specialists also took off to provide assistance. Staggered by what they saw, these people felt it their duty to write about the lessons of the terrible calamity. They urged the formation of quick-response detachments, a special medical service. They wrote that we have an enormous seismic hazard zone, Ashkhabad, Tashkent...

The proposals were sent to high authorities. In response, deafening silence, and no action at all. In those years they glorified Soviet medicine as the "best in the world." Official optimism and complete absence of information about our tragedies did their work. We were assured by many that natural disasters and catastrophes befell only the "rotten" world of capitalism.

Indisputably the most solid experience in providing aid to a great number of injured and victims belongs to the military medical service. It also has the highest mobility. Recall Afghanistan. War, from the medical aspect, is analogous to a planned disaster. The plans for medical support of combat actions and the principles of field surgery are structured on this thesis. Not to consider this experience in developing a uniform all-union quick response service in the country is at the least wasteful. Only, here is the question of questions: how much can we write of this? Four years separate us from the nuclear fires of Chernobyl, almost a year and a half from the earthquake in Armenia. Since then tens of accounts and funds have been opened. There is a collection to fight AIDS. Correctly, if this is not within the power of the state. But we must admit that even AIDS cannot take 25 thousand lives in a moment. We do not economize in that.

What do we have today? A commission for emergency situations in the USSR Council of Ministers. An idea for

the development of a Center for Emergency Medicine on the basis of the Institute of Surgery imeni Vishnevskiy. There are four detachments of professional rescuers. I saw their resplendent Swedish suits. They will not burn or melt, they cannot even be eaten away by sulfuric acid. Excellent. But that's all there is to say. Except, perhaps, that today in our country 64 million people live in the zones of possible dangerous and extremely dangerous contamination. That in around 800 cities there are around three thousand chemically hazardous installations. Plus nuclear power plants, warehouses of toxic substances, genetic engineering, microbiology... Should we be complacent?

Today many ministries have an emergency rescue service. However there is still no precise coordination of the actions of all departments, nor is there a uniform doctrine. For the time being it's every man for himself. The disasters of recent years have demonstrated all the unsoundness of the system of providing medical help through the civil defense medical service.

Military doctors have their own views of the problem. They believe that in extreme situations, mobile medical groups, reliable transport support, and a command and control system are indispensable. The chief of the Central Military Medicine Directorate, Maj Gen of Medical Service E. Nekhayev, pays special attention to this area. He initiated development of a methods center for training specialists in disaster medicine.

Recently military doctors held their first special conference on "disaster medicine." I will not tire the readers with the purely technical aspect of the discussion of specialists. I want to talk of something else. The discussions were preceded by exercises, a practical demonstration of all that military medicine has at its disposal in the event of emergency situations. This was not a spectacle designed for show. They were resolving a fundamental question: how to proceed further? Some of it was encouraging. The French are not the only ones with mobile forces. A MOON—a special-purpose medical detachment—is a modular detachment (air-dropped with all

gear) of professionals capable of working autonomously up to 14 days. Precisely the type of detachments urgently needed in the terrible disasters of recent years. Reliable "Skalpel" rescue aircraft, "Bissektrisa" helicopters, medical tractor trailers, hospital ships—all this already exists and is in constant readiness. And, let us assume, should be part of the system of uniform all-state disaster medicine.

But still the matter proceeds along departmental lines. Often different departments invent the bicycle, not knowing that one just like it, and even better, has already been developed and is in the armament somewhere. This was discussed at the conference of military doctors by leading civilian specialists in the field of disaster medicine, the director of the Institute of Surgery imeni A. V. Vishnevskiy of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, National Chief Surgeon Academician V. Fedorov, the chairman of the problem commission for emergency medicine of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences Academician G. Ryabov, and others. Their opinion today is unequivocal: the development of uniform mobile quick-response medicine in our country today is impossible without the participation of military doctors. Without allowance for their unique experience. It is no accident that I stress this. Because even yesterday this clear understanding did not exist in our country.

Only by gathering all forces and spurning all departmental ambitions will society be able to fight disasters. How unforgivably long it has taken all of us, people from different departments, to arrive at these simple truths.

#### On what does the matter now depend?

Much that is needed to resolve this vital problem already exists. The matter depends on a small thing: the USSR Council of Ministers should speed up adoption of a final decision regarding the creation of an all-union quick-response service. The corresponding proposals have been submitted. The lessons have been taken into account. Only the signatures have still to be placed on this document...

**Kirillin of Rear Services Staff on Surplus Sales**

*90UM0480A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
14 Apr 90 First Edition p 2*

[Interview with Col Vitaliy Petrovich Kirillin, department chief, USSR Armed Forces Rear Services Staff by Maj I. Ivanyuk: "Clearance Sale. Who Profits From It?"]

[Text] Col V. Kirillin, department chief of the USSR Armed Forces Rear Services Staff, replies to this and other questions.

[Ivanyuk] Vitaliy Petrovich, the sale of surplus military equipment and property in the national economy occupies the minds of many people. Some see this almost as a radical means of solving social and personal problems in the army and navy through entrusted resources. Others feel that the consumer goods situation in the country could even be corrected in this fashion.

[Kirillin] I don't know what it was that created such a stir. As long as our armed forces have existed, surplus equipment and property has been transferred to places where it could still be beneficial—enterprises, construction projects, kolkhozes and sovkhozes. And this is not counting the fact that the USSR Ministry of Defense, and the national economy's defense sectors as well, have the assignment of using available production capacities to manufacture consumer goods. In comparison with last year, and all the more so the year before last, this assignment increased significantly, now being 300 million rubles in monetary terms. Generally speaking, that's not so little, though this basically involves low-output repair operations and construction industry enterprises. But on the other hand, you must agree that this is but a drop in the ocean for our vast market. Nor could the decisive role be played here by the 500 million rubles' worth of motor vehicle equipment, clothing and housekeeping property, materials and equipment we were supposed to have transferred last year to the USSR Gossnab, at wholesale prices, for subsequent sale. This possibility came into being in connection with the reduction of the armed forces. But for practical purposes the sales volume was only 365 million rubles.

[Ivanyuk] Are you saying that the program was short by almost a third?

[Kirillin] We couldn't have hoped for much otherwise, at least because according to a government decision Gossnab had the right to sell the listed material valuables only to the public and to cooperatives.

[Ivanyuk] This decision is entirely understandable: After all, it was based on the need for rectifying the situation in the consumer market....

[Kirillin] I'm not against that. But they concurrently closed the traditional channel for selling off surplus property—to state organizations, enterprises and institutions. As a result many of the high quality "goods" were not paired up with customers. Judge for yourself, who would be in a position to acquire an imported

painting station costing 4 million rubles? Its productivity is such that it could easily satisfy the needs of a large specialized organization. Of course, it's beyond the pocketbook of even a large cooperative. It is true that in the end the Ministry of Defense and Gossnab were able to get permission from the USSR Council of Ministers to include enterprises and organizations in the sphere of the business deals. But this did not happen until November, meaning that we did not have enough time to make up for lost ground.

[Ivanyuk] Surely the absence of experience in commercial activity also had an effect?

[Kirillin] Of course, no one in the Armed Forces Rear Services Staff had formerly been involved in either organizing shows and auctions or in marketing. Even so, we were the ones given the job of coordinating the work of all fund holders and product clients in the Ministry of Defense, and correspondingly in the military districts through which these products make their way to territorial Gossnab organs.

But what happens in real life is that rather than Gossnab, it is the Ministry of Defense that seeks the buyers, sets up deals and draws up the lion's share of the documents. Doing no real work, local Gossnab organs receive deductions equaling up to 15-20 percent of total sales.

[Ivanyuk] So where does the rest of the money go?

[Kirillin] Except for overhead, it goes to the state budget. It stands to reason that this does not pertain to cost-accounting enterprises and organizations—they are entitled to dispose of their profit themselves. But their share, incidentally, is relatively small—less than 5 percent, if we consider the Ministry of Defense as a whole. Meaning that there is nothing to be said at the moment for material interest. Fairs and auctions are an exception: Only half of their profits are deducted into the budget, with the rest of the money being distributed among the organizers. As a rule the Ministry of Defense gets a fifth. From my point of view this practice is fundamentally wrong. There are material stimuli in the troops even for turning in scrap metal, after all. Why not reward privates and officers who managed to take good care of equipment and property entrusted to them?

[Ivanyuk] Is the absence of interest the explanation for the literally laughable prices sometimes encountered in this unique market?

[Kirillin] Yes, among other things. Generally speaking, the unit commander is entitled to establish the residual value of a given piece of equipment or article himself. There is an opportunity in this case for both revealing the true worth of the goods, and for doing otherwise. The question some ask is this: Why do all that work without getting something for it? There are loopholes that permit abuses.

[Ivanyuk] There must be another aspect here as well. Activity of this sort needs to be appropriately supported.

[Kirillin] Without a doubt. But neither the Ministry of Defense nor Gossnab organs have the needed material base. They don't have the money to buy material valuables from the military units, or the storage space, or the enterprises that could process the materials and prepare them for sale. As an example we have a large number of motor vehicle chassis for sale, but hardly anyone takes them. Were Gossnab to organize manufacture of vehicle bodies, of "preassembled" motor vehicles, I'm certain that they would be snatched up in a moment. We also found out that our partner is not interested in having anything to do with small lots of goods, such as radio components for example. They have to be gathered together, accumulated and sorted somewhere, you see. All of this requires considerable effort, as do advertising and other organizational measures.

We on our part are trying to get this work going. In 1989 we visited Kiev, Rostov, Tbilisi and other cities. We found that blankets, cotton and woolen underwear, and many things which go like hotcakes are not selling there. In Moscow, the same underwear, protective overalls, fabrics and other goods were sold at cut-rate prices to the tune of 85,000 rubles. There is good reason why they say that water does not flow beneath a resting stone, which is true here as well. Consider the protective overalls for example: They are very useful to fishermen and hunters, but who among the local population knew about them?

In the meantime the position of supply organs is in most cases like this: Give us the surplus goods, and we'll sell them. They ask for passenger cars, construction materials and motor vehicle spare parts. But where, may I ask, are such goods in abundance? It is of course very tempting to receive profit without investing a single kopek into the effort, but things don't happen like that. Back in December of last year we asked the USSR Gossnab to foresee budget appropriations in support of the planned measures. We still haven't received an answer to this letter. On the other hand we can't go on doing all this on a voluntary basis, semi-primitively.

For some reason representatives of the defense complex are showing no interest in what is happening. And yet they could open up completely new possibilities for themselves by studying the demand for products which are now being manufactured for the troops. And then there would be no need to shut down the production cycles that have evolved, and perhaps they could even be expanded.

Take at least the field meat packing stations. They would free kolkhozes and sovkhozes of the need for shipping farm animals long distances, and allow them to provide meat to the state locally, thus avoiding enormous losses due to transportation of the animals. We have also exhibited vehicles with timber handling attachments, supplied to the engineering troops. This would be an irreplaceable article in the village, in the cooperative and in orchard management. It costs around 2,000 rubles. When we put these goods on show, even the number of foreign representatives were more than we could handle.

As it turns out, they have a better sense of where the profits lie. Once they even came to us with a totally exotic proposal—selling them a submarine without all of its internal fittings. What could they possibly do with such a thing? Build an underwater hotel on the Mediterranean coast. We also need to seriously study the possibilities of utilizing the armed forces' unneeded goods in the national economy. No one is doing this at the moment.

[Ivanyuk] But certainly this should not be the concern of just the Ministry of Defense alone?

[Kirillin] Of course, it would be better for each to do his own work.

#### Deputy Minister Chekov on Improving Social State of Servicemen

90UM0601A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
24 May 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel General N. Chekov, USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Construction and Biliing of Troops, conducted by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Major I. Ivanyuk: "Social Guarantees: Reality and Prospects"]

[Text] On the instructions of USSR President M. S. Gorbachev, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Finance, and the USSR Gosplan have elaborated a draft special purpose State social security program for servicemen and members of their families, and also for individuals, who have been discharged from the military service. At present, the draft program has been submitted to the USSR Council of Ministers for consideration.

[Ivanyuk] Nikolay Vasilyevich, it probably is not an exaggeration to say that everyone associated with the USSR Armed Forces is anxiously awaiting the program that will provide reliable social guarantees to servicemen. You headed the committee for drawing up the program. What kind of program is this?

[Chekov] One can understand the uneasiness of servicemen and their families with the state of their financial security and with their working and living conditions. Frequently, the burdens and deprivations that they experience are associated with their inadequate legal and social protection and not with the peculiarities of military service. Problems have accumulated in this area not only for years but for decades. This currently affects all aspects of the lives of officers, warrant officers, and servicemen on compulsory or extended military service, and all aspects of their family members' lives. Proceeding from this, a set of measures, which would encompass all aspects of social protection for people devoting their lives to the USSR Armed Forces, was also prepared. First of all, it was necessary to think about the legal foundations of the decisions being made. The introductory portion of our program was dedicated to these issues.

Thus, next year we are planning to elaborate a draft USSR law, "On the Status of Servicemen". The situation is such that many regulations associated with active military service are not supported by legislation. Some standard documents are out of date and contradict each other. We will have to systematize all standards concerning not only servicemen's rights and responsibilities, for example, but also concerning their system of social security, of course, taking into account the peculiarities of society's and the Armed Forces' current stage of development.

As early as this year, proposals on increasing amenability for causing spiritual and other damage to servicemen, as well as for insulting the USSR Armed Forces, the USSR KGB and MVD troops, and their symbols will be submitted to the government. For the present, legislation does not mention special amenability for assaulting or attempting to murder those who are performing their military duty or duties in maintaining public order.

As regards the principal portion of the proposed draft program, it consists of two sections: the first applies to improving the financial security and the working and living conditions of servicemen, and the second applies to ways of solving the housing problem in the near future.

[Ivanyuk] It seems the majority of our readers would assign none other than the housing problem to first place in acuteness and extensiveness...

[Chekov] Indeed, despite the increasing volume of housing construction within the Ministry of Defense, this issue remains the most critical to date. The number of families without adequate housing has exceeded 178 thousand and exhibits a tendency toward growth. It will suffice to remind you of the 25 thousand families of officers and warrant officers, who will return to the homeland after the withdrawal of our troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. All of this has forced us to reconsider the previously approved "Housing-2000" program. Thus, during the 12th five-year plan, 19.4 million square meters of dwelling space will be constructed for servicemen and their families, as well as for civilian workers and employees living on military installations. And during the following five-year plan, the 13th, 24 million square meters will be constructed. Almost four fifths of this will be built by forces from military construction organizations. The remaining five million square meters of dwelling space must be constructed by manpower from contract organizations in the union republics with share holding by the Ministry of Defense.

During this time, the construction of dwelling space with a total area of 2.1 million, 460 thousand, and 600 thousand square meters is planned for the USSR KGB, MVD, and the railroad troops respectively. During the 14th five-year plan, it will be necessary to increase the pace of construction even more in order to completely solve the housing problem.

Furthermore, starting next year, we propose to expand officers' rights to join housing and housing construction cooperatives in those settlements, where they plan to live after being released from military service. Namely: to make it so that they will be able to exercise this right as early as after 15 years of service, instead of only during the three years prior to their retirement to the reserve, as is the case at present.

I think that the USSR President's recently published decree, "On new approaches to the country's housing problem and measures for their practical realization", will, on the whole, serve as a stimulus for the successful realization of the program being outlined.

[Ivanyuk] Plans on top of plans, but what shall we do with those who are in need of urgent social assistance today? Letters permeated with anxiety are coming into the editorial office from the Baltic republics, Moldavia, and other regions of the country, where discriminatory decisions have been made with respect to servicemen.

[Chekov] Yes, the processes, to which you refer, are very complicated and proceed very painfully. The lack of proper legal standards is also an impediment in this area. In the near term we are planning to submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet proposals on approving legislative acts, which would provide social guarantees to servicemen's family members and to military pensioners in case of their involuntary transfer to a new place of residence. We are referring to providing housing, to job placement, and to reimbursement of all expenses associated with the transfer, at the expense of the union republics whose territory they are compelled to abandon.

[Ivanyuk] Nikolay Vasilyevich, even in Moscow there are about 10 thousand families of officers and warrant officers that do not have housing. The situation is nearly critical. What is the way out of this situation?

[Chekov] The Ministry of Defense is taking additional steps for housing arrangements in the capital. This year we expect to put into service apartment houses with a total area of 180 thousand square meters—this is substantially more than in the past. Recently, a construction directorate, headed by Colonel A. Shishkarev, which will only be involved in the construction of housing, was created. As early as this year, we expect 415 apartments from the construction directorate, and by 1992, we hope that it will be in the vicinity of 1,000 apartments annually. The Main Military Construction Directorate, under the direction of Lieutenant General V. Zakinmatov, is also increasing the volume of housing construction in the capital.

It must be said that the unconstructive position, to put it mildly, which is taken at times by the Moscow gorsispolkom, adversely affects the pace of solving the housing problem. For example, the municipal authorities, as if paying no heed to how much they are doing for the needs of Moscow's builder in military uniform, refuse to apportion the allotted housing to the Ministry of Defense, according to the 1984 government resolution

and according to the share holding agreement. I would remind you that 11 military construction detachments in Moscow and eight in the oblast are engaged in solving the capital's problems, including the housing problem. Servicemen should receive 65 thousand square meters of dwelling space annually from the city, but this rarely works out. And the deficit that has accumulated over past years still has not been made up. We will strive for mutual understanding in these issues.

[Ivanyuk] The housing problems are just as critical for those who have been released from active military service. Are there new approaches here?

[Chekov] Here the basic complication lies in the fact that many servicemen after being transferred to the reserve or retiring, continue to live on the territory of closed and isolated military installations. At present, these families number about 75 thousand.

This is what we are proposing. To allocate, starting with the next five year plan, capital investments to the USSR Ministry of Defense, KGB, MVD, and Ministry of Transport Construction (for railroad troops), and then to transfer the capital investments to special purpose local government bodies. One of the program's paragraphs also obliges the Councils of Ministers in the union republics to ensure immediate approval of capital investments under the system of share holding to provide dwelling space to those subject to resettlement from closed military installations.

During this year and the next, we expect that the Councils of Ministers in the union republics will be able to clear up their liabilities in allocating the housing prescribed by the government resolution and also by the share holding agreement. At present, this deficit is 24 thousand apartments. Mostly in the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kirghizia. Germanly speaking, the validity of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers resolution on the annual allocation of 500 thousand square meters of dwelling space to the Ministry of Defense by the Councils of Ministers in the union republics expires this year. The draft program provides for extending the validity of the resolution for five more years.

[Ivanyuk] Won't these estimates remain only on paper? Considerable additional funds, materials, and manpower are needed. Where will we get them?

[Chekov] The draft program is based upon the limits of the capital investments allocated to the Ministry of Defense being significantly increased in the next five-year plan. In turn, we will set all possible reserves in motion, redirecting funds and resources to the development of the social sphere. While capital investments in the construction of housing and social and cultural welfare facilities was 86 percent of the total amount last year and 46 percent this year, starting next year, for the first time during the entire history of the Armed Forces, the amount of that which was built in the past by the so-called residual principle will exceed assignments for

the commissioning of warhead delivery systems. In this case I do not only mean housing. At present, military units are provided only nine tenths of the required barracks resources, there is even a greater shortage of mess halls, and they are short of medical facilities and clubs—almost by one third. Thirty-five percent of servicemen's preschool children and half of their schoolchildren are not provided with places in preschools and at Young Pioneer summer camps. Special purpose funds will be allocated to solve these problems.

For the present, the manpower problem is being solved with difficulty. At the same time, as is generally known, many thousands of military builders have been diverted to the national economy and are being used there, incidentally, not in the most efficient manner. In March, the USSR Gosplan was instructed to submit proposals on the transfer of 15 of these detachments to the infrastructure of units and subunits being withdrawn from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. All the control dates passed and the instructions never were carried out. Alas, evidently, bureaucratic interests still prevail in the ministries having military builders. We will have to "wage war" on this improper point of view.

I would like to add that we considered it advisable to suggest certain measures in the program in order to change the status of military builders. It is no secret that many of them, even toward the end of their military service, are unable to pay for food and uniforms, the cost of which has increased appreciably in recent years. How can this be corrected? We hope the so-called decreasing coefficient for the wages of military builders will be rescinded; wages will be raised for time spent in professional training and in improvement of professional skills; and the providing of special work clothes and footwear from the overhead expenses of the construction organizations will be implemented on a level with workers in corresponding branches of the national economy.

[Ivanyuk] At present, many people are experiencing anxiety in connection with the change to a planned market economy. Servicemen and their families, like all people with fixed incomes, are in particular need of social protection on the part of the government.

[Chekov] We tried to take these and other peculiarities of military service conditions into account in the program. In particular, measures to substantially increase monetary allowances in the future for officers, warrant officers, and servicemen on extended military service have been outlined. Some special problems will be solved as early as in the next year or two. By way of illustration, civilian workers and employees in certain "difficult" regions receive a 1.3—1.4 wage coefficient. At the same time this bonus is half as much for servicemen. We think such injustice must be eliminated.

A proposal to establish a supplement to the official salary rate for officers not entitled to receive rations was also put into the program. This is 74 percent of the officers in

the Armed Forces. Instead of the current 20 rubles, they will then receive funds for the actual cost of rations based on the current prices for food products.

I also think such measures as the introduction of compensation in case of the injury, shell shock, mutilation, or death of a serviceman during peacetime military service will bring satisfaction. Or, let us say, granting to officers' wives, who are receiving a pension on account of the loss of the breadwinner, rights to medical care along the lines of corresponding ministries and departments.

The draft program provides for the introduction of allowances, equal to the minimum salary rate, to non-working wives of servicemen for care of children up to the age of 18 months. A number of measures are contemplated to improve the transportation service provided to servicemen. In particular, there is discussion of allowing them to use air transportation in those cases when they are entitled to travel at government expense. In the next five-year plan, we plan to complete the development and apply in industry new, contemporary styles of military clothing and footwear.

[Ivanyuk] Very many censures, requests, and wishes are received from military pensioners. And it must be said, these are fully justified. After retiring from the Armed Forces, they find their rights to medical, commercial, and consumer services infringed upon. Especially those of them who for some reason or other do not have 25 years of longevity. What will be done for veterans?

[Chekov] Proposals to improve the provision of pensions to servicemen and their families have already found their reflection in a law recently approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet. However, the special purpose social security program, which is being discussed, provides the solution to a number of problems. Thus, we are proposing to extend the right to free financial assistance to pensioners from the USSR Ministry of Defense, KGB, MVD, as well as from the railroad troops, who have joined housing construction cooperatives or have undertaken the construction of their own home. In addition, until their own home is finished, they will only have to pay part of the expenses for renting temporary housing.

The authors of the draft program feel that the right should be extended to senior grade officers, who have 20 years or more of longevity. Those who were discharged because of age, illness, reductions of personnel, or health limitations should be given the right to reduced payments for housing and also to medical care along the lines of corresponding ministries and departments.

Starting in 1991, we are asking for a three billion ruble increase in funds for foodstuffs and nonedible goods for the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Trade Directorate. This will allow us to ensure that former servicemen living on closed and isolated military installations will be on equal grounds with cadre military personnel and their families. The program also calls for giving those military pensioners not living on military installations rights,

equal to those of any other customer, to purchase high demand items through the military exchange system.

[Ivanyuk] Today, one and all are in need of increased social protection. In view of this, one cannot help talking about the needs of servicemen in their compulsory term of service. Is it possible to accept the fact that a soldier is authorized one ruble a day for food? Or the fact that their monthly pay and allowances is not even enough for personal hygiene articles?

[Chekov] Actually, the cost of soldier's rations is low, although the required calorie content is provided in them. Of course, the rations are not notable for a large variety of foodstuffs and courses. That is why the program has stipulated that, beginning next year, the soldier's rations will begin to steadily improve due to a change in its composition and the inclusion of milk and vegetable and fruit juices in it.

As for the salary of servicemen in their compulsory term of service, it has remained practically the same for a long time. We hope that it will be raised as early as next year. For the present, I am unable to say to what extent it will be raised. The improvement of material incentives for military reservists, who are called up for training sessions, is also stipulated by the program.

[Ivanyuk] And a final question, Nikolay Vasilyevich. What will the realization of the entire program cost the State?

[Chekov] It is calculated for a five-year period and it will be implemented gradually. Expenditures will come to several billion rubles annually. The upper limit of expenditures will come in 1994-1995. There is hope that the country's economy will be firmly on its feet by that time. The reliability of the guarantees of social protection for servicemen and their families will depend a great deal upon this.

#### Military Housing Space Listed By Republic

90UM0750A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
20 Jul 90 p 4

[Article by Col Gen N. Gryaznov, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Billeting and Maintenance Directorate: "What Is Exacerbating The Housing Problem"]

[Text] "Please tell how much housing the various republics owe our soldiers."—Reserve Lieutenant Colonel V. Ziyatdinov.

**Col Gen N. Gryaznov, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Billeting and Maintenance Directorate**

The situation with housing space in the Armed Forces continues to be one of the most difficult social problems. As of January 1 of this year, the Ministry of Defense had 173,600 soldiers' families without apartments. This

number is growing as a result of the withdrawal of units from the Central and Southern Groups of Forces, as well as from Mongolia.

One cause of this situation is the union republic Councils of Ministers' failure to fulfill USSR government assignments for the allocation of housing to the Ministry of Defense. Each year, a total of 500,000 square meters of housing space is to be turned over to the Ministry of Defense in order to house soldiers' families. However, as the following table makes clear, this decision is not being carried out.

All the data in the table are in thousands of square meters:

Republics	Annual Assignment	Housing Received		Arrears as of January 1, 1990
		1988	1989	
RSFSR, including	325.0	304.4	213.1	311.0
—Moscow	65.0	70.2	29.4	79.9
—Lenin-grad	30.0	38.7	26.1	5.0
Ukrainian SSR	80.0	77.9	57.7	41.1
Belorus-sian SSR	15.0	13.5	13.7	3.5
Uzbek SSR	13.0	11.8	8.9	5.5
Kazakh SSR	20.0	14.4	5.3	45.5
Georgian SSR	6.0	5.0	5.6	3.95
Azerbaijan SSR	7.0	7.5	0.6	8.75
Lithuanian SSR	7.0	7.3	1.9	5.5
Moldavian SSR	4.0	4.1	3.5	0.55
Latvian SSR	4.0	2.35	1.3	4.15
Kirghiz SSR	4.0	2.5	1.9	20.7
Tajik SSR	5.0	5.6	2.6	11.5
Armenian SSR	6.0	1.4	0.4	11.4
Turkmen SSR	1.0	1.0	1.1	-
Estonian SSR	3.0	2.9	1.3	2.7
Total	500.0	461.6	318.9	475.7

A special program has now been drawn up to meet the social needs of soldiers and members of their families, as well as of persons discharged from active military service. Its adoption by the USSR Supreme Soviet will help solve the housing problem in the Armed Forces.

### Conversion Problems in Kaluga Oblast Discussed

904D0183A Moscow TRUD in Russian 22 Jul 90 p 2

[Article by S. Strelenko, doctor of technical sciences and secretary of the Kaluga CPSU Obkom: "Neither a Sword Nor a Plowshare: What They Expected From Conversion and What It is Yielding"]

[Text] On the eve of the new year, the Signal Plant in Obninsk released the first batch of instant cameras. The latest technical advances, great dependability, elegance, and ease of handling all distinguish the innovation advantageously. It was created at a joint Soviet-American enterprise, which previously issued output for defense only. They will manufacture 10 million rubles' worth of such cameras annually.

This is just one of the many examples of what conversion yields. Practically all of the large enterprises located in Kaluga Oblast are shifting to the production of complex domestic equipment, for which the need is now so great. Preparations are being made for the production of household kitchen appliances, woodworking machines, miniature tape recorders and home computers. The Kaluga Motor Building Association released the first batch of motor blocks for rural leasers. We are vigorously developing the production of sporting goods, including delta planes, water skis and sports complexes.

Medical equipment has become a separate line in the plans of the "defense people" and the therapeutic laser device "Uzor" issued in hundreds of units at the Voskhod Production Association in Kaluga was the winner in international competition in Finland and South Korea. Domestic medicine has an enormous need for it and developed capitalist countries are also prepared to buy it without limitations.

The preparation for the transition to regional economic accountability and the transfer of planning and management principles from the center to the localities forced the people in Kaluga to unite their efforts to resolve the complex tasks of conversion and to bring about a dramatic increase in the output of goods for the people. It is sufficient to say that the association of enterprises "Tovnar" (a contraction of the well-known slogan "tovary narody" [goods to the people]) established on its basis can solve practically any problems having to do with the development and production of domestic appliances of the highest level of complexity. It includes more than 20 plants and has a great scientific, personnel and production potential.

The first thing that Tovnar decided to do is to establish an independent plant through joint efforts for the production of electric motors of different capacities for household appliances. It is well known that at the present time very many are prepared to make complex machines for the home. But the question invariably involves precisely the lack of electric motors. More than 10 million rubles will be invested in the new production.

And still another figure: this year the output of consumer goods will increase by a factor of 1.4 in the oblast thanks to conversion.

There is no doubt that conversion is a good thing. Throughout almost the entire history of the Soviet state, the country gave its best forces and huge resources to defense. The change in the situation in the world and the perestroika of political thinking in our country made it possible to begin a fundamental reassessment of priorities.

But the realization of what has been conceived by the government sometimes amounts to primitive actions. The ministries decided that it would be sufficient to present to the enterprises a plan for consumer goods in the form of a state order, one involving a substantial increase. The plants supposedly would understand what needed to be done. Neither raw materials nor equipment nor capital investments resulted. What is this—naivety or a desire to present as progress the attempt to get moving in a railroad car that has been shunted off to the siding?

Central Television has repeatedly advertised the services of Tekhnologiya Scientific Production Association in Obninsk, which offers materials with superresistance to heat to all those interested. Everywhere they sent proposals for the acquisition of the casing that covers the "Buran" space shuttle at an affordable price. Neither metallurgists nor the enterprises of the construction industry showed any particular interest. In curtailing production without the possibility of shifting to really new forms of output, Tekhnologiya Scientific Production Association was forced to produce tennis rackets, the collective, left without work, had to be given something to do.

Here it ought to be explained that this powerful scientific production association is in the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry and is capable of maintaining the highest world standards in aircraft building. At the plenum of the CPSU obkom recently, General Director of "Tekhnologiya" A. Romashin presented the following example: the reduction of the weight of the country's entire fleet of passenger aircraft saves one million tons of fuel or 10-15 million tons of oil. And the developments of the scientists and engineers in Obninsk reduce the weight of components and elements of "Buran" by 20 to 25 percent. The savings amount to 500 kg on each space vehicle. The transfer of each kilogram to space costs \$8,000. Figure it up yourself....

But it seems that they put the "Buran" in a remote dead-end. They attack it in the press, forgetting that it is just the first swallow. And this is the opportune time to say that the precongress program of the CPSU states: "The acceleration of scientific-technical progress is the main instrument in raising the efficiency of production." Meanwhile, incentives have not yet been established in industry to get people interested in scientific-technical

progress and in introducing new equipment and producing the most nearly ideal output. The funds for science going to that same Tekhnologiya Association were reduced by 15 percent in comparison with last year.

It is worthwhile to consider what is happening. In 1986 in the United States, for example, they spent \$117 billion on research and design developments, whereas in 1988 the USSR spent 37.8 billion rubles. Is it any wonder that instead of tasks at the world level, "Tekhnologiya" is now taking on literally anything just to earn money. They make electrical insulators and floors and devise interiors. Meanwhile, the USSR is a major aircraft-building power and, as numerous aircraft shows have shown, it is possible to buy hundreds of looms and thousands of computers and video recorders for one aircraft produced in the country.

The same thing may be said about the Kaluga Motor Building Association. Its output—gas-turbine engines—is unique, for they are made by very few enterprises in the country. These engines are competitive and they are prepared to accept them abroad. But the plant does not have the right to make such deals, for the state has a monopoly there. And the state, foreseeing conversion, reduces the plan for the basic output by many tens of millions of rubles without doing anything to develop new directions in the work of enterprises. But nothing can be done without a restructuring of technology, requiring different equipment. Series production outfitted with special lines and machine tools cannot be used for anything else.

Let us think about what is happening: in proclaiming the slogan of conversion, the USSR Council of Ministers did practically nothing to support it. In tearing down one thing, we are very timid about introducing anything new. And this leads to just one thing: the enterprises finding themselves in this situation are beginning to see a drain of their best specialists, wages are declining and social conditions are worsening. And it is possible that without having really begun to produce vacuum cleaners, televisions and refrigerators, we will forget how to make aircraft and engines, although through them it would be possible to earn considerable sums for the real development of conversion—and at those same enterprises, acquiring all the necessary equipment with the earned foreign exchange.

But then, still not having obtained appreciable results, the planning bodies are already preparing reports on the successes of conversion. Is that not a familiar picture from the recent past, when for the sake of a brilliant report they could put a power-generating unit into service without a generator, create an artificial sea of no use to anyone or build a plant where no one would work....

The RSFSR Gosplan, having issued a conversion plan to the people in Kaluga, explained that eight enterprises of the oblast are subject to reorientation. They include the Barabanovo Needle-Platinum Plant and the Tovarkovskiy Plant for Textile Machine Building. They will go

over to especially peaceful output—one can report to the very top on the great work that was done. But both plants were never involved with "defense."

Conversion is too serious a matter for one to relate to it in such an amateur way. We shut down the flow of extremely complex output produced on the basis of the most up-to-date technology. It is clear that it is difficult to begin to produce passenger airliners immediately instead of fighters or washing machines and vacuum cleaners instead of, say, tanks or cannons. But one cannot, after all, promote tasks that put the collectives in a ridiculous and humiliating position, forcing them to make washing boards, colanders and hangers.

The transition to a new and rather complex peaceful output must be accompanied by the provision of enterprises with new equipment, for the previous equipment, as good as it may have been, is unsuitable in the overwhelming majority of cases. But this is not happening. And in general, conversion at many scientific institutions and enterprises is now being carried on extremely simply by the government: they cut back the whole line and stop issuing all products at once, without thinking about what the collective will do tomorrow. The financing is stopped even in those cases in which they are just half a step away from completing the work. Cooperation is collapsing, contacts are being lost and basic science and progress are suffering.

I fear that for several years we will ask ourselves why in such a short time the priorities were neglected in a number of branches of science and technology. It is time to have a serious discussion at the meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the situation with respect to conversion and the prospects for reform of "defense." Conversion, yes. But not in the stillness of ministerial offices, when again specific culprits will not be found. We cannot break our swords without thinking about how we will forge plowshares....

### Industrial Conversion Fails to Help Agriculture

**Conversion Aggravates Equipment Shortages**  
904B0277A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian  
25 Jul 90 p 2

[Article by A. Popov: "Not That Priority!"]

[Text] Every year our country buys up to 40 million tons of grain abroad. It is reasonable to ask: Do we have the possibility of raising its gross harvest by this same amount? As practice shows, it is possible to raise the harvest of food grains by improving the standards of farming, applying more intensive technologies and preventing losses. But there are quite a number of reasons restraining the intensification of plant growing. One of them is the lack of the needed equipment. Despite this, the USSR Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural Machine Building is reorganizing a number of its plants that

previously specialized in the production of farm machinery for the manufacture of automotive subassemblies and components.

Meanwhile, in terms of the level of technical equipment, our farms are far behind not only the farms of the most developed countries but also most of the CEMA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] member countries. In terms of the number of tractors per 1,000 hectares of cultivated land, the USSR is lagging behind the CSFR and GDR by a factor of approximately 2, behind the United States by a factor of 3.6, behind Great Britain by a factor of 5 and behind the FRG by a factor of more than 10! In contrast, one can present the following figures: the power-worker ratio in our country is below that of the United States by a factor of 3.9 and below that of the CEMA countries by a factor of 2.1. Is this really any way to do business?

As a result of such poor technical equipment and imperfection of complex mechanization on our farms, the harvest of grain crops last year took more than 23 days instead of the optimum 10 days. For this reason, farms lost no less than 12 to 14 million tons of grain.

Here it is appropriate to remember still another reserve for filling the granaries—the application of intensive technologies. At Kolkhoz imeni Lenin in Sumy, they obtained 70.5 quintals of winter wheat from each of 600 hectares thanks to these technologies. Last year the machine operators of Zhovten Kolkhoz in Akhtyrskiy Rayon harvested 73.9 quintals of grain per hectare in an area of 212 hectares and 83 farms obtained a harvest of more than 50 quintals of winter wheat!

In 1986, the oblast began to grow food grains under intensive technologies. Their relative share in the total sown area now amounts to about 60 percent. The workers of the Sumy Agricultural Experimental Station and Ukrzemprojekt Institute jointly worked out recommendations for each farm, taking into account the state of each field. Under production conditions, however, it has become impossible to achieve the desired results in large areas. Thus, of all brands of cultivators intended for the preparation of the soil prior to sowing, only the USMK-5 met the agrotechnical requirements. But there are very few of them and the sowers SZ-3.6 and others do not cover the seeds evenly.

To escape from the existing situation, machine operators began to alter the machines by themselves in their own shops or to appeal to patrons for assistance. For example, the Konotop Mechanical Plant began to manufacture attachments for the covering of seeds at the desired depth and tractor hitches. Rayon repair and service enterprises also did a lot. The machine operators of other oblasts were also forced to take this path. When economists made a calculation, it turned out that such self-help is more expensive for the kolkhozes and sovkhozes than the purchase of machinery coming off the plant conveyor. It is clear that specialized industrial enterprises should be doing this. Why are they not providing the

countryside with such needed machinery? After all, we have been talking about this for a long time. Industry was given the task of accelerating the establishment of capacities for the production of farm machinery and of dramatically increasing its manufacture at the enterprises of the former USSR Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building.

In the years 1981 through 1987, more than one billion rubles in capital investments were allocated for the construction and reconstruction of the Syzranelmash, Karagandaselmash, Davydovselmash, Krasnoarmeysk-sel'mash, Bashselmash, Suzenskiy and other plants. The kolkhozes and sovkhozes began to receive more machines in short supply for the application of fertilizers and lime, the opening up of new lands, the provision of fodder and others. But as strange as it may seem, after the merger of the ministries, the new leadership of USSR Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural Machine Building suddenly began to reorganize a number of plants for the manufacture of automotive subassemblies and components. It explains this through the law on the enterprise and through economic advantage. But this advantage is imaginary and one-sided and does not take into account the interests of agriculture.

"Because of inadequate equipment, many technological operations are performed under obsolete and uneconomical technological systems, with gross violations of the agrotechnical times for the performance of work and with large expenditures of labor and therefore production losses," says P.Ya. Gulyy, in charge of the agrarian section of the Sumy Party Obkom.

And he is right. Here is just one example: only 70 of 111 machines foreseen by the System of Machines for the postharvest processing and storage of food grain and seeds are available. The situation with respect to other machines is analogous.

Yes, the national economic plan does not provide for the priority development of the building of tractors and farm machinery in the 13th Five-Year Plan. A particularly difficult situation is developing in regard to the manufacture of machines for the application of fertilizers and the liming of soils. Their manufacture was already worked out at several enterprises of the former USSR Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building. V-nsnoarmeysk-sel'mash (Saratov Oblast) has now been turned over to the Moskvich Production Association and Karagandaselmash to the ZIL Production Association. Tselinogradselmash, which produced the I RMG-4, is now also providing other output. Davydovselmash left the Selkhozmashkompleks Association, is curtailing the production of equipment for the application of fertilizers and is preparing to switch to the assembly of busses.

Perhaps there is no longer any need for machines that apply fertilizers and liming materials to the soil? To obtain an answer to this question, I went to the Bashselmash Plant, which produces them.

"The demand for our output is twice the capacity of the enterprise. This is indicated by dozens of telegrams received daily and by messengers from all almost all parts of the country," says A.F. Kunichenko, deputy plant director for the production and sale of output.

The plant produces the MVU-5, which has a broad range for the application of fertilizers, high productivity and dependability in operation. Foreign farmers also took an interest in it. The first lots have been sent to Finland, France and Canada for testing.

The only machine in the USSR that can perform early-spring fertilizing and fully replace agricultural aviation—the highly mobile self-propelled ESBM-7, on which the AMP-5 assembly is mounted—has been put on the conveyor at Bashselmash. This innovation is worthy of much more attention. The universality and interchangeability of working elements were made part of its design.

The application of a self-propelled machine with a range of replaceable assemblies is especially effective in specialized subdivisions of the Soyuzselkhozhimiya All-Union Production Association. Analogous units in the United States, Canada and Australia are being acquired by agents for the sale of mineral fertilizers and toxic chemicals, who apply them to the soil at the request of farmers. The plant was intended for the production of 25,000 machines of the type RUM-5 and 4,000 self-propelled machines with replaceable assemblies. It has not achieved this capacity. They have already spent 200 million rubles on its construction and approximately another 10 million are needed for its completion. Instead of collecting this sum, USSR Minister of the Automotive and Agricultural Machine Building N.A. Pugin issued an order effective 1 March 1990 to stop construction and to carry out a partial preservation of plant facilities for which there is no financing.

The plant was built recently but it is already necessary to think about tomorrow, about life and work under the conditions of a normal market. But the enterprise has almost no funds of its own for development. The leadership of the firm "AG-KhIM" visited there in 1988 and was prepared to organize cooperation with Bashselkhozhimash. For the time being, the enterprise does not have foreign exchange of its own. And the Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural Machine Building was also unable to come up with a few thousand dollars for a reciprocal trip of the plant management abroad to exchange experience. Only one person, the director, was able to go abroad in recent years.

Last year, the nearby plant for dump trucks (KamAZ) received a large quantity of imported goods and 10 times as many passenger cars than Bashselmash for its own collective thanks only to an exchange of output in kind. Rural dwellers need machines for the application of fertilizer. But what can they give in exchange?

It appears that for the purpose of the priority development of agricultural machine building it is already time

to return to the previous situation and take away from the Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural Machine Building all enterprises for agricultural machine building and establish an independent association on their basis. People will then be happy to go to these enterprises to work. As a result, there will be more equipment and there will also be more produce on the counters.

**Products from Defense Plants Explosive**

904B0277B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian  
8 Aug 90 p 2

[Commentary by I. Selivanov under "Problems of Technical Progress" rubric: "More Expensive to the Countryside Than the Original: New Equipment Issued by Defense Enterprises Under Foreign Patterns"]

[Text] Leningrad Oblast—The industrial enterprises of Leningrad, primarily defense enterprises, had promised by the spring of this year to manufacture a complex of machines similar to world models that will make it possible to fully mechanize the cultivation of vegetables and potatoes. By the start of the field work, however, such equipment had just begun to reach the farms. And peasants were immediately disturbed by its exorbitant cost—frequently several times higher than the traditional price for farm machines and equipment. What are the reasons for this? This is how they were explained by the managers of manufacturing plants:

**G.P. Korsanov**, general director of the Uran Scientific Production Association:

Our collective kept its word. We dispatched the first lot of precision drills on time. But naturally they cost three times as much as customary vegetable drills. Of course this is explained primarily by the higher quality. At the same time, it must be frankly acknowledged that our overhead expenditures and outlays for highly qualified specialists are significantly higher than at ordinary enterprises for agricultural machine building. And the price-setting system is inflexible. The main thing is that the new equipment for vegetable growing has not been put on a unified mechanized flow. It had to be assembled by hand. The rigging is very expensive. There was a continual shortage of completing products.

For the evenness and saturation of production and price for products are closely related concepts. No one wants to work for a loss. And so as not to permit this, today we should already have thought out the question of the series manufacture of those same drills. In principle, we can manufacture not half a hundred of them, as now, but thousands, let us say. But this requires long-term direct ties with plants supplying completing products. It is time for us to include the manufacture of equipment for the countryside in the basic plan, issue a state order for it and allocate funds and means. Only then will it be possible to talk seriously about reducing its cost.

The same thing can be said about other kinds of machines and equipment for the agricultural industry,

which we are dealing with in conversion. Take, for example, dough-kneading machines, the pay-back period of which extends to 20 years. We have developed original models of this equipment capable of acting automatically, tested them in a kitchen factory in Vyborgskiy Rayon and are prepared to manufacture them in large batches of up to 600 units a year. Because of the high price, however, they ordered just 15 such machines from us. The result is a vicious circle: customers do not want to make major outlays for experimental models and we cannot go to less expensive series models, because they are not ordering them from us.

We also undertook to manufacture 40 sets of automated equipment as a compact means of growing seedlings in greenhouses. But why not 100 or 200? They tell us that the oblast does not need so many. Well, in that event let them pay more.

Returning to the question of the drills, I can add that we are prepared to sponsor the Kirovograd Plant for Agricultural Machine Building, which has specialized in the production of flow-line equipment. In short, it is necessary to approach the matter nationally on a large scale.

**V.A. Koshevarov**, director of the Ritm Scientific Production Association, Petrozavod:

We ordered by contract the first lot of haulm shredders for potato growing. But we will hardly be able to manufacture it on time. The fact is that questions involving cooperative deliveries from other enterprises have not been resolved. Last year they manufactured reduction gears for an experimental model for us at the Ravenstvo Association, a number of other parts at the Bolshevik Plant and the machine body at the Sredne-Nevskiy Ship Building Plant. They are now refusing to do this, which threatens to disrupt the entire program.

In addition to everything else, there are no funds for materials and the technical documentation that they are preparing for us at the Central Research Institute of the Ritm Scientific Production Association has not been corrected.

Also unfortunate is the fact that our plant is an experimental plant. We cannot undertake the manufacture of a large lot of machines and hence they become more expensive. By the way, I repeat that we are not refusing the order, for we understand very well how important it is for the countryside. But we need help from our Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry so that we will not have to manufacture several other products.

**V.A. Zosimov**, head of the central design bureau of the Znamya Oktyabrya Scientific Production Association:

The fact that the price of new equipment is indeed exorbitant is sometimes the fault of the workers of the agricultural industry themselves. Take, for example, the cultivator-ridger KOR-1, which we developed, manufactured and tested in action last year and it demonstrated good results. The only thing left to do was to put it into

series production. But suddenly we receive a letter from the Leningrad Oblast Agricultural Production Association, in which they ask us to change the width of the interrow machine from 75 to 70 centimeters. But this means the complete reworking of the design.

By the way, we expressed our doubts to the customer even before then: why set a width of 75 centimeters when the entire domestic technology for the cultivation of potatoes is designed for 70 centimeters? No, they told us, the width of the interrow spacing for the cultivator-ridger must correspond to the technological task and analogous foreign model.

The agreement is practically broken already, because three times the agricultural industry demanded a reduction of the price for the cultivator—from 9,000 to 3,000 rubles. But we ourselves had to pay 21,000 rubles to the Burevestnik Plant in Gatchina just for two reduction gears for experimental models.

The fact is that we also have to order completing parts at enterprises of the defense industry, in particular at aircraft plants, where their cost is a magnitude greater than in other branches of machine building.

#### Commentary of the Correspondent

In the Leningrad Oblast Agro-Industrial Association, as a momento, they gave me a sheet of paper with the plan-order to industrial enterprises for the manufacture of new equipment for the cultivation of potatoes and vegetables under intensive technologies. It included a little more than 360 different machines and sets of equipment of nine product descriptions. Their total cost is more than five million rubles. It could have been more if the customers had agreed to pay the cost of the new potato-planting machine, the manufacture of which at the Bolshevik Plant cost 130,000 rubles—200 times more than an ordinary potato planter.

Not wanting to bear such exorbitant expenditures, the potato growers rejected a foreign copy of a transplanting machine, which in turn led to a return to the traditional interrow spacing of potatoes and therefore to a reworking of other machines in technology.

In short, it is difficult to explain what happened other than through a serious engineering and technological miscalculation. One recalls with what delight the participants in an All-Union seminar had observed the work of machines acquired in Western Europe with foreign exchange for more than a year and half in vegetable and potato fields of the Tognenskiy Agro-Industrial Combine. Even then, however, doubts were expressed about the necessity of copying each of them blindly. And no one anticipated that our domestic copies would cost more than the imported originals. As deplorable as it might be, however, that is exactly what happened—with the exception, perhaps, of the precision drill and transplanting machine.

And, of course, my interlocutors are right: it is time to put the matter on a long-term national basis and not limit ourselves to one-time orders for individual oblasts. As reported in USSR Gosplan, with requests from the agricultural industry amounting to 3.1 billion rubles, the enterprises of the defense industry have agreed to manufacture only 2.65 billion rubles in machines and equipment in 1991. But this is in terms of the total value. As for the products list, here the situation is even more depressing. One gets the impression that, in raising prices, machine builders are striving to force the enterprises of the agricultural industry to cut back on their orders.

The matter will proceed more certainly and the countryside will receive new equipment only under the condition that its interests actually become a priority. It is necessary, finally, to turn over some of the ship steel and other high-quality materials to agricultural machine building and to have its enterprises in contact with conversion specialize in the mass production of completing parts for new equipment. Only then will its assembly proceed more rapidly, will quality not suffer and will the price be acceptable for the buyer.

#### Uzbek Enterprises' Conversion Problems Described

904D02004 Moscow TRUD in Russian 5 Aug 90 p 2

[Article by Ye. Varshavskaya, special correspondent, Uzbek SSR: "Navoi: Rehearsal for the Market—Conversion of Defense Complex Enterprises Proceeds with Difficulty"]

[Text] The way from this small town deep in Uzbekistan has always been shorter to Moscow than to Bukhara, the oblast center, or to Tashkent. There is nothing strange about it: the main enterprises in Navoi, its electromechanical plant, the "Navoiazot" industrial association, the mining and metallurgical combine [NGMK], are under union-level management. As to the town itself, together with its buildings and structures, roads and parks, it has always been payrolled by an industrial giant, the NGMK. The enterprise—which is the reason Navoi was built in the first place—used to generously allocate funds for the town's development and the general program of construction. Nor was the Ministry of Medium-Sized Machinery tight-fisted, since it dug secret uranium and equally secret pure gold in the surrounding area.

This oasis, concealed though it was from the eyes of foreigners, would have continued to flourish in the Uzbek desert had new times not arrived. The weighty word "conversion" was uttered in Navoi.

When we hear that a tank plant switched to making separators and rocket makers started to produce pots, we nod knowledgeably: this is the result of conversion. But the essence of the phenomenon goes deeper than a mere exchange of six of one for half a dozen of another, or swords for plowshares. It entails studying the market and

developing new production technologies. It entails converting production for new output which consumers would want to buy. It entails searching for new partners and raw materials and retraining staffs. It entails investing into future projects and tackling the problem of price setting.

In effect, when we started conversion a couple of years ago we began a process which will inevitably involve all of our enterprises, and relatively soon. When the country's economy shifts to the market, defense plants will not be the only ones facing such problems. This is why it is so interesting to see how conversion is getting on.

Events moved very fast. In December 1987 Gorbachev signed the famous arms-cutting agreements and starting in 1988 the "Navoiazot" association lost its state order for the catalyst. While the peace-loving progressive people of the world rejoiced, the Navoi plant was feverishly calculating how much the sudden turn towards peace would cost them. One third of profits was lost irretrievably. The catalyst, which took 10 years to develop (not to mention the enormous investment) suddenly was not needed. Losses were expressed in terms that were fantastical on the scale of an enterprise. In 1989 they exceeded R53.7 million. And what to do with the personnel, i.e., the experts, who had developed and produced the unneeded product? And what about capacities, which now stood idle—what was to be done with them? These were painful and urgent questions.

The hopes that the center would come through were dashed. The enterprise was relieved of various payments to the state budget, such as for labor resources and capital investment, but this did not eliminate the losses. As to other forms of assistance, such as placing orders for other types of output or finding new customers for the catalyst, nothing was even mentioned. It became clear that they would have to find solutions on their own.

But where? Chemical products made by "Navoiazot" offered no profits. They were mainly raw materials for other types of production. But what if they themselves tried to process chemical inputs into finished goods?

Goods produced by the enterprise fortunately included one such product, nitron fibers. It was shipped to various textile enterprises where wool was added to it and artificial fur was made out of it.

"We decided to make nitron thread here," V. Krupin, "Navoiazot" director general, explained to me. "It would be a godsend for our miserable consumer market."

The price, at R2 per spool, was more than affordable, the colors were astounding and the appearance—if one didn't look too closely—was that of wool. What if they were to knit various garments from it, such as sweaters, children's clothes and hats, using Burda's fashions, and to sell them profitably. Or make upholstery fabric? Or plaids? An entire factory could be placed on the territory

of the association, especially since it had an empty new building. These were grand plans.

"The state order for our fibers was 98 percent of the plan. Of course we got more by using wastes and exceeding capacities, but still the remainder was a drop in the bucket as far as major production was concerned," explained V. Krupin.

Besides, "Navoiazot" was naive enough to ask for textile and knitting equipment, which was the full and exclusive property of the State Committee for Light Industry. One did not have to be a seer to predict who would get that equipment, textile manufacturers or a chemistry plant. Why should the State Committee for Light Industry sell to outsiders?

The total extent of superior entities' involvement in conversion was to refuse to buy the catalyst. After that the ministry washed its hands of the business. Incidentally, the plant does not blame their superiors: they think that the task of restructuring the output and finding their niche in satisfying consumer demand is their own affair. It is not assistance we are talking about. The enterprise was changing on its own initiative while they, at the top, kept diligently demanding various indicators, as they had done for decades: the same old documentation on profits plans for the next five-year period, future product lists and various other bureaucratic red tape. They kept remitting state orders and setting prices. They were in no danger of bankruptcy and therefore in no hurry to restructure their relations with the enterprise that was undergoing change.

The only thing we could say to cheer up "Navoiazot" employees is an old cliche: it could be worse. An example of how bad it could get is next door. It is the Navoi electric chemical plant [EChZ]. Until very recently it was another successful enterprise with a bright future.

Conversion at defense industry plants did not concern that enterprise in any way since one of its main products was fertilizer and chemicals for agriculture. The lightning struck from the clear sky. In 1988, the state order for chemicals was cut by half, and in 1989, without any warning whatsoever, completely abolished.

It was as if the enterprise had been tripped while running full speed. Having just bought much imported equipment, it was barely starting to bring it to capacity and get back their investment. Now, it had to stop production.

When all seemed hopeless and lost, EChZ director G. Yan started conversion, a peaceful one, as he called it.

First, the EChZ sold the unneeded output abroad. Not all of it, but still it was a lucky break. After that the director took a radical step to start producing other output on the equipment he used to make the chemicals the State Committee for Agricultural Chemicals no longer wanted.

The market study showed that it would be profitable to produce additives to polyurethane to make it firmer and

more durable. It is used to make fenders for motor vehicles and insulation for airplanes.

Other gaps were also found in the assortment offered by the chemical industry that the plant could fill. But this is the task for the future. For now, output growth rates are only 75 percent of last year's. The enterprise got no subsidies for converting production.

Yan and his team are making a desperate effort to keep afloat. But tomorrow, the State Committee for Agricultural Chemicals may well ask them sternly where those chemicals have gone. They are still in the plan, the authorities never told the plant to stop producing them and they may now ask for them.

"There is no way back," said G. Yan definitively. "We are not going to restructure production again."

One out of four Navoi residents works for the mining and metallurgical combine. This giant's property extends far beyond the city line, to places hundred of kilometers from Navoi, to mines in the republic's desert. The rumor has it that the enterprise is fabulously rich. Its influence in this area is boundless. The local USSR people's deputy is none other than Nikolay Ivanovich Kucherskiy, the NGMK director. Then conversion struck. On the one hand, there were cuts in the defense industry and, on the other, cutbacks in the nuclear energy program. Uranium extraction is being cut. It is not happening at the same catastrophic rate as in the case of the chemical plant: the NGMK has two or three years to convert. But on the other hand, the losses the NGMK is suffering are no less impressive in absolute terms. The idea is the same: it is on its own when it searches for solutions and partners and tries to retrain its staff. What does the enterprise intend to do in the future?

"We plan to unveil many new lines," said N. Kucherskiy. "We will open a shop to make jewelry worth R200 million-to-R250 million a year. We plan to open a plant to process sheepskins: Uzbek desert regions lack slaughter houses and processing plants. Our production

will go to the republic, to its plan and stores, and our taxes will contribute to its budget.

This strong and rich enterprise will easily survive the storm of conversion. The NGMK is even setting its sights on other struggling enterprises in Navoi. The rumor has it that it has signed an agreement with "Navoiazot" to jointly produce goods from nitron. Maybe one day the combine will take over its neighbors who by then will be weakened by their struggle for survival. The combine is strong.

There can be no question that the defense industry giant is in a better shape compared to other enterprises in the city. It can afford to spend enormous sums to develop new lines and buy advanced technologies and equipment, even from abroad.

Circumstances conspired to make Navoi the testing ground for a large-scale experiment. It would be a sin not to profit from its experience.

Soon, when the state will stop financing or purchasing the output of many enterprises, even civilian enterprises will have to restructure their production. Will monopolies controlling our economy allow them to do so? It turns out that it is much easier to restructure within the confine of one's old industry, without invading others' territory.

Other troubling trends have been identified, such as the voluntary withdrawal of superior entities from the plants' struggle for survival. At the top, they found a very convenient role for themselves, that of tax collectors. What will happen when, starting next January, ministries will be made regulators of the economy? Once again, without owning anything, they will be asked to manage. This is because the state will delegate to them all of its property rights while remaining the actual owner of all property.

The experience of conversion gives much food for thought. Our future greatly depends on how well we will use these lessons.

### Future of DOSAAF Questioned

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pp 22-23

[Article by A. Anokhin, chief of Mass Organizational Work and Military Patriotic Education Directorate of USSR DOSAAF Central Committee: "DOSAAF or a Union of Societies?"]

[Text] Participants of the 5th USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum unanimously advocated radical restructuring in the Defense Society. This is also the general mood in its organizations. Unfortunately, the measures planned by the Society's 5th Congress have not resulted in an increase of mass defense work.

Up till now, a significant portion of the workers and young people, including those of pre-conscription and conscription age, just join DOSAAF. It is increasingly obvious that the leading defense collectives of many enterprises, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and educational institutions are also poorly organized. Their initiative is constrained by old structures and by obsolete regulations and instructions. The work style of the majority of DOSAAF Committees has essentially remained as before—command-administrative with all of the consequences ensuing from it. DOSAAF collectives frequently do not enlist the Society's activists in their work.

The quality of training for Armed Forces specialists is still low. The existing school manning system does not permit improvement of the training and education process. Issues of legal and social protection of conscripts have not been resolved in school and aviation organizations and little attention is being paid to cadet living conditions.

The weakness of sports and technical clubs and lack of development of Military and Technical Training Houses do not permit increased training of specialists of the massive technical professions and to attract the population to activities involving technical and applied military types of sport. The popularity of sports shooting is low and motocross, go-carting, and high-speed underwater swimming are being introduced slowly.

The system that has developed over long years of providing the same level of financial support to both well-run and poorly-run collectives has not provided any noticeable improvements in operations. The transition of DOSAAF Organizations to total cost accounting and self-financing is being slowing implemented and lease terms are being timidly introduced. In short, the conception of the Defense Society's perestroika that was developed by the 10th DOSAAF Congress has come into contact with real life and has begun to spin its wheels.

Where is the key to resolving the problems listed? First of all, we need to talk about changes in DOSAAF's organizational system. DOSAAF members at report-back election meetings and conferences, delegates of the

10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress, USSR People's Deputies from the Defense Society, and Society workers and activists at gatherings, seminars, and in the press have said a lot about the glaring disparity with today's demands. We do not think we have to repeat them here. Really just because we are once again calling black what is black does not mean that it will turn white. It is important for each of us right now to ponder these constructive proposals. In which areas is there already general agreement? In that we need to seek such a structure of the Society that will stimulate the flow of new detachments of workers and young people into its ranks and insure their active participation in mass defense work.

To do this, we propose simplifying the procedure for becoming a member of the defense patriotic organization. Both individual and group memberships will be permitted. At the same time, the frequency and sizes of entry and membership contributions is being set at defense collective general meetings and the collected assets and deductions of enterprises, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, institutions, organizations, and of individual citizens remain at the disposal of the appropriate organizations. According to a decision of the general meeting, they can also be partially transferred to the higher agency for creation of a fund to improve training and sports facilities. It seems that all of this already requires us to conduct replace membership cards, let us say, in 1991-1993 that will permit normalization and accounting of Society members.

It is very important to determine what we consider the foundation of the Defense Society to be. Orientation on leading organizations alone as is the case right now is also not entirely correct. Educational organizations, sports and technical clubs, technical circles and sporting sections, military patriotic associations, clubs for enthusiasts with various interests, sports facilities, production enterprises, shops, cooperatives established at work sites, study areas and living quarters of workers and young people fulfill various no less significant functions. In short, the most varied collectives whose activities meet the goals and missions of the Defense Society may be the foundation. At the same time, it is important not to look for discrepancies that have developed in our structure but to develop a basis for cooperation. The associations themselves must independently select their internal system and direction of operation.

We need to particularly carefully approach reorganization of raygorkomites [rayon city committees] that occupy a special place in the Society. They have direct contact with leading organizations and operate in the very thick of life. We need to afford them the right to determine their own staff composition. Their activities, to a greater degree than right now, must be built on social foundations, the broadening of democracy, glasnost, criticism, and self-criticism, and the development of initiative and businesslike activity.

The question currently being actively discussed within the Society is the advisability of transforming DOSAAF USSR from a centralized organization into a Union of societies and organizations that promote the strengthening of the nation's defense and where the interests of the Union as a whole and of each organization that is a part of it on an equal basis would be combined on a common ideological platform. These can be both union republic collectives and also various other societies and associations right up to informal unions. At the same time, the Union will assume the legal defense of their interests in state and social organs, and aid in providing training, sports, and other facilities, and with material and financial resources.

From a managerial point of view, the center will not have any special rights with regard to their regional formations. The latter are totally independent in their activities just like the small organizations that are part of them.

To lead the Union, we propose formation of a Central Council of Societies and Organizations that promote the nation's defense and in the republics—Central Councils of Republic Organizations. Kray, oblast, district, city, and rayon committees will be transformed into their respective councils.

We certainly are not talking about a mechanical replacement of one organ by another. The interrelationship of the center and local organs will be constructed in an entirely different way. In our opinion, The Central Council must guide the Union's organizations, develop program guidelines for all types of their practical activities and instruct and inspect; and, coordinate with state organs, social, defense, and sports organizations of foreign countries and organize all-union and international activities along various directions of activity. Furthermore, carry out training of workers and young people for military service; engage in the selection, placement, training, and education of personnel; and, establish and distribute a reserve fund of financial and material assets.

We need to carry out all-union referendums in order to consider the opinions of Union members while resolving important issues of their activities. It is advisable to also change staff functions and to completely subordinate it to elected organs. And it is best of all to conduct elections of councils and auditing commissions of all levels on an open alternative basis. In general, we need to ponder the establishment of a single, independent, open monitoring and auditing service and system the subordination of lower auditing commissions to higher ones. In required situations, their staffs will be strengthened at the expense of staff workers of other services.

As for Central Councils of Republics, they can be afforded the right, based on their common tasks, to independently solve issues of mass defense and sports activities, including determination of the name of republic organizations and adoption of their charters.

I will allow myself to express two more basic opinions in connection with the determination of the councils' functions. First is the need to guide their activities through the Party just like it has been throughout the Society's entire history. Second is the preservation of the right for the Union of Societies and Organizations to legislative initiative, the right to propose their variations for solving problems of mass defense work in the nation and to seek their realization through the organs of power.

As for the trends of the Society's work, in our opinion we need to preserve the currently existing forms and methods while substantially renewing their content. We assign priority to the following: Active participation together with other state and social organizations in the military patriotic education of workers and young people; training of young people for service in the USSR Armed Forces and training conscripts for military technical specialties at educational organizations; training personnel of mass technical professions; and, development of technical and applied types of sport. Here along with ministries, departments, and other social organizations—the development of independent technical creativity of citizens of the USSR, first of all of young people; and, active cooperation of organs of civil defense; and, broadening and strengthening cooperation with defense and sports organizations of fraternal socialist countries and establishing ties with sports organizations of capitalist and developing countries.

The primary proposals directed at the improvement of mass organizational, military patriotic, educational, and sports work, improvement of training facilities, and development of financial management activities are grouped in USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum Resolution 5 (1989).

The Plenum decreed the establishment of an All-Union Defense Society Conference in December 1990 with the right to amend the charter, the organizational and staff structure, and managing organs.

We proposed election of delegates to the conference at DOSAAF Central Committee Plenums of union republics and RSFSR DOSAAF kray and oblast committees. At the same time, delegates from USSR DOSAAF kray and oblast organizations will be provided with the power to establish a Russian Federation Defense Organization. The prescribed representation standard will be one delegate for each 250,000 members of the Defense Society based on dated accounting data as of 1 February 1990; one delegate will be elected from organizations numbering fewer than 250,000 DOSAAF members. USSR DOSAAF Central Committee members, members of the Central Auditing Commission, and USSR People's Deputies from the Defense Society will be afforded the right to a deciding vote.

Approved: Commission (58 people)—for scientific and final development of the primary directions to deepen perestroyka and the activities of the Defense Society,

development of proposals and documents for the All-Union Defense Society Conference; an organizational committee (45 people)—to develop proposals to create an RSFSR defense organization. The Central Committee will implement efficient operational control of the organizational committee's activities.

A discussion of materials of the 5th Plenum of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee is going on right now in DOSAAF committees and in educational, sports and leading organizations and a lively and frank conversation has begun about deepening perestroika in mass organization, military patriotic, educational and sports work and improving the material technical base.

Posing the problem is basic, the prognosis is difficult, but we are talking about the fate of the Defense Society. All of this requires the organization's leaders and all members to admit their personal responsibility to develop specific proposals in the conception of perestroika. In the words of V.I. Lenin, we need to "think about verifying those steps ahead which we proclaim hourly, that we perform each minute, and we sometimes prove their flimsiness, unreliability, and incomprehensibility each second. Here, it would be most harmful of all to rush."

However, time is not waiting. We need to begin working on impending solutions without delay. The All-Union DOSAAF Conference being convened in December is tasked to adopt a proven and comprehensively thought out program on the organizational structure and content of the activities of the Defense Society under new conditions.

**FROM THE EDITOR:** Dear readers, we await your opinions and proposals.

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#### **Uzbek Council of Ministers Passes Resolution on Military Service**

90US0998A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS  
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 17 May 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the Uzbek Council of Ministers: The Uzbek Council of Ministers Has Adopted a Decree on the Induction of Citizens for Active Military Service"]

[Text] The Karakalpak ASSR Council of Ministers, the obispolkoms, the Tashkent Gorispolkom and the leaders of the enterprises, institutions and organizations have been instructed to ensure the fulfillment of the USSR Law on Universal Military Service.

It has been taken into consideration that by the decision of the USSR Ministry of Defense, in carrying out the call-up in the spring of 1990, there is to be an increase in the contingent for call-up for combat units from Uzbekistan and respectively the contingent for call-up has been

reduced for the military construction detachments of the USSR Ministry of Defense. The military construction workers inducted from the public will serve in the Red Banner Turkestan Military District.

The Karakalpak ASSR Council of Ministers, the obispolkoms and the Tashkent Gorispolkom are to pay particular attention to setting up special commissions with the involvement of the people's deputies and representatives of the social organizations in their membership for becoming acquainted with the conditions for service of the personnel called up from Uzbekistan into the military construction detachments, regardless of their disposition. From the results of the work, when necessary, the commissions will submit proposals to the Uzbek Supreme Soviet and the Uzbek Council of Ministers on the possibility of the further service by personnel called up from the republic in the designated troop units.

The republic Council of Ministers has instructed the executive committees of the soviets together with the military commissariats and the public health bodies to provide high-quality selection for members of the induction commissions. Their membership is to include USSR and Uzbek people's deputies as well as deputies from the local soviets.

The induction commissions, the decree emphasizes, should pay particular attention to providing skilled medical certification of the inductees and strict observance of regulations concerning the providing of deferment from induction in accord with the law.

The decree notes the necessity of creating normal routine conditions for the inductees and for their relatives at the induction (assembly) points. Under agreement with the enterprises and public organizations, their representatives will accompany the troop trains with inductees.

Maximum attention and concern must be shown in receiving the servicemen dismissed from active military service and measures taken to provide jobs considering their specialty prior to induction and the one acquired during the period of service in the army.

#### **Commentary on the Decree**

You have been acquainted with an important decree which has just been adopted by the republic Council of Ministers.

During these spring days, thousands of young men, our sons and brothers will be returning home having honestly carried out their duty to the motherland. During their time of military service, they have grown strong physically, they have gained knowledge and experience, many have obtained a specialty and the best have been admitted to the party.

It is very important that the leaders of the soviet bodies, the enterprises, organizations, kolkhozes and sovkhozes as well as the parents show attention to finding jobs for

them and using them in accord with the specialty obtained in the army, create good housing conditions for them and assist in gaining admission to institutions of learning.

It is to be hoped that young energy from yesterday's servicemen, their experience and knowledge will bring tangible benefit to the labor collectives in improving production operations, in bettering the moral and psychological situation at the enterprises and institutions and bring tranquility and prosperity in the family.

In the spring the next induction has also been begun for active regular service. This is being carried out in a difficult time for the republic and for the entire nation. In line with the increase in the antiarmy attitudes, the question is being posed evermore acutely: Does our nation need armed defense? The answer is certain, yes, it does. For a person responsible for the destiny of the motherland and for a patriot, such a question has never existed and it does not exist now.

There is the different question of what are the conditions of this service, and can the parents be reassured about their sons who have gone into the army?

Regardless of the measures which are being taken, the army, unfortunately, still has many problems in providing proper amenities for the servicemen; in a number of subunits military discipline has weakened. The negative factors existing in the life and routine of the men, the instances of hazing, humiliating and the death of servicemen cause tension among the public and antiarmy attitudes. The state bodies, the public organizations and the mass information media in the republic more and more frequently have received letters about serious shortcomings in organizing military service.

The Uzbek President, the Uzbek Supreme Soviet and the republic government, the people's deputies and the representatives of the social organizations have repeatedly raised the questions related to the call-up of young men from Uzbekistan into the army, particularly into the construction units, to the nation's President, the USSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers as well as the permanent committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The republic government has seen to it that in the spring of the current year, the contingents have been increased for call-up into combat units and respectively the call-up for the military construction detachments has been reduced.

The young men from Uzbekistan will serve in construction detachments in the Red Banner Turkestan Military District.

Extensive organizational work has to be done in line with the call-up of the young men to active military service.

The soviet bodies and the leaders of the enterprises, institutions and organizations have been instructed to ensure the fulfillment of the USSR Law on Universal

Military Service and provide aid to the military commissariats in the prompt reporting of the inductees to the induction districts. The necessary amount of technical workers and transport is to be assigned to them for the time of the call-up.

There have been numerous complaints from citizens against the public health bodies which do not always provide a highly-skilled medical certification of the inductees and there have been instances of sending to the units young men who have health problems and in line with this greater responsibility now rests on the leaders of the public health bodies for the high-quality induction of young men into the troops.

Individual leaders of enterprises, organizations, institutions and schools together with the military commissariats do not always organize festive send-offs of the inductees with orders issued on behalf of the labor collectives, the parents, the war and labor veterans and the internationalist soldiers. Sponsorship ties are not established or maintained with the troop units where men called up from the republic are serving. The decree provides a fundamental improvement in this work and recognizes the advisability of having the executive committees of the soviets, with the agreement of the enterprises and social organizations, to use their representatives for accompanying the troop trains with the draftees to the place of service.

Special commissions involving the people's deputies and representatives from the social organizations will be set up to become familiar with the service conditions of men in the military construction detachments. This will make it possible to strengthen the ties with the troop collectives and promptly respond to the eliminating of negative phenomena and will help to improve the quality of service.

The leaders of the internal affairs and trade bodies are confronted with the task at the induction and assembly points and departure areas for the inductees to ensure high discipline and order and at these points organize the operation of buffets, tearooms, messes and trade in consumer necessities.

The organized call-up of the young men for active military service is a responsible task for all the republic soviet bodies and social organizations.

#### Estonian Legal Position on Draft Clarified

90UM0270B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA  
in Russian 27 Jun 90 p 3

[Letter by R. Tamme, chairman of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet Commission on Defense Matters: "To Those Who are Serving in the Army"]

[Text] Service in the army of the USSR is causing well-justified disquiet among residents of Estonia. The violence and trampling of human worth that reign in the military units are causing the main alarm.

Recalling the recent past, we must state that young people called up into the USSR Armed Forces have been forced to take part in anti-human acts, which in the meantime have been acknowledged to be political errors by the USSR Government: Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Afghanistan in 1979-1989, the armed clashes in the Caucasus, which continue even today.

The Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic, guided by the 30 Mar 90 decision "On the State Status of Estonia," on 11 Apr 90 approved the law, "On Service of Residents of the Estonian SSR in the USSR Armed Forces in the Transitional Period," which was published in the newspapers.

This law proclaims protection to inductees and military reservists who live on Estonian territory and refuse to serve in the USSR Armed Forces, who, in accordance with the USSR Constitution and the law "On Universal Military Obligation," must enter active service, or who served their time in the USSR armed forces, but are not excluded from the system of so-called assemblies. This same law rehabilitates those persons who, at the moment of its approval, were serving punishment for refusal to serve in the USSR Armed Forces or evasion of such service, as well as for evasion of training and inspection assemblies. This law is enforced only on Estonian territory, and extends to persons serving punishment in the Estonian Republic.

The Supreme Soviet Commission on Defense Matters learned that the erroneous opinion exists that the law also extends to those young people who are presently carrying out compulsory service, and for various reasons interrupted it outside of Estonia.

Paragraph 5 of the law of 11 Apr 90 states unambiguously that the subsequent procedure for them to carry out compulsory service, and the conditions for release from service, shall be determined by the government of the Estonian Republic, in coordination with the USSR Council of Ministers.

The USSR Government has not yet reacted constructively to the proposal by the Estonian Republic Government to begin negotiations on these matters. As a result of this, the cessation of service in the USSR Armed Forces is not yet regulated.

Based on this, protection by the organs of government of the Estonian Republic does not extend to those who deliberately interrupted their service in the USSR Armed Forces. We must take into consideration that the USSR military establishments, making use of their own laws and power, obviously will continue to forcibly detain runaways, so-called deserters. It should also be noted that executive organs of government subordinate to the Estonian Republic are not taking part in these actions.

Only those who left their military units (no matter where they were serving) due to a threat to their health and life, and only if physical and psychic trauma have been

established by an official commission of experts; i.e., cases of violence in the military unit have been documented, can count on legal protection. For this, the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet Commission proposed to the district and city soviets (letter 3/11-265 of 7 May 90) that a commission be created to assist inductees and compulsory service military personnel, consisting of a doctor, lawyer, psychologist, and military expert. The task of such commissions should include conducting immediate experts' inquiries of the physical and psychic state of persons who have left their military units, and, using the authority granted to them, deciding on each individual case. When necessary they should go to the military units, demand that those at fault be made to answer, and watch over the course of the investigation.

We recommend that our soldiers and their relatives report quickly and accurately cases of violence in military units. To do so, get in touch with the soviets at your place of residence, and the missions that they have created to assist inductees and compulsory service military personnel.

The Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet Commission will create the conditions necessary for local commissions to react quickly to these instances.

[Response by Col N. Ya. Redko, Estonian Republic deputy military commissar]

*Since this material affects directly the interests of military personnel carrying out active service in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces, the editors asked the leadership of the republic military commissariat to comment. Here is what Col N. Ya. Redko, republic deputy military commissar, stated:*

"We support in every way the assistance of various public organizations, associations, and collectives, and especially of parents, which they provide in the matter of improving the armed forces, stepping up their perestroika processes, and showing concern about the defenders of our country. Contacts between army and non-army collectives have expanded substantially of late, and are frequently constructive in nature and have a favorable influence on the microclimate in the military units and subunits.

"However, unfortunately there are numerous instances when the activity of various informal organizations confuses young people and their parents, and pushes the youth onto the path of conflict with existing laws. It costs the unit commands and political organs considerable efforts to restrain the youth from thoughtless deeds, so as not to allow a single still forming destiny to be ruined.

"As concerns the specific material, and it looks like a document, and is signed by the chairman of the Republic Supreme Soviet Commission, I must state the following.

"The Supreme Soviet Commission is not empowered to make such statements, since the questions they touch upon are not within the area of competence of the

commission. It is not a legislative organ, and in this case is replacing the functions of the legislature; i.e., the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic. As for military crimes, including absence without leave from the unit area, desertion and others, these questions are related to the area of competence of the USSR, and not the union republics.

"The creation of district and city commissions, and granting to them of authority to conduct examinations by experts, evokes at least amazement. In all existing legal norms this relates exclusively to the competence of organs of inquiry, investigation, and the court, which, with respect to military personnel, are the unit commanders, military procurators' offices, and military tribunals.

"Thus, the incorrectness of the statements contained in R. Tamme's material is obvious, and these statements will bring nothing but disorder and confusion to the minds of military personnel and their parents."

#### **Belorussian CP CC On Pre-Service Training**

*Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jul 90 p 1*

[Interview of Maj Gen V. Korotkov, Belorussian SSR military commissar, by Col A. Smolyanko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Program 'Youth'"]

[Text] The Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has examined the question of improving the preparation of youth for service in the USSR Armed Forces. Maj Gen V. Korotkov, Belorussian SSR military commissar, comments on the problem under discussion and the decisions that have been made:

"The fall callup has been completed successfully. There have been no refusals to enter military service. There are 650 universities of military-patriotic education, and 4,000 associations and clubs, operating in the republic.

They are visited by 35,000 youth. Ninety-six percent of the educational institutions have a modern base for military training classes.

"Can we be happy about this? No. Here is another, alarming, statistic.

"The number of crimes among youth is not declining. On 1 January of this year there are approximately 8,000 youth on the rolls of the militia who have had convictions, and the number of drug abusers is growing.

"Perestroyka of the system of initial military training and military and patriotic education is going slowly. The living conditions of cadets in the DOSAAF training organizations are unsatisfactory.

"The Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has levied major complaints against the mass media. Today one does not read in the newspaper, or hear on radio and television, such phrases as "defense of the homeland," "combat traditions of the army," and "international friendship."

"Under the conditions of the new situation and society, and the changes in the functions of the party, it is considered advisable to form unified socio-political centers of the Belorussian Communist Party obkoms, based on the Political Education Houses, the universities of Marxism-Leninism, and the retraining and skill enhancement courses for party, soviet and ideological workers. They are called upon to become strongpoints in mass political and cultural-educational work with the population.

"The Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has examined and approved the draft 'Youth' program, developed by the government. It calls for matters associated with the preparation of youth for army service. The program will be presented for examination and approval by the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet and, thus, will acquire the force of law."

**Dissatisfaction of Foreign Students With Frunze Aviation School**

90UM0496B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 7 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by A. Chelnokov: "Fly, 'Condors,' Fly..."]

**[Text] In January a group of cadets from a Latin American country refused to eat in the garrison mess hall. Hunger strike. The cadets were protesting against poor services in the Soviet Union.**

Everyone is familiar with this military post in the city of Frunze. It is described in official papers as an aviation school training personnel for the air forces of Asian, African and Latin American countries. This military school for foreigners, which has been in existence since 1958, is proud of its graduates, some of whom now occupy high positions. Representatives from over 34 countries of the world come here to learn to fly airplanes and helicopters of the latest designs and to service them. Naturally, not for free, and naturally, not for rubles—schooling is paid for in hard currency.

When I reached "Frunze-1" and was admitted, after a few formalities, through the checkpoint into the post, the first thing that caught my eye was the ramshackle hotel with its cracking plaster. Even the word "hotel" is something of an exaggeration. It is more a squalid dormitory, in which the long-rotted floors are breaking through, paint is blistering on panel walls, and invalid tables and chairs limp.

"The foreigners understand our difficulties," battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel I. Shkidin saw me staring at one of the "hotels." "They understand that we had been at war, that we are short on resources, and that we are having difficulty recovering from the years of stagnation."

"We understand all of that," an African cadet seconded the lieutenant colonel. "But nonetheless, the food in the mess hall is bad, and additionally there is often not enough dishware there."

"I was arrested several times in my homeland for disseminating literature on the USSR. After coming here and seeing everything with my own eyes, I realized that I had done so in vain, and that we cannot look at the Soviet Union as a model upon which to build a new society in our country—such is the opinion of representatives of the African National Congress."

"To me, your school is the best school of anticomunism. From this day forward I will tell my children and my grandchildren that socialism exists in the USSR only on paper," was what one person who had fought all of his life for the ideals of socialism said as he left the Soviet Union and his "Condor" group. (There was only one pair of flight boots in the "Condor" group for all of the cadets).

"Where does the money that our government pays for training go?"—This question came up in practically all discussions with the foreigners. "We have nothing to do with your problems, they are your own internal matter, but we have paid you money to solve all of our problems!"

The logic is murderous. It is difficult to oppose it with arguments concerning the Great Patriotic War or the civil war. Where does the money paid for services go? Alas, none of the school executives were able to answer this question.

"The situation we have here is this, you see," explained Colonel V. Belotskiy. "The contracts are signed by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, but the task is carried out by the Ministry of Defense, which gets nothing for its services."

One foreign officer recently declared that "training in the USSR is no longer prestigious, and when it comes to selecting candidates for training, the national command of my country usually creates the groups out of the most undisciplined, most poorly trained and unneeded people." This would be a good time to recall the fights, the improprieties, the girls, AIDS—phenomena local residents associate in their minds with "Frunze-1." Talking about the "prestige" of our school abroad, need we be amazed by the fact that foreigners coming to the Soviet Union are disdainful of everything Soviet, and that they show disrespect for criminal legislation? There are many examples of the exposure of illegal currency manipulations involving cadets, of knifings, and of other crimes....

Of course, not everyone comes to us with a prejudiced view. Many are fully resolved to fight for the ideals of a glorious future. But even in these cases we manage to shatter their convictions.

During summer vacation in the year before last the Kirghiz Komsomol Central Committee and the aviation school political department reached agreement to establish a student construction detachment to build housing for workers in Tokmak. The Komsomol promised the cadets that this was a profitable undertaking. But when the "volunteers" learned that the wages were to be 30-40 rubles, they refused to accept this money.

"Our labor was utilized in poorly-paid, dirty jobs. Some of our cadets did the same kind of work in South Africa. Let me assure you that the racists paid us more...."

So that's the way it is. As I wander through the post I see majors and lieutenant colonels grooming the territory with rakes and shovels, and I see the smirks on the passing cadets, in whose countries even a lowly lieutenant is already someone important.

"But what is to be done?" the senior officers shrug their shoulders. "We've been asking the command for at least

a service company for a long time already, but with no results. No one gives a thought to the special kind of work we do!"

There is one other problem. Twelve AIDS virus carriers from different countries have been revealed in the school since 1987. Ninety Soviet citizens are known to have come in contact with them. But that's only the ones we managed to register.

There is a USSR Ministry of Defense order according to which all foreigners attending our military schools must be tested for AIDS within a 10-day period. This is easy to do, because most cadets are accommodated in Moscow for the first days of their stay in the Soviet Union. But testing begins when the cadets reach their place of study. There is a laboratory that runs AIDS analyses on blood in the Kirghiz SSR, but it is intended for the civilian population, and moreover, it is converting to cost accounting, such that it would hardly be within the means of "Frunze-1." And if the reaction of a cadet who is tested turns out to be positive, the analysis is sent to Moscow for confirmation. This takes a month and a half or two months as a rule. During all this time the cadet lives far from a monastic way of life: The supply of entertainment significantly exceeds the demand of the visitors. The AIDS virus carrier should be placed into isolation, but according to both officers and physicians, complete isolation is impossible to ensure for even two weeks at "Frunze-1."

There are frequent cases in which foreigners absolutely refuse to be tested—the aviation hospital does not have disposable syringes. The hospital is supposed to receive 100 persons at a time, but even in a pinch the doctors cannot accommodate 60.

"Well, what do you expect?" Lieutenant Colonel Shkidin irritably lit a cigarette. "Our school is but a small reflection of what is occurring in the country. It's embarrassing, of course, but...."

Yes, it is embarrassing for the country. Especially when you read official papers such as this: "The air force chief of rear services of a certain African country unsuccessfully tried to persuade the Soviet command of the need to improve the quality of aviation specialist training, fearing that the airplanes his country was purchasing would be lost in the first aerial battles. He asserted that after four years of training in the USSR, a pilot requires a minimum of another five years before he is fully ready to engage in aerial combat." As an example, while in English military institutions of higher education a cadet clocks 500-1,000 hours of total flying time, in our country a cadet clocks 100-150 hours. Need we be amazed after this that people in only third- and fourth-rated groups are sent to the USSR for training as military pilots, despite the fact that helicopter pilot trainees must be in not less than the second-rated group, not to mention fighter pilot trainees, which must be in the first group.

The officers feel that if they were allowed to select students, there would be no problems. But the entire misfortune is that the people making the selection often do not even know what they are selecting applicants for, and why. Hence the absence of exactingness. Applicants are not subjected to strict selection by Soviet specialists in relation to general educational level, at the same time that American representatives select students with at least a 12th grade education. The result is this: In 1987 graduates of Soviet institutions of higher education were involved in 13 air crashes, while students from the USA were not involved in a single one.

An ownerless, impoverished school is called upon to train pilots and friends of our country. But alas, this is not happening.

**Brezhnev's Role as War Hero Deflated**

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[Article by Roy Medvedev: "In the Second Echelon; L.I. Brezhnev During the War Years"]

[Text] In May 1981, on the slopes of the Dnieper in Kiev, an enormous memorial complex was opened ceremoniously on the history of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. At a large meeting on the occasion of the opening of the complex, L.I. Brezhnev who had come specially to Kiev on this occasion gave a speech. Among the numerous structures and halls of the memorial, the attention of all the visitors was drawn to the marble slabs set up in the halls of the museum and on which, following the example of the St. George's Hall in the Kremlin, there were inscribed the names of 11,613 soldiers and 201 rear workers who during the war years had been awarded the honorary titles of Hero of the Soviet Union and Hero of Socialist Labor.

Among the guests in Kiev at that time were many veterans who found their own names on the marble slabs. One of the veterans who told me about the events of those days could not conceal his indignation. It was hard for him to locate the names of many famous military leaders on the marble slabs when they had received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union just once. Somewhere in 98th place in the list he found the name of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Generalissimo Stalin who was twice Hero of the Soviet Union but, according to the alphabet, had been placed at the end of the list of the 104 twice Heroes of the Soviet Union. On the marble slabs they had inscribed the names of the three thrice Heroes, including the famous pilots A. Pokryshkin and I. Kozhedub. The same list was headed by the two 4-time Heroes of the Soviet Union, Marshal G.K. Zhukov and Leonid Illich Brezhnev, who, according to the alphabet, was first in the long list of Heroes. However, my veteran friend was well aware that while G.K. Zhukov had received his fourth title of Hero after the war, but still for military accomplishments, Brezhnev had received all his honorific titles of Hero of the Soviet Union many years after the war, and the same held true for the Order of Victory and even the presentation weapon, a decoration used chiefly during the years of the Civil War and not the Patriotic War. Moreover, all the veterans were well aware that Brezhnev during the war years had essentially not excelled in anything.

**On the Southern Sector**

As is known, the first period of the Patriotic War developed unsuccessfully for the USSR. The German offensive was carried out quickly along all fronts. Even at the beginning of July, German aviation began bombing Dnepropetrovsk. The population and enterprises were evacuated through the city and oblast from the Western oblasts of the Ukraine. Soon thereafter there began the evacuation of the main enterprises of Dnepropetrovsk itself. L.I. Brezhnev had a military specialty and

requested that he be dispatched to the front. In mid-July 1941, he was sent to the staff of the Southern Front. Soon thereafter, Leonid Illich was appointed the deputy chief of this front's political directorate. The Southern Front was hurriedly organized in the summer of 1941 on the basis of the troops and the military structure of the Odessa Military District. It included the 9th and 18th Armies and the IX Separate Rifle Corps. Both the command of the front and the military situation changed rapidly, however during the first months of the war the Southern Front defended itself successfully and stubbornly and the troops retreated to the east while engaged in fighting more slowly than on the western sector. Here there were not many German divisions. Only by the end of July 1941 did the troops of the Southern Front retreat behind the Dniester.

In August, the front was approaching the Dnieper and Dnepropetrovsk which had come under fierce artillery shelling. At the end of August, the front in an organized manner retreated behind the Dnieper, having organized the separate Maritime Army for the defense of Odessa. The Germans took Dnepropetrovsk. Soon thereafter the adjacent Southwestern Front almost completely collapsed. The Nazis were able not only to take Kiev but also captured hundreds of thousands of officers and soldiers.

The Southern Front avoided this fate. Its troops retreated to the east, stubbornly defending the Donbass during all of October and blocking the approaches to Rostov-na-Donu. The Germans pushed forward trying to reach the Caucasus. In a short period of time, they succeeded in capturing Rostov, but in the course of the Rostov Offensive Operation, one of the first in the Patriotic War, the troops of the Southern Front under the command of Gen Ya.T. Cherevichenko were able to defeat the assault group of German armies and liberate Rostov. The Nazis were thrown 60-80 miles back from the city and for several months the fighting assumed a protracted positional nature.

L.I. Brezhnev also took some part in all these events, in receiving in his transfer to military service a rather high title or, more accurately, rank of brigade commissar. On his gorget patch at that time we see a single diamond. We can see this also in a photograph published in the 5th volume of "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [History of World War II]. It was precisely Brezhnev who along with Grushev directed the evacuation of the main defense industry installations in Dnepropetrovsk. A portion of the installations, including the bridge over the Dnieper, had to be blown up, and this was to have negative consequences for both Brezhnev and Grushev. With the introduction of the new standard ranks in the army at the beginning of 1943, a brigade commissar could be given the rank of major general or colonel. L.I. Brezhnev, as is known, became a colonel and this clearly shows that the military or the military-political leadership did not have the best opinion of him. Simultaneously, Brezhnev was reduced in his position, from deputy chief of the front

political directorate to the chief of the political department of the 18th Army and he spent basically the entire remaining portion of the war in this position. According to the evidence of D.A. Volkogonov, the Regimental Commissar of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] Political Directorate Verkhovubov, in inspecting political work in the 18th Army, commented not only on the loyalty of Brig Commissar Brezhnev to the party of Lenin—Stalin, but also wrote in the recommendation drawn up by him: "He avoids hard work. The military knowledge of Comrade Brezhnev is very poor. He settles many questions as an economic worker and not as a political worker. He is not even-handed with others and is inclined to have favorites."

At the beginning of 1942, Stalin ordered the Soviet Army to go over to an offensive on all fronts. This order was also received by the troops of the Southern Front which had been worn down in the autumn and winter fighting. The front did not have advantages over the Germans either in the number of troops or weaponry, however our units were better prepared for war under winter conditions and they were fighting on Soviet territory. In January-February 1942, the Southern Front was under the command of R.Ya. Malinovskiy. At that time, he was well acquainted, naturally, with the army commanders but at that time he had not even met L.I. Brezhnev. Good relations between Brezhnev and Malinovskiy, now marshal of the Soviet Union, were established only at the beginning of the 1960s.

The main operation of the front was at that time the so-called Barvenkovo-Lozovskaya Operation carried out jointly with units of the Southwestern Front. Our troops breached the enemy defenses, they advanced some 90-100 km and captured operational staging areas from which it would be possible to launch strikes into the rear and flanks of the Donbass and Kharkov enemy groupings. Although the Southern Front did not carry out all of the tasks posed for it, the operations conducted by it were viewed affirmatively by Headquarters. Many commanders, soldiers and political workers were decorated. Precisely for participation in the Barvenkovo-Lozovskaya Operation, L. Brezhnev was awarded his first order, the Order of the Red Banner.

However, the vicissitudes of war are tricky. After a brief lull in the fighting, the troops of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts received orders to conduct a new offensive operation. The troops of the two fronts began a major offensive on 12 May 1942 in the aim of liberating Kharkov and creating conditions for a further offensive to Dnepropetrovsk. This operation ended in a complete defeat. Although the Soviet troops breached the front and advanced some 20-50 km, the German divisions succeeded in reaching the rear of the assault grouping of the Southwestern Front and encircling it. After fierce fighting, only around 20,000 men were able to break out of the encirclement.

We do not know where Col Brezhnev was and what he was doing during these alarming months of defeat and

retreat. Many of those who had been involved in the unsuccessful Kharkov Operation were reduced in rank. R. Malinovskiy became the commander of the 66th Army and only in February 1943 was he again appointed the commander of the Southern Front. Brezhnev was transferred to the Caucasus and appointed the deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Black Sea Troop Group of the Transcaucasus Front and this group participated in the fighting for Tuapse as well as Novorossiysk. In the spring of 1943, he was appointed the chief of the political department of the 18th Army. Until just before, this army had been under the command of A.A. Grechko and with whom Leonid Ilich was to establish the closest relations later. But Grechko had shortly before been replaced by Gen K.N. Leselidze.

#### Chief of a Political Department

To judge from the official Brezhnev biography, one would have to conclude that the chief of a political department was always the second man in the army. This was not the case. During the first year of the war, the forms of political administration in the Soviet Army underwent significant restructurings several times, but by the end of 1942, they had assumed a permanent character which lasted until the war's end. The "military council member" was the main political leader in the army and in the front and he was approved directly by the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee and was considered to be the main representative of the party in military leadership. The army commander, the chief of staff and the military council member took all major decisions and were responsible for the fate of the army or the front. The military council member, a political worker, was considered the second man in an army and he took obligatory participation in working out the operational plans and was sometimes called the "first member of the military council." Thus, in 1943, Maj Gen S.Ye. Kolonin was the military council member of the 18th Army, with Col L.I. Brezhnev directly subordinate to him. In addition to these individuals, participating in the work of the military council were the deputy commanders and commanders of the combat arms but not the chiefs of the political departments.

The political departments of the armies directed the work of the party and Komsomol organizations, the agitation-propaganda work, the army press, the preparation of award documents and so forth. The political department did not participate in working out military plans. In its work an army political department reported to the army military council and to the front political directorate as well as to the army commander. Party and Komsomol meetings were conducted under the leadership of the political departments in the army units and new party members were also admitted. Often Brezhnev personally presented party cards to soldiers and officers joining the party.

Generally speaking, Brezhnev's career as the chief of the political department of the 18th Army was not too

conventional. The military council members of this army were changed. The army commanders were also frequently changed. But in 1942, 1943 and 1944, Col L. Brezhnev remained the chief of the political department of the 18th Army. Brezhnev had been "forgotten" not only in terms of the new appointments and ranks but also as far as decorations. When the workers of the political departments prepared the award lists, the army political workers were not forgotten. The political department of the 18th Army was no exception in this regard. But someone higher up constantly crossed off the name of Brezhnev on the promotion and award lists, and this affected his self-esteem. Aside from the Order of the Red Banner, about which we have already spoken, in the remaining three years of the war, Brezhnev received just three orders, another Order of the Red Banner, the Order of the Red Star and the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitskiy introduced in 1943 upon the proposal of N.S. Khrushchev for the participants in the liberation of the Ukraine.

Only at the end of 1944 did Col Brezhnev receive the next rank of major general. He was also appointed the chief of the Political Directorate of the Fourth Ukrainian Front which had just completed military operations on the territory of Czechoslovakia. During the Victory Parade in June 1945, when Maj Gen L.I. Brezhnev was walking with the commander at the head of the column of his front, on Brezhnev's chest there flashed only four orders and two medals, much fewer than any other general who had fought from the beginning to the end of the war.

But let us return to the fate of the 18th Army. After the end of the war and particularly in the 1970s, much more was said and written about this army in the Soviet press than any other. Left in the shadows were the combat feats of many glorious armies, including those which during the war had received the honorific of guards. In several cities of the nation, museums were even opened devoted exclusively to the 18th Army.

The first such exhibit appeared in Baku, although there were many other armies which had played a much more important role in the defense of Baku, the ultimate aim of the Nazi offensive in the Northern Caucasus. The initiator for setting up such a museum had been Geydar Aliyev who headed the republic Communist Party in the 1970s. At the same time, the campaign record of the 18th Army was not marked by any particular victories and it did not participate in the decisive engagements of the Patriotic War.

At the end of 1942 and for virtually all of 1943, the 18th Army fought as part of the Northern Caucasus Front which was initially under the command of Col Gen I.I. Maslennikov and later Col Gen I.Ye. Petrov. In 1943, the 18th Army participated in the so-called Krasnodar Offensive Operation.

This operation commenced in February 1943. According to the plan of Headquarters, the Northern Caucasus Front was not only to defeat the strong Krasnodar enemy

grouping, but also surround and destroy it, preventing the retreat of the German troops into the Crimea. At the same time, the front was to defeat the enemy in the area of Novorossiysk and liberate this city. The Soviet armies, however, still did not possess sufficient forces for carrying out the tasks fully. As a result of fierce fighting, Krasnodar was liberated and the Northern Caucasus Front advanced 60-80 km to the west of the city. However, they were unable to cross the powerful defensive line which had been erected here ahead of time. For this reason, both the Taman Peninsula and Novorossiysk remained in German hands for another several months.

#### Malaya Zemlya

In preparing for the Krasnodar Operation, the command of the front decided to conduct an important diversionary action. While the main forces were preparing for an offensive against Krasnodar, the Black Sea Fleet during the night of 4 February and then on 5-9 February was to land 15,000 soldiers with artillery and tanks to the south of Novorossiysk in the area of Myskhako. They were to capture a small beachhead, creating numerous difficulties for the enemy. However, further events developed not according to plan as envisaged by the front command and Headquarters. The offensive of our main forces was stopped and then deferred for a long time. The beachhead on Myskhako remained cut off.

Here for an offensive there were too few forces but the defense of the beachhead required great effort. The capturing of the beachhead was, in essence, only a portion of the previously planned major landing operation. The basic landing force was to capture the area of Yuznyye Ozereyki and deploy major forces here. The landing on Myskhako was conceived of only as an auxiliary one. But because of a storm and errors by the fleet, it was impossible to land the main force, while the auxiliary one under the command of Maj Kunikov was able to dig in on a section some 4 km along the front and 2 1/2 in depth. It was this sector which was later called "Malaya Zemlya" [Little Land]. The auxiliary landing was thus turned into the main one. Initially, the landing group was organized from volunteers from the ships and the units of the Novorossiysk Naval Base. However, after the formation of the beachhead and its broadening to 30 km<sup>2</sup>, the front command decided to reinforce the units fighting on it with four rifle brigades from the 18th Army and several partisan detachments. The leadership of the landing force was assumed by the operations group of the 18th Army headed by Maj Gen A.A. Grechko.

The attempts by the Germans to push the landing force back into the sea were driven off. On Malaya Zemlya our troops created a strong defense and were able to maintain the beachhead until the beginning (in September 1943) of the so-called Novorossiysk-Taman Offensive Operation.

On the scale of the Patriotic War, the defensive fighting on Malaya Zemlya became just one of the many thousand similar operations. The Chief of the Political

Department L. Brezhnev did not take any part either in the planning or the carrying out of this operation. The official Brezhnev biography states that he "was frequently here (on Malaya Zemlya) and, as a rule, at moments when the situation became particularly difficult and the fighting reached high intensity.... During the difficult days of fighting, L.I. Brezhnev shared with the Malaya Zemlya fighters all the grief and joy, the hardship and difficulties of front life. His optimism, his ebullient energy and good cheer forced the soldiers to stand tall and straighten their shoulders. The landing troops knew him personally and in the noise and roar of fighting repeatedly heard his calm voice."

However, for a chief of an army political department, participation in fighting was not a duty but rather it was considered unnecessary and often even harmful, as his presence in the "thick of the fighting" could only impede the line commanders. During all 225 days of fighting on Malaya Zemlya, both the staff of the 18th Army and its political department were in relative security back on the mainland. As one can judge from the small book of "Memoirs" by Brezhnev entitled "Malaya Zemlya," he went to the beachhead just twice, once with a brigade of the party Central Committee and the second time for presenting the party cards and decorations to soldiers and officers. In the major documentary story by Georgiy Sokolov entitled "Malaya zemlya," the author of which, as is stated in the foreword, was all "seven long months in the thick of the fighting on Malaya Zemlya," we can find just two mentions of Brezhnev, a "thin colonel with heavy dark eyebrows." Certainly, even the rare trips to Malaya Zemlya involved a certain danger. As was described in 1958 by a former military correspondent S.A. Borzenko, "once the seiner on which Brezhnev was traveling struck a mine and the colonel was thrown into the sea, and the sailors fished him out unconscious."

In subsequent years, even this episode began to undergo very strange metamorphoses. In the publications on the battles on Malaya Zemlya, initially the fact disappeared that Brezhnev was picked up and raised onto the seiner unconscious. Later it would be possible to read that Brezhnev not only got himself out of the difficult situation, but also helped several weakened sailors get back on board.

A veteran from the 18th Army, A. Nikulin, not long ago in the newspaper ARGUMENTY I FAKTY wrote: "As a veteran of the 18th Army and on Malaya Zemlya from 14 February through 28 April 1943, until recently I have been constantly asked whether I had seen L.I. Brezhnev on Malaya Zemlya. No, I only learned in 1957 that he was the chief of the political department. In the book 'Malaya zemlya' much has been correctly written but there are lamentable exceptions."

"It is stated that any subunit could travel through the communications trenches. Possibly L. Brezhnev was led through the trenches but we crawled across the surface, using for shelter the folds in the ground and the craters of bombs and large-caliber shells of which, unfortunately,

there was no shortage. Firing positions and foxholes for the signal troops were set up in them. But it would have been impossible to dig a communications trench from a weapon to a signal foxhole either with a small or large shovel in the rocky ground and we did not have any other entrenching tool. In crawling along, I suffered a concussion from the shock wave from an exploding large-caliber shell and became a lifelong invalid in group II.

"Furthermore, the book describes that everyday life for the Malaya Zemlya troops was well organized and there was even a bathhouse which supposedly was the idea of L.I. Brezhnev. During the entire stay on Malaya Zemlya, we washed only in the torrential rains and bathed in the sea during the landing as well as when we were trying to recover some rice concentrate from a sunken ship. And we ate it, as the diesel vessel with food was hit by the Germans and sunk some 150 m from shore. That was in March and for three weeks we did not receive any food at all.

"One last thing: from the veterans of the 18th Army I learned that L.I. Brezhnev met only with political workers and others, such as I, the officers (and not to say the soldiers) never saw him.

"At present, on Malaya Zemlya and in other places where the 18th Army was fighting, they are removing everything related to the name of L.I. Brezhnev. In so doing they are destroying everything that is dear to the heart of each soldier from this army. Why must we cross out the mass heroic feats of thousands of Malaya Zemlya soldiers who gave up their lives for the motherland and have remained disabled?" A. Nikulin rightly asks. "There have been talks that Novorossiysk did not merit the title of Hero City and that the landing force did not play any role in the Great Patriotic War. That is not the case at all. Our landing force held this small clump of land some 30 km<sup>2</sup> in area for a period of 225 days, tying down significant Nazi forces which otherwise would have been used on other sectors of the front. And, finally, it must be understood that the landing operation was not planned by L. Brezhnev."

Of course, one can fully understand the vexation of veterans from the fighting on Malaya Zemlya. But one can also understand the dissatisfaction of other veterans when in the 1970s our press mentioned the fighting on this small beachhead almost more often than the fighting at Stalingrad, Kursk, Leningrad and Moscow, and certainly much more frequently than about the heroic defense of Odessa, Brest and Sevastopol. Falsification and the exaggerating of Brezhnev's role in the Patriotic War were carried out so flagrantly and unceremoniously that even in the book by Mar Zhukov "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" [Recollections and Reflections], its editor "upon advice from above" incorporated phrases mentioning Brezhnev, although in actuality G. Zhukov during the years of the Patriotic War did not even hear the name of Col Brezhnev. It is known, for example, that on 18 April 1943, G.K. Zhukov together with the People's Commissar of the Navy G.N. Kuznetsov and the

worker from the General Staff, Gen S.M. Shtemenko, visited the Northern Caucasus Front, where the offensive of the Soviet troops had somewhat slowed down and in a number of areas had halted. The representatives of Headquarters spoke with the commanders of the 18th and 56th Armies, K.N. Leselidze and A.A. Grechko. It must also be assumed that the question of the situation on Malaya Zemlya was also discussed.

But in the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov, we can read in line with this the following awkward sentence: "We wanted to seek advice about this with the Chief of the Political Department of the 18th Army, L.I. Brezhnev, who had been there repeatedly and knew the situation well but at this moment was on Malaya Zemlya where the heaviest fighting was underway." Only in the last edition of Zhukov's book was this sentence removed. It can also be pointed out that in the 12-volume "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny" Brezhnev's name is mentioned much more frequently than the names of many famous military leaders.

In the meanwhile, the conditions for resuming offensive operations arose in the Northern Caucasus only by the autumn of 1943. Only in September 1943 did the Northern Caucasus Front, now under the command of I.Ye. Petrov, prepare to carry out a final operation to liberate the Northern Caucasus from the Nazi troops. In the course of the heavy fighting which lasted over a month, the Soviet troops completely cleared the Taman Peninsula and liberated Novorossiysk. For participation in all these operations, many armies and divisions were given honorific designators. Col L.I. Brezhnev also received the medal For the Defense of the Caucasus and one other combat order.

As a result of ascribing various accomplishments to L. Brezhnev and for which he was not responsible, there probably arose the sarcastic joke that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin, having heard the report from his deputy G. Zhukov or chief of the General Staff on the plans for the next major operation would inevitably ask: Has this plan been approved by Col L.I. Brezhnev?

The "Brief Biographic Essay" is not too accurate in describing the Kerch Landing Operation in November-December 1943 and which actively involved the 18th Army. If one restricts oneself to this source, one may gain the impression that precisely the 18th Army was able to capture the main beachheads on the Kerch Peninsula and only in the final stage of the Kerch Operation was the Leselidze Army for unknown reasons shifted to another strategic sector, namely to the First Ukrainian Front.

#### New Acquaintances

Meetings at the front were brief but memorable. We have already written above about the acquaintance of L. Brezhnev with Maj Gen A.A. Grechko. This acquaintanceship could have continued after Grechko came to command the 56th Army and when he was appointed the deputy commander of the First Ukrainian Front. It can

be assumed that precisely in 1943, Brezhnev became acquainted with M.A. Suslov, the secretary of the Stavropol Party Obkom and who in 1943 headed the kray staff of the partisan movement and was also a member of the military council of the Northern Troop Group of the Transcaucasus Front. Probably in the Ukraine, Brezhnev became acquainted with A. Kirilenko who in 1940-1941 was the second secretary of the Zaporozhye Party Obkom and in 1942, the member of the Military Council of the 18th Army. The military roads of 1942-1943 undoubtedly brought together Brezhnev with the future Admiral S.G. Gorshkov who was the commander of the Azov Naval Flotilla.

Even during the days of the fighting on the small Eltigen bridgehead, the 18th Army was actually idle. At that time, the Black Sea Fleet did not have enough ships to build up the forces simultaneously on two beachheads and the units of the 18th Army could support their landing troops only by the fire of long-range artillery. Only individual vessels made their way with difficulty to the beachhead in order to deliver ammunition, food and evacuate wounded. But it was precisely at this time that a powerful offensive was being developed in the Ukraine by the Soviet troops. By a decision of Headquarters, the 18th Army was moved from the Northern Caucasus Front and shifted to the First Ukrainian Front. Gen N.F. Vatutin became the commander of this front. N.S. Khrushchev was the member of the front military council and L. Brezhnev was from now on subordinate to it. The front only recently had liberated the capital of the Ukraine, Kiev, and was now preparing not only to repel a German counterstrike but also resume the offensive to the west.

The 18th Army, along with the other armies of the First Ukrainian Front, took an active part in the so-called Zhitomir Operation conducted in December 1943-January 1944. As a result of this operation, the German Grouping South suffered heavy losses and many of the Ukrainian cities were liberated.

When there is a war, all its participants, albeit to a varying degree, subject their lives to danger. In the fighting in the Ukraine, the morally wounded Army Gen N.F. Vatutin perished. After a severe illness, the Commander of the 18th Army, Col Gen K.N. Leselidze, died. He was replaced in this post by Lt Gen Ye.P. Zhuravlev. And L.I. Brezhnev at times also came into dangerous situations. Once a rifleman was killed next to him. In December 1943, during an enemy counterattack, as group of German troops broke through to the Kiev Highway, and in repelling this breakthrough, workers from the political department also had to participate, including Brezhnev himself. Much later Leonid Illich was to write: "Without wasting precious seconds, I rushed to the machine gun. The entire world for me then narrowed to that narrow strip of land along which the Nazis were running. I do not remember how long everything lasted. Only one idea took possession of my entire being and that was to stop them!"

No witnesses have been found for this feat by the political department chief, and Brezhnev himself scarcely wrote the above-quoted lines in his own hand. Nevertheless, at the assumed place of this brief fight, some 45 years later an enormous monument was to be erected. It was put up on the outskirts of the village of Stavishche in Korostyshevskiy Rayon of Zhitomir Oblast. On the monument is the inscription: "Here during the night of 11-12 December 1943, the political department chief of the 18th Army, L.I. Brezhnev, fired a machine gun, repelling an enemy attack." In opening the monument generals and highly placed workers from the oblast and republic arrived at the previously unknown village. A mountain of flowers grew up around the monument. Later everything was made into enormous colored photographs and these were then presented to Brezhnev himself. I do not wish to dispute the very fact of the night battle and on the front there were many such episodes involving generals and not only colonels. However, the sentence that Brezhnev not only edited the army newspaper but also "with a submachine gun in hand stormed the German barracks" and which one can find in the Brezhnev biography published in West Germany is an obvious exaggeration.

In any event, the fates were kind to Brezhnev and in the entire war he did not sustain a single wound. In the course of the general offensive in the Ukraine, the Soviet Army reached the foothills of the Carpathians, and for the offensive across the Carpathians requiring special preparations, a new Fourth Ukrainian Front was established with Gen I.Ye. Petrov becoming the commander of this front. The 18th Army was also part of this front. The fighting in the Carpathians was exceptionally heavy but the Soviet troops were able to overwhelm the enemy and come out in Czechoslovakian territory. These battles were recalled by Gen P.G. Grigorenko in his book and he in the rank of lieutenant colonel and then colonel fought in one of the divisions of the 18th Army in 1944. Fighting next to the 18th Army was the Czechoslovak Corps under the command of Gen Ludvik Svoboda. Several friendly meetings were held between the Soviet and Czechoslovak officers, and at these Brezhnev and Svoboda also became acquainted.

Brezhnev also met repeatedly with the future dissidents, the Lt Col and then Col P.G. Grigorenko, the chief of staff of one of the divisions of the 18th Army. In his memoirs which were published in the United States and are now being prepared for publishing by the journal ZVEZDA, Grigorenko, in recalling these meetings, does not respond too favorably about Brezhnev, although, as in virtually all memoirs, those of P. Grigorenko bear the imprint of subjectivism.

"Everyone who got to know him more closely," Grigorenko wrote about Brezhnev, "viewed him as a simpleton who would not go far. Behind his back he was called Lenya, Lenchka, our political leader. I feel that such an attitude toward him has survived in his postwar life.... The meeting described by me with Brezhnev was not the first and not the last. But this was the only

instance when Brezhnev in my presence was so close to the forward edge (3 km). I say this not to condemn Brezhnev. Ultimately, in the army as well, as in life generally, each post has its duties. According to his position, Brezhnev was not required to be not only on the forward edge but also at the army command post. The military council member should be with the commander, that is, the superior of all the army political workers, including Brezhnev. The place of the political department chief was in the army second echelon, that is, where they kept the party documents. To travel to the troops to meet with the communists or generally with the personnel was required only when the men were not fighting. In combat the head of an army political department would only get in the way."

For participation in the battles for the liberation of the Ukraine, Brezhnev was awarded the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitskiy. At the end of November 1944, he was awarded the rank of major general. But only in mid-May 1945, was he appointed the chief of the Political Directorate of the Fourth Ukrainian Front. The troops of the front from January through May 1945 conducted a series of major combat operations in liberating Slovakia and the southern regions of Poland and the Moravian-Ostrava industrial region. Together with the troops of the First Ukrainian Front, the Fourth Ukrainian Front participated in the 1945 Prague Operation which concluded the war. And here, in Prague, Maj Gen Brezhnev greeted the end of the war.

Immediately after the end of the war, they began to cut back on the army and demobilize the older ages and a portion of the officers, including the political workers. However, Brezhnev remained in the army for another year. At the end of May, they began to break up a portion of the divisions and armies. The 18th Army was also broken up. Those staff workers who in 1945 were deciding which armies and divisions were to be kept and which broken up could not even imagine, of course, that so many articles and even museums would appear in honor of this army. Soon after the Victory Parade they began reorganizing the recent fronts into military districts. On the basis of the Fourth Ukrainian Front, the Carpathian Military District was formed and in it L.I. Brezhnev became the chief of the political directorate.

A significant portion of the officers and generals did not receive their former positions here. Some of them were transferred to serve in other military districts. Many generals and senior officers were admitted to study in various military academies. But a large number of military commanders and political workers was transferred to civilian and party work. The fate of the leading political workers was resolved jointly by the Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and the Personnel Department of the VKP(b) Central Committee. In August 1946, L.I. Brezhnev was sent to the Ukrainian CP Central Committee.

**1928: Treatment of Intra-Military Dissent**  
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[Article by Lt Col F. Kulik, candidate of historical sciences, and Lt Col N. Maslovskiy, graduate of the history department of the CPSU All-Union Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin: "Ten Years Before '37"]

[Text] Recollections of "intra-army opposition of 1928" are not to be found today in any military encyclopedic source. A minimum of information about it is contained in rare monographs and in memoirs. And yet, half a century ago the attitude toward this "opposition" necessarily reflected upon the characteristics of Red Army commanders and political workers, and not only the possibility of service in the army or membership in the party but also sometimes life itself depended on it....

There was more excitement than usual on 15 March 1928 in the massive five-story building housing the Military-Political Academy, a gray lump towering over Tuchkov's Quay. A big notice posted in the lobby reminded communists of an all-academy party meeting. If only the "Tolmachevtsy" (prior to 1938 the academy bore the name of Nikolay Guryevich Tolmachev, one of the Red Army's first commissars, who died heroically in combat against Yudenich) had known what aftershocks their meeting would create, how it was to impact their destinies....

The topic of discussion was something most troubling. Hard though it may have been to believe, the most shameful phenomena had penetrated into the young socialist army from the old, prerevolutionary one—falsification of reports, sergeant-majorism, physical abuse. As an example it was noted in November 1928 in a court session held in the Seventh Cavalry Division of the Belorussian Military District that "not a single review, not a single competition in which the division's units participated went on without falsification of reports." Moreover, this was done with the silent consent of Budenny, Timoshenko and others visiting the division. And as follows from an RVS [Revolutionary Military Council] order dated 27 October of that same year, such facts were becoming a widespread phenomenon.

Social and personal conditions remained difficult. Over half of the commanders, political workers and administrative workers did not have any housing. Things were descending to the absurd. For example it was reported from the Central Asian Military District that a number of commanders were forced to build tree-houses for want of a place to live.

In the first years following the civil war, the people did not complain about this, understanding that things were hard for the entire country. But now they perceived such facts as manifestations of callousness, and they attempted to protest against them. The forms of protest often assumed ugly forms in this case: drunkenness, suicide, refusal to carry out orders.... In comparison with

the same period of 1926-1927, just in the winter period of 1927-1928 the number of disciplinary infractions increased by 22 percent. Drunkenness became the most acute problem. According to data of PUR [Revolutionary Military Council Political Directorate] deputy chief I. Slavin, cited in March 1928, "40 percent of the all-army organization was in trouble for drunkenness."

This caused concern among most commanders and political workers, and it could not but cause them concern. But in many ways their energy was exhausted in efforts to clarify relations and reduce frictions in connection with the 1924 transition to one-man command. There were many different kinds of people. And not everyone accurately perceived the sole proper course for development of the armed forces.

Participants of the party meeting in the Military-Political Academy adopted a resolution which essentially said that all of the problems that had arisen could be resolved only through the cooperative joint work of commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations. On the condition of their open discussion at an all-army scale.

The "Tolmachevtsy" took their resolution to the Second All-Army Conference of Party Organization Secretaries, at which V. Orlov, their party leader, spoke: "The May directive of the PUR (1926) on one-man command is a fabulous thing. But officers met this directive with fixed bayonets." "The problem is that this May directive is being shoved down their throats. The experience of introducing one-man command shows that it is being pushed through too fast.... You're a commander, and a communist. So be a one-man commander as well. But they don't care if the individual is worthy of assuming the important position of leader of the unit's political life, and instead, they are mechanically creating a combined commander-communist and political worker out of an individual when he is not adapted for such work."

The question here is this: Was there something unique, something which other party organizations were not aware of in the proposals of the "Tolmachevtsy"? No. This was obvious from the fact that this problem was discussed at the Seventh Moscow Garrison-Province Party Conference of Military Cells, in meetings of active party members of the Kharkov garrison, in meetings of party organization secretaries of military educational institutions and formations of the Leningrad garrison, and in many other forums.

A conference of the higher political staff of the BVO [Belorussian Military District] on 23 May 1928 discussed this problem as well. After listening to a report from BVO political directorate chief M. Landa, the participants of the conference came to a conclusion similar to the one reached by communists of the Military-Political Academy. They concurrently brought up the matter of the insufficiently firm and clear leadership of the armed forces on the part of the RVS and the PUR and their leaders, K. Voroshilov and A. Bubnov. Here is

an important detail: Immediately following the BVO conference Landa forwarded its resolution to RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] PUR chief A. Bubnov, who initially assessed it as being completely loyal, and who did not even bring it to the awareness of the Revolutionary Military Council.

The lightning struck when the resolution was reported to K. Voroshilov. Convening executive political workers of the BVO and other districts on 9 June, he gave it, and the resolution of the "Tolmachevtsy" as well, a negative assessment.

What was it that evoked the anger of the chairman of the USSR RVS? Officially, communists of the VPA [Military-Political Academy] and the BVO were accused of supposedly speaking out against introduction of one-man command, causing division among commanders and political workers, and thus threatening the fighting capability of the Red Army. They were accused of failing to understand the changes that had occurred in mutual relations between commanders and political workers during the years of Soviet rule. The submitted resolutions were interpreted as an inability to surmount narrow local sentiments and to reach an understanding of the party-wide objectives dictated by the new conditions of military development.

From our point of view there was more rhetoric here than desire to adequately assess the position of the opponents. In fact, we believe that Voroshilov's sharp displeasure was the product of the categorical conclusion reached by the political staff of the Belorussian Military District—that the leadership being provided to the armed forces by the RVS and the PUR was insufficiently firm and clear, that it was faltering before the negative phenomena, and that it was trying to belittle their danger. This was a direct reproach against him, a member of the Politburo.

Feeling his oats, he immediately went over to the offensive, declaring: "You have made an unprecedented accusation against the leadership of the Red Army...; what you essentially want to say is that you are being led by people who need to be dealt with in a manner similar to the former opposition."

Today's reader might wonder why what they did—criticize their leaders—might be called heroic. However, we need to remember the situation of those days, when the appearance of a "military," a "workers'" or a "new" opposition in the arena of political confrontation was almost an annual occurrence, and when associating someone's name with the word "opposition" was not at all harmless.

Subsequent events confirmed this quite definitely. The country's RVS held an expanded meeting on 25-27 June 1928. I. Unshlikht, M. Tukhachevskiy, P. Baranov and a number of other RVS members insisted upon inclusion of a clause in their resolution condemning the position of VPA communists. As far as assessments of shortcomings existing in the army by the BVO political staff were

concerned, it was the conclusion of the Revolutionary Military Council that they "should be recognized as being politically harmful."

An October (1928) decision of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee made the condemnation of the point of view of the "Tolmachevtsy" and some political workers of the BVO a party-wide condemnation. And the 25 February 1929 Central Committee decree "On Commanders and Political Workers of the RKKA" clearly defined their position as the "intra-army opposition of 1928," with the support of the leadership of the RVS and PUR. A new accusation was added to the former ones—clannishness, attempts to organize an army-wide demonstration against the Revolutionary Military Council and the RKKA Political Directorate. Political organs of the army and navy received a directive requiring them to condemn "members of the opposition" wherever they were to be found.

The obvious question is this: Were their views really those of an opposition, were they really contrary in any way to the party line? Meticulous analysis of statements and actions of comrades, and of the party decisions of those days, provides the grounds for what in our opinion is a categorical conclusion: No, they were not, and they did not. Of course, if we were to be objective, we would have to recognize that there was some pessimism in the assessments, that there was inadequate purposefulness in the actions, especially of BVO political workers. We cannot ignore the fact that they did maintain a tight circle in some ways. They didn't even attempt to implement effective measures to eradicate the negative phenomena they were witnessing, at least on a district scale.

But was this really grounds for the leadership of the armed forces to undertake such serious countermeasures against the "opposition"? Probably not. Then what was the real problem? Why the tempest in the teapot?, the reader might ask. The answer, we believe, is hidden in the situation that began to evolve in the country and in the party as of the late 1920s.

We believe that communists of the VPA and BVO were specially selected by the ruling elite as targets in order to confirm a certain principle once and for all time, and make them understand that only the "elite" may see shortcomings, and criticize. The "rank and file" should only follow orders.

We will not be so bold as to assert that those who were accused of being in the "intra-army opposition" clearly recognized the perniciousness of current policy and associated it with Stalin specifically. In view of their official position, they had no bearing on formation of "big policy." But the fact that these communists continued to insist upon the Leninist traditions of collective, democratic discussion of the situation that had evolved in the army, and upon comradely criticism, irrespective of one's position, cannot be doubted. It was precisely

because of this that they fell into disfavor with the increasingly stronger Stalinist regime.

All weapons were put into play: demands for public repentance, indiscriminate public dishonor, a universal—army-wide—campaign to condemn the “opposition,” dismissal of its members from their posts, and arrests.

The absolute majority of army communists simply didn't understand the essence of that which they condemned so enthusiastically. It never occurred to them that all that communists of the Military-Political Academy and executives of the BVO were to “blame” for was criticizing shortcomings in the work of the executive staff, and for offering proposals to broaden the foundation of democratic principles in military development and to increase the role of party organizations—something which was beyond the comprehension of “the elite.”

Not all were able to withstand the first massed attack. On 7 December 1928 the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published an open letter by some former “Tolmachevtsy” who rejected their former position and appealed to their associates to follow their example. On 5 January 1929 (following a meticulous purge of the “opposition”), the collective of the Military-Political Academy met to condemn the 15 March resolution. In the new resolution adopted in regard to A. Bubnov's report, the spring action both in the academy and in the BVO was characterized as “an action against all of the party's military policy.”

A meeting of VKP(b) cells of the political directorate, headquarters and administration of the BVO also expressed “complete agreement with the assessment made by the VKP(b) Central Committee of the draft resolution submitted by some persons of the BVO higher political staff as being totally incorrect.”

The confessions of the “dissenters” were not enough for the administrative system, personified by executives of the Central Committee, the RVS and the PUR. A purge of their ranks began. PUR deputy chief I. Slavin, BVO political directorate chief M. Landa, Ukrainian Military District political directorate chief L. Degtyarev, Lenigrad Military District political directorate deputy chief Kuznetsov, VPA chief Ya. Berman, and many commissars and deputy commanders for political affairs of formations and units of several districts and academy instructors and students were dismissed from their positions.

In the late 1920s, when the pendulum of reprisals against dissenters had only just begun to swing, it might have seemed that the matter of the “intra-army opposition” was closed forever with its organized destruction. However, it was not until 10 years later that the fuse lit in

1928 wrecked its havoc. Statements by People's Commissar for Defense K. Voroshilov and RKKA political directorate chief L. Mekhlis served as a call to action by internal affairs organs. New, by far more malicious labels issued from the mouths of Stalin's henchmen—“anti-party, anti-army Belorussian-Tolmachev grouping.” Now, 10 years later, communists of the academy and political executives of the BVO, as well as all who had shared their views, were accused of Trotskyism, of right-wing leanings, of counterrevolutionary activity.... Everyone is aware today of what inevitably followed such assessments.

All among the participants of the 1928 events who were still in the armed forces at this time were dismissed from the army, and most were repressed. Today just in the Military-Political Academy we have established the names of around 180 persons who felt sacrifice to the repressions. Here are just a few of them: Yu. A. Alyakrinskiy, N. I. Vlasov, A. S. Kur, A. R. Medvedev, G. S. Tymanskiy.... The staffs of the departments of party history, political economics, party-political work, Marxist-Leninist philosophy and war history were practically completely “renewed.”

Voroshilov and Mekhlis (clearly with Stalin's instigation) not only artificially combined the “Tolmachevtsy” and political executives of the BVO into one “opposition” in order to impart to independent actions the nature of one large-scale action, planned ahead of time and led from a single center of conspiracy. They also directly associated the repressions in the Red Army with membership to the “Belorussian-Tolmachev opposition.” In his speech titled “Twenty Years of the RKKA and the Navy” Voroshilov noted that over a period of a number of years, “hardened traitors of the motherland” and “spies” such as Tukhachevskiy, Gamarnik, Yakir, Uborevich, Orlov, Kork and others “did everything they could to protect the former participants of the ‘anti-party Belorussian-Tolmachev grouping’: They concealed their counterrevolutionary work from the party, and portrayed them as innocently erring people.”

Today we know quite well the sort of monstrous fabrications to which Stalin's faithful “arms-bearers” resorted in order to discredit and belittle the prominent Soviet military chiefs named in Voroshilov's speech.

On 29 May of this year a commission of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo created to additionally study materials associated with the repressions that occurred in the 1930s-1940s and in the early 1950s established that the so-called intra-army opposition of 1928 did not in fact exist. It recommended examination of materials calling for legal and party rehabilitation of persons involved in this affair.

The truth must triumph.

**Iraqi, Israeli Missile Capability Noted**

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[Article by M. Mikhaylov: "Jericho", 'Shavit', and Others"]

**[Text] Proliferation of Nuclear Missile Weapons in the Near East**

A number of "Third World" countries already have or are on the threshold of developing their own nuclear missile weapons. This phenomenon is accompanied by exacerbation of relations between states, something which is especially characteristic of the Near East. Thus the persistent striving of Israel to build up its nuclear missile potential threatens an increase in Israel-Arab military confrontation.

More than 140 countries of the world have joined the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty. Possessed by nuclear ambitions, to this point Israel has not signed it. Thus it deliberately maintains an equivocal position with respect to its nuclear status. According to reports from the foreign press, work to create and develop nuclear potential has been carried out in Israel for roughly twenty years. The nuclear reactor at Dimona (Negev Desert) is capable of developing 20-40 kg of weapons-grade plutonium a year, which is sufficient for the production of 5-8 nuclear munitions. At the present time Israel may have more than 100 nuclear munitions. The achieved technological level and information received from various capitalist countries on the design and results of testing of nuclear explosive devices frees Israel of the need to conduct its own testing.

The Dimona reactor, which is not under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], is a heavy-water reactor operating on natural uranium. It is thought that Israel might acquire this material from Argentina, South Africa, Belgium, France, and other countries. Heavy water, which is a neutron decelerator, was purchased abroad, including from the U.S. and Norway. According to estimates of western specialists, Israel now has the necessary potential for independent production of reactor fuel and heavy water in quantities sufficient to maintain operation of the nuclear reactor.

In addition, at the Dimona research center there are two units for chemical refinement of irradiated fuel. The first unit, of the laboratory type, was constructed with the help of Great Britain. The second, more powerful, is a source of weapons-grade plutonium, and was constructed with the help of France. It makes it possible to produce from 15 to 40 kg of fissionable plutonium a year.

Israel has mobile surface-to-surface missile systems to deliver the nuclear munitions to their target. The single-stage solid-fuel ballistic missile "Jericho-1," with a range of 450-550 km, was developed using the technology of the French "Avionics Marcel Dassault" company. Israel

has around 160 Lance missiles (range up to 120 km) supplied by the U.S. In 1987 flight tests were begun on the new Jericho-2 missile system developed by the Israelis, with a range of around 1,450 km. American technology was used to develop the most important assemblies and systems.

A two-stage Shavit launch vehicle was developed on the basis of the Jericho-2 missile, and was used to launch the Ofek-1 and Ofek-2 artificial earth satellites into low near-earth orbits in September 1988 and April 1990 respectively. Their orbits were chosen so that the satellites would pass over territories of Arab countries bordering Israel at minimal altitude, which is very important, since according to the data of western specialists they are designed to collect reconnaissance information.

In this regard, the idea was put forward in the Arab world of developing their own military space potential in retaliation. But soon it became clear that launching an Arab military satellite into space was a very complex task. The possibility of acquiring a missile strike potential through purchase of missile complexes abroad, or development of their own missiles, was admitted to be more feasible.

Iraq, which has no small experience in the use of missiles in the course of armed conflict with Iran, is considered the most advanced in this field. Iraqi specialists have been able to increase the range of fire of missiles purchased abroad by modernizing them. The "Al-Hussein" operational-tactical missile, with a range of fire up to 600 km, was used to bombard Teheran and other Iranian cities. The "Al-Abbas," with a range of fire of 900 km, was tested in 1988. Specialists of Argentina, the FRG, and other countries participated in modernization of both missiles. The Tammuz-1 ballistic missile, with a range of fire of 2,000 km, is being developed on the basis of the Argentine-West German missile Kondor-2 (in Arab countries it is known as the "Badr-2000"). It can be equipped with a high-explosive fragmentation or dispenser warhead with fragmentation or chemical submunitions.

Iraq is conducting intensive development of launch vehicles designed to orbit artificial earth satellites, including for military purposes. Within the framework of this program, in Dec 1989 a test launch of the "Abed" launch vehicle was performed at the Al-Aibar range. It was developed on the basis of local and foreign technology, and is capable of putting satellites with a mass up to 150 kg into low near-earth orbit. The purpose of the launch was to demonstrate Iraq's capabilities in the field of missile technology, and as the press reported, to demonstrate that it had eliminated its lag behind Israel in this field. However according to estimates of western specialists, analysis of launch data showed that it was not as successful as Baghdad had announced. Iraq is preparing for another launch of its delivery vehicle in the immediate future.

Other countries which are developing their own missile weapons or acquiring them abroad in order to "balance out" the Israeli threat include Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, and Iran.

As for the creation of their own nuclear weapons, near-eastern countries (with the exception of Israel) do not have the necessary scientific-technical base. In the opinion of western specialists, they are doing theoretical and laboratory work there using research reactors (Iran, Iraq, Egypt). However, monitoring of the operation of these reactors by the IAEA rules out the possibility of creating plutonium suitable for use in nuclear weapons. According to estimates of western specialists, if the corresponding decisions are made by the governments of

these countries, the development of an experimental model of a nuclear device is possible in Iraq at the end of the 90s and in Iran no earlier than the year 2000. In the other Near-Eastern countries, the question of the possibility of creating such weapons is not seriously considered for the time being. Considering the clear advantage of Israel in this field, certain Arab countries, particularly Iraq, are working to develop new types of chemical weapons.

Thus Israel is the first in the Near East to acquire mass-destruction weapons. Connivance in this on the part of a number of western countries promotes destabilization of the situation in the region and beyond its borders.

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